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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic activities are fundamentally influenced by their location in space, which 
determines the physical and natural environment in which they take place. Likewise, 
location defines the social context of economic activity prescribing the particular 
laws, regulations and social norms to which it should conform. Moreover, spatial 
location defines proximity, which shapes the costs of accessing factor inputs, product 
markets and other economic and social institutions.  In fact, spatial location mediates 
most forms of interaction, intended and unintended, that may arise from 
communication and connections between economic agents. These spatial processes 
have important implications for estimation, policy evaluation and prediction in 
models of economic activity.   
 
This thesis is comprised of two parts.  Part I presents a broad range of issues that 
arise in estimation due to space and frames these as general spatial omitted variables.  
I explore the use of semi-parametric estimators to identify the parameters of interest 
in this general model and derive identification conditions for fixed and local adaptive 
spatial smoothing estimators.  The properties of these estimators are contrasted to 
OLS and spatial econometric estimators.   
 
Part II addresses issues in policy evaluation and prediction.  I derive an equilibrium 
sorting model with endogenous tenure choice that can be used to evaluate the general 
equilibrium welfare effects of policies that affect local environmental quality.  Using 
a series of simulations, motivated by a real world policy application, I contrast the 
welfare changes derived under this model to a conventional static approach.  By 
allowing for rental and purchase markets the model I develop provides a far richer 
characterisation of the complex adjustments that propagate through the property 
market following policy changes and the contrary impact such policies can have 
upon renters and owners.  The usefulness of the model for applied policy analysis is 
demonstrated through two applications: The Polegate Bypass and Mortgage Interest 
Deduction reform. 
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PREFACE 
 
Economic activities are fundamentally influenced by their location in space, which 
determines the physical and natural environment in which they take place. Likewise, 
location defines the social context of economic activity prescribing the particular 
laws, regulations and social norms to which it should conform. Moreover, spatial 
location defines proximity, which shapes the costs of accessing factor inputs, product 
markets and other economic and social institutions.  In fact, spatial location mediates 
most forms of interaction, intended and unintended, that may arise from 
communication and connections between economic agents.   Furthermore, space also 
influences the way in which economic activities are measured, for example the 
spatial scale that information is collected at and the process of spatial aggregation 
(e.g. to census track, county and country levels) introduce a spatial dimension into 
economic data.  Likewise, data can be affected by spatially correlated measurement 
error due to localised differences in the tools that are used to measure economic 
activity and their drivers.  For example, local authority procedures may lead to 
regional differences in the classification of categorical variables and scientific 
equipment may be sensitive to localised fluctuations in wind speed, temperature or 
machine calibration.  This suggests that the analysis of economic activities is 
affected by numerous spatial processes.  These spatial processes have important 
implications for both the estimation of economic models and economic policy 
evaluation.  This thesis examines these two issues sequentially. 
 
Chapter 1 presents an examination of the issue of identifying the parameters of 
models with an omitted spatial data generating process (DGP).   I identify a number 
of theoretical foundations for spatial processes and characterise these through a set of 
spatial data generating processes, which I show can each be represented as an 
additive omitted spatial variable in a general linear model.  I then contrast the 
conventional estimation approach provided by spatial econometric models to the 
alternative semi-parametric approach of spatial smoothing.  I derive a set of 
conditions under which a spatial smoothing estimator is able to identify the 
parameters of the model and discuss the efficiency of the estimator.  The properties 
of a local polynomial regression based spatial smoothing estimator are illustrated 
through a series of Monte Carlo simulations, which demonstrate the ability of the 
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estimator to deal with a broad class of spatial-DGPs.  The chapter provides the first 
derivation of a set of clearly defined identification conditions that are also presented 
in terms of the underlying data in environmental economics. 
 
Chapter 2 builds on the work of chapter 1 to present an intuitive extension to the 
SSE. In particular, I develop a locally adaptive spatial smoothing estimator (LASSE) 
in which the smoothing parameters are specified at each location in space using an 
optimality condition. The paper demonstrates when the LASSE is more efficient than 
a Fixed-SSE estimator and derives a relaxed set of conditions under which the 
parameters of the model are identified.  While the formal properties of the LASSE 
are not derived analytically, I present the results of a Monte Carlo analysis 
demonstrating its properties under a variety of spatial-DGPs.  This work presents the 
first consideration of these issues in terms of parameter identification within the 
context of environmental economics.  
 
Part II explores the issue of policy appraisal and predicting welfare changes in the 
presence of spatial processes.  This part of the thesis concerns itself with economic 
theory, particularly the development of economic models in which the choice of 
spatial location is a fundamental component of economic activity. The particular 
focus is residential location decisions and their response to exogenous policy shocks. 
The modelling framework that I adopt for this purpose is that of Equilibrium Sorting 
Models (ESMs) (Kuminoff et al., 2010). In brief, the ESM I develop treats the 
property market as a series of distinct neighbourhoods. Each neighbourhood is 
differentiated by its level of environmental quality. Households, with varying 
characteristics, judge the quality of a neighbourhood not only on the basis of its 
environmental quality but also on the basis of the characteristics of the other 
households living in that neighbourhood. Using numerical algorithms, the model is 
solved by finding a set of property prices that match the supply of property in each 
neighbourhood with the demand for property in that neighbourhood. A solution to 
the model, therefore, describes both the set of neighbourhood property prices as well 
as a sorting of the heterogeneous households across neighbourhoods. 
 
My research builds on the work of previous authors, particularly (Epple and Platt, 
1998) extending those precedents in a number of key directions. In particular, the 
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model I present is the first ESM to endogenise tenure choice. Households in my 
model can choose to rent or buy their homes according to conditions in parallel and 
interacting purchase and rental markets. I adapt the model to explore two public 
policy questions that together constitute the final two chapters of this thesis. 
 
This thesis was part-funded by the UK Department for Transport (DfT). Many 
projects that the DfT undertakes result in localised changes in environmental quality. 
Examples include the construction of a new rail link or the building of a bypass 
around a rural town. Currently, those projects are evaluated by aggregating estimates 
of the willingness to pay (WTP) of the residents that are directly and immediately 
impacted by the local change in environmental quality.  Chapter 3 demonstrates how 
a static analysis fails to capture the complex repercussions that emanate through the 
entire economy as a result of the local change. Over the medium term, rental and 
purchase prices adjust throughout the economy as households change their 
residential location and tenure decisions as a result of the new conditions in the 
property market. Accordingly, the motivating policy question for the first paper in 
the second part of my thesis concerns understanding how project evaluation using a 
static analysis compares to an analysis allowing for property market adjustments.  
 
By allowing for rental and purchase markets my model provides a far richer 
characterisation of those differences. For example, I find that renters in 
neighbourhoods that experience environmental improvements may be disadvantaged 
as a result of rental prices rising in those neighbourhoods. In contrast, homeowners 
in such neighbourhoods enjoy an improvement in environmental quality and also 
benefit from capital gains that result from increases in the price of their homes. I 
adapt the model to examine how these distributional effects are impacted when I 
allow for the possibility that households in the community are also landlords and 
hence gain income from the rental payments of other households. The paper 
examines the key dynamics of the model in the context of a simple two-community 
model. Finally, in Appendix A a more complex seven-community model is 
developed and calibrated to the town of Polegate in East Sussex in 2001, the year in 
which a bypass was constructed round the town. The Polegate calibration is used to 
illustrate how the ESM developed in my thesis might be used to provide input in a 
real policy context. 
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Chapter 4 presents the second paper in Part 2.  This chapter adapts the ESM with 
endogenous tenure choice to examine a policy question currently under debate in the 
USA: reform of Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID). The policy of MID allows 
taxpayers to subtract interest paid on a residential mortgage from their taxable 
income. MID is vigorously supported by the real estate industry on the grounds that 
it reduces the costs of purchasing properties and, as such, encourages 
homeownership. As well as homeownership being seen as a desirable outcome in its 
own right, it is also argued that a significant weight of empirical evidence supports 
the idea that increasing levels of homeownership creates positive spillovers, raising 
neighbourhood quality in a variety of ways (e.g. higher educational achievement, 
lower levels of crime etc.). In contrast, others, including the current administration, 
have argued that MID simply inflates the prices of properties, greatly favours 
wealthy homeowners and cannot be justified given the large federal deficit. In this 
paper I explore the MID debate using an ESM with simultaneous rental and purchase 
markets and endogenous tenure choice. The model is extended by additionally 
endogenising neighbourhood quality, such that the desirability of any particular 
neighbourhood is partly determined by its levels of homeownership. The public 
policy relevance of the model is shown through a calibration exercise for Boston, 
Massachusetts, which explores the impacts of various reforms to the MID policy. 
The simulations confirm some of the arguments made about reforming MID but also 
demonstrate how the complex patterns of behavioural change induced by policy 
reform can lead to unanticipated effects. The simulations suggest that it may be 
possible to reform MID whilst maintaining the prevailing rates of homeownership 
and reducing the federal budget deficit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is motivated by the importance of space, which is receiving growing 
attention from researchers in economics and is becoming an increasingly prevalent 
issue with the progressive availability and use of large spatially delineated datasets.  
Economic activities are fundamentally influenced by their location in space, which 
determines the physical and natural environment that surrounds them.  Likewise, 
location defines the social context of economic activity prescribing the particular 
laws, regulations and social norms to which it should conform. Moreover, spatial 
location defines proximity, which shapes the costs of accessing factor inputs, product 
markets and other economic and social institutions.  In fact, spatial location mediates 
most forms of interaction, intended and unintended, that may arise from 
communication and connections between economic agents.    
 
The roots of spatial research stem from earlier developments in the regional science 
and urban economics literature, which sought to explain spatial spillovers, where 
outcomes in one location are related to outcomes in other proximate locations.  This 
developed into the field of spatial econometrics, the expansion of which has shed 
light on a multitude of complexities that are introduced into the estimation and 
analysis of spatially organised data, hereafter referred to as “spatial data”.  In 
particular, through exploring the theoretical foundations of spatial models, the 
literature has simultaneously highlighted the potential spatial data generating 
processes that underpin and are embedded in spatial data.  The interesting and 
challenging issue is that these spatial data generating processes are a feature of 
spatial data whether they themselves are of primary interest or not.   
 
The field of spatial econometrics was conceived over thirty years ago.  In his recent 
review Anselin (2010) examines the evolution of the subject, dividing it into three 
phases: growth, take-off and maturity.  The growth phase is taken to have begun 
roughly thirty years ago following the publication of Paelinck and Klassen’s (1979) 
volume Spatial econometrics, Bartels and Ketellapper’s (1979) 
Exploratory and explanatory statistical analysis of spatial data and Bennett’s (1979) 
Spatial time series. 
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The early work of Paelinck and Klassen (1979) specified five principles to guide the 
formulation of spatial econometric models.  These five principles illustrate potential 
issues associated with space, which continue to apply to the analysis of spatial data 
and provide a concise summary of the multifaceted importance of space.  The five 
principles are: i) the role of spatial interdependencies, ii) the asymmetry in spatial 
relations, iii) explanatory factors located in other spaces, iv) differentiation between 
ex post and ex ante interactions and v) explicit modelling of space.   
 
Although this work was originally conceived and interpreted within the realm of 
regional science models, as the literature has developed it has become evident that 
spatial processes have far reaching implications and the same challenges are faced by 
all analysts dealing with spatial data.  In this thesis I draw on the characterisation of 
spatial issues from the spatial econometrics literature and consider it in the context of 
the analysis of general economic models.  In this vein, it becomes clear that space 
has wide reaching implications for the analysis of many economic models. Drawing 
upon Paelinck and Klassen’s five principles, spatial processes arise in economic 
models when i) the economic agents interact with each other across space, ii) there 
are asymmetric spatial effects for example through regional policies and 
jurisdictional boundaries, iii) there are unobserved or immeasurable spatial 
explanatory variables, iv) economic outcomes in one area may influence outcomes in 
another area and moreover the spatial environment may be endogenously determined 
by behaviour and activities in the area and v) the economic activity itself occurs in a 
geographically defined space. 
 
Anselin (2010) categorises the contributions of spatial econometrics over the last 
thirty years into four key groups, i) specification of spatial models, ii) estimation, iii) 
specification testing and iv) prediction.   Significant advances have been made in 
each of these areas over the last thirty years.  Consequently, awareness and 
popularity of spatial econometrics has increased amongst analysts in regional science 
and broader fields of economics.  However, it is argued that there is a gap between 
the theoretical models and applied problems and, moreover, that spatial parametric 
models have been adopted as a solution with little theoretical guidance, thus making 
the results difficult to interpret and justify (Gibbons and Overman, 2012).  The 
Journal of Regional Science, a journal which has been at the forefront of promoting 
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spatial econometrics, recently celebrated its 50th anniversary issue with a focus on 
reviewing spatial econometrics (Partridge et al., 2012) including papers by McMillen 
(2012), Corrado and Fingleton (2012) and Gibbons and Overman (2012) reflecting 
upon the current condition of the literature and consider how spatial econometrics 
should be used.  These papers, along with McMillen (2010), Pinkse and Slade (2010) 
and Brady and Irwin (2011) consider the limitations of the current spatial 
econometric methods when it comes to practical applications.   
 
Following from this, what is needed now is a greater synergy between the 
requirements of applied analysis and theoretical developments.  This involves 
marrying the insights and tools provided by spatial econometrics with knowledge 
from other fields, such as non-parametric estimation, and theoretical considerations.  
In this thesis I focus on the issues of estimation and prediction in the presence of 
spatial processes within the remit of environmental economics.  To achieve this, the 
thesis is organised in two parts: Part I deals with the issue of parameter identification 
through the estimation of spatial models.  Part II compliments this by addressing the 
issue of policy appraisal and prediction in spatial models.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I  
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
 
Part I of this thesis considers the estimation challenges that arise in the presence of 
unaccounted-for spatial data generating processes (DGPs).  This research was 
motivated by the problem of parameter identification in the presence of omitted 
spatially correlated variables.  The importance of this spatial context is evident 
across the spectrum of empirical economic applications including studies of growth 
(Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003), human capital (Corneo and Jeanne, 1999), 
infrastructure (Baum-Snow, 2007), competition between firms (Berry, 1994, Davis, 
2006, Epifani and Gancia, 2006) product demand (Jones, 2005), location choice 
(Hoff and Sen, 2005), economic migration, school choice (Gibbons and Machin, 
2006, Harris and Johnston, 2008), crime rates (Sah, 1991, Anselin et al., 2000, 
Puech, 2004) and health (McIntosh, 2008).  In environmental economics, studies of 
land use depend on spatially organised data such as soil types, climate, water quality 
and proximity to market (Leggett and Bockstael, 2000).  Spatial factors such as the 
proximity to amenities and dis-amenities as well as the characteristics of 
neighbouring households are important in the analysis of residential property prices 
(Kim and Goldsmith, 2008, Grimes and Liang, 2009). The location of emitters and 
receptors of pollutants (Zabel and Kiel, 2000, Day et al., 2004, Day et al., 2007, 
Bayer et al., 2009), and likewise the location of environmental amenities, such as 
parks, beaches, mountains and rivers, and their users are important factors in 
valuation studies and are all inherently spatial (Rehdanz and Maddison, 2008, 
Hoshino and Kuriyama, 2010, Waltert et al., 2011).  It is evident therefore that the 
challenges posed by spatial-DGPs have far reaching influences.  In fact, any analysis 
that relies upon spatially organised data is vulnerable to omitted spatial variable 
problems and other spatial data problems, which can undermine the estimation of 
economic models. 
 
When I began my research I was inspired by a desire to understand the potential to 
utilise the semi-parametric approaches to address spatial data problems and hoped to 
contrast these approaches to the alternative spatial econometric models developed in 
the spatial econometrics literature (Anselin, 1988, 2004).  I began by examining 
three semi-parametric approaches: matching, difference in differences (DID) and 
spatial smoothing estimation (SSE).    
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The principle of matching is to group observations according to a set of explanatory 
variables for which no parametric form is specified (Rubin, 1973, Gibbons and 
Machin, 2003, 2006).  The first application of matching was provided by Belson 
(1956) who employed the method to derive the treatment effect of exposure to a 
number of television broadcasts.  Since then matching has been applied to a variety 
of issues, for example, Rubin (1973) examines automobile accident severity with and 
without seatbelts, Rosenbaum (1986) explores US high school dropouts, Ichino et al 
(2006) examine the impact of temporary work agency on future employment in Italy 
and Brodaty et al (2000) use kernel matching to evaluate youth employment 
schemes.   
 
This literature is closely associated with analyses that adopt a difference in 
differences (DID) approach, which considers the difference in outcomes between an 
otherwise equivalent treatment and control group. Examples of the DID estimation 
approach are most frequently presented by treatment effect studies in health 
economics and policy evaluation, one of the most well-known studies is Card and 
Krueger’s (1994) evaluation of the effect of New Jersey’s minimum wage.  More 
recently, Gibbons and Machin (2003) examine DID methodologies in the valuing of 
English primary schools, Smith and Todd (2005) adopt a DID approach to assess the 
National Supported Worker demonstration, Autor and Hausman (2006) use it to 
examine the impact on earnings of temporary agency placements and Wagstaff et al 
(2005) compares a pure DID approach to a DID with matching approach in an 
assessment of the World Bank’s Health VIII Project. 
 
Finally, this led to my consideration of spatial smoothing estimators which have 
been applied, for example, by Gibbons and Machin (2003) for valuing English 
primary schools, Kneib Muller and Hothorn (2006) for assessing habitat suitability 
for birds in Northern Bavarian forests and Day et al (2007) in assessing the impact of 
noise pollution.  This early research allowed me to demonstrate that both the 
matching and difference in difference approaches are constrained versions of a 
spatial smoothing estimator.  This led to a focusing of the thesis upon a comparison 
of spatial smoothing estimators (SSEs) with spatial parametric estimators (SPEs).  
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To compare the performance of these two approaches I sought to explore a range of 
spatial-DGPs that present challenges to the analysis of spatial data.  In doing so, I 
defined a more general framework which encompasses a broad range of spatial-
DGPs including spatial econometric models (such as might result from spatial 
interactions, peer group effects etc.), spatial misspecification, spatial measurement 
error and omitted spatial variables.   
 
Driven by a desire to enable SSEs to be employed with confidence, I directed my 
research towards developing a deeper understanding of the conditions under which 
identification is achievable and present this in a clear, concise and accessible manner 
for applied researchers.  In the context of a partial linear model (Robinson, 1988) the 
first chapter develops a set of sufficiency conditions for identification of the linear 
parameters of the model in the presence of a variety of spatial-DGPs.  This led to the 
development of the two chapters presented in Part I. 
 
The first chapter demonstrates how a broad class of spatial-DGPs can be treated as 
an unknown additive element in a linear model.  I derive a set of conditions under 
which a SSE returns unbiased parameter estimates in the presence of that broad class 
of spatial-DGPs.  I interpret these conditions in the context of a local polynomial 
regression based SSE.  The performance of this estimator in small samples is 
demonstrated through a series of Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
Through this work it became clear that the smoothing parameters play a crucial role 
in determining the bias elements associated with spatial smoothing and, as a result, 
are central to understanding the conditions for identification.  This motivated me to 
explore more recent work on selecting local smoothing parameters (Fan and Gijbels, 
1995).  In chapter 2, I adapt the methodology derived by Fan and Gijbels to develop 
a Local Adaptive SSE (LASSE).  I examine the properties of a LASSE in 
comparison to a Fixed SSE and demonstrate that the revised estimator has greater 
efficiency properties and moreover, it presents additional opportunities for 
identification.  I derive a set of identification conditions for the LASSE with a local 
polynomial kernel density estimator.   Finally, I explore the properties of the LASSE 
estimator and compare it to a Fixed SSE using a series of Monte Carlo simulations. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
1  
 
Addressing spatial dependence in linear models using semi-
parametric estimation 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Economic activities are fundamentally influenced by their location in space. 
Location determines the physical and natural environment in which those activities 
take place. Location defines the social context of economic activity prescribing the 
particular laws, regulations and social norms to which it should conform. Location 
defines proximity, shaping the costs of accessing factor inputs, product markets and 
other economic and social institutions, as well as the apparatus of law and 
government.  In fact, spatial location mediates most forms of interaction, intended 
and unintended, that may arise from communication and connections between 
economic agents. 
 
In empirical analyses of economic data, the multitude of paths through which 
location can influence economic activity can be problematic. In particular, parameter 
bias is likely to arise should an analyst’s econometric specification fail to fully 
account for the array of spatial processes generating the data.  
 
The possibility of unaccounted-for spatial processes in economic data has long been 
recognised. The extensive literature on spatial econometrics (Anselin, 2010), for 
example,  focuses on one possible form for such spatial processes. In spatial 
econometric specifications, outcomes in one location are assumed to be partly 
determined by variables at nearby locations, where ‘nearby’ is identified by some 
analyst-defined spatial weights matrix and the spatially-lagged regressors are any 
combination of dependent variables (spatial lag models), explanatory variables 
(spatial cross-regressive models) and error terms (spatial error models).  
 
Since the 1990s spatial econometric models (SEMs) have seen widespread 
application in the analysis of spatially organised economic data (see Anselin et al 
(2004) for a review and Anselin (2010) for a discussion of the evolution of the field). 
While the field has continued to evolve (Brady and Irwin, 2011) , recent literature 
has struck a rather more critical tone (McMillen, 2010, Pinkse and Slade, 2010, 
Gibbons and Overman, 2012, Partridge et al., 2012). At the heart of that criticism is 
the concern that spatial lag processes are a rather specific form of spatial data 
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generating process. The routine application of SEMs to deal with spatial dependence 
in economic data may not be appropriate, particularly when there is no strong 
theoretical justification for suspecting a spatial lag process to be at work in the data. 
Moreover, even if the assumption of a spatial lag process is correct, the reliance on 
an analyst-defined spatial weights matrix and a parametric functional form for the 
spatial lag process opens up a significant possibility of misspecification. 
 
The first contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the spatial processes 
envisaged by a large variety of SEMs can be recast as an unknown additive element 
in a linear model.  In addition, the paper demonstrates that numerous other spatial 
processes that might otherwise confound parameter identification in linear models 
also share this same basic form. More importantly, the paper demonstrates that this 
broad class of spatial data-generating processes is amenable to estimation using a 
semi-parametric estimator that I term a Spatial Smoothing Estimator (SSE). 
Accordingly, the paper contends that, in many circumstances, there are good reasons 
to prefer application of the SSE over the application of SEMs.  
 
The SSE is an application of Robinson’s (1988) partial linear model, which uses the 
data itself to determine the nature of any unaccounted-for spatial processes. The SSE 
has seen previous application in the economic literature, for example, in the 
valuation of English primary schools (Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2006) and noise 
avoidance (Day, 2005, Day et al., 2007). Building on the work of Paciorek (2010), a 
second contribution of this paper is to provide a systematic investigation of the SSE, 
formally identifying the set of conditions under which the estimator is able to 
identify parameters of interest in the presence of unaccounted-for spatial processes 
of different forms. The performance of the estimator is illustrated through a series of 
Monte Carlo experiments.   
 
2.0 Unaccounted-for Spatial Processes  
 
Consider a standard estimation problem in which an analyst has spatially organised 
data relating measures of a dependent variable, denoted by the vector , and a set of 
independent variables given by the 	 × 	 data matrix 	, where the variables in 	 
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are a function of spatial location, 
, and possibly other non-spatial factors, . The 
focus in this paper is on the standard linear model which, given the available data, 
the analyst may specify as, 
 	 = 	
,  + ϵ	 (1.1)  
 
Where ϵ  is an error term.  The objective of the analysis is assumed to be the 
identification of the parameters	. 
 
Without loss of generality 	 can be represented by its orthogonal decomposition. 
Hence, 	 can be expressed as additively separable functions of location and non-
spatial elements, , which is orthogonal to space, 
, such that, 
 	
,  	= 	
 + 	 (1.2)  
 
Where 
 is a vector function mapping S into the  dimensions of  	.  By 
definition, 
 [′
] 	= 	0	 (1.3)  
 
Without loss of generality it is also assumed that, 
 [] = 	0	 (1.4)  
 
Such that the means of 	 are treated as constants in the spatial functions,	
. 
 
2.1 Spatial Econometric Models (SEMs) 
 
While (1.1) is amenable to estimation using OLS, the analyst may be concerned that 
the application of that estimator may be confounded by the presence of some 
unaccounted-for spatial data-generating process. Such a diagnosis may be prompted 
by the application of one of a raft of post-estimation specification tests suggested by 
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the spatial econometrics literature (Anselin, 1988). Following the recommendations 
of that literature, the analyst may proceed by fitting some particular form of SEM. 
 
While there are very many different SEMs, here I focus on two of the most popular 
specifications: the spatial lag and spatial error models (see, for example, Pace and 
Giley, (1997), Kelejian and Prucha, (1998)).1 These SEMs have the general form, 
 	 = 	
,  + 	 +  + ϵ	 (1.5)  
 
In a model with  observations,  and  are 	 × 	 spatial weights matrices and  
is a scalar known as a spatial multiplier. In a spatial weights matrix the  ! element, 
being the element in the  !  row and the  !	column, describes the relationship 
between observations  and . For example, in a binary spatial weight matrix the  ! 
element would equal one when observations  and  are in the same neighbourhood. 
Alternatively, the spatial weights matrix may record the distance between 
observations. The spatial weights matrix  constitutes the spatial autoregressive lag 
(SAR) component of the model and  is a spatial error dependence component 
defined by the spatial weights matrix	.2 
 
2.2 Spatial Misspecification  
 
Frequently, the spatial elements of (1.1) require analysts to specify some particular 
form for the spatial process generating the data. An obvious example concerns the 
choice of spatial weights matrices,  and , in (1.5). Should the elements of the 
weights matrix be binary or should they somehow increase with greater proximity? 
Should that proximity be measured by straight line distance, travel time or perhaps 
travel cost? Faced with such a diversity of possibilities, misspecification raises a 
serious concern. 
                                                      
 
1
 Here I focus on spatial lag and spatial error models.  One may also wish to consider a 
model with a lagged subset of independent variables 	", where 	" ∈ 	. 
2
 The models can be estimated using Maximum Likelihood or Generalized Method of 
Moments (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Fingleton, 2008). 
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Consider, for example, a true underlying spatial data generating process (DGP) 
which is characterised by equation (1.5).  Should the spatial weights matrices be 
incorrectly specified as $ and % , then that equation can be rewritten as, 
  = 	 + $ + %  + & −$( +  − %  + ) (1.6)  
 
The two latter elements & −$( and  − %  are not observed. 
 
2.3 Spatial Measurement Error 
 
Another potential issue is that spatial elements of the model may be measured with 
error. Of particular concern here is when that measurement error is itself a function 
of space, for example, when estimates of a regressor are measured more accurately 
in densely populated regions than in sparsely populated ones. 
 
Consider the case where the true variable of interest, 	
, , is measured with 
spatially correlated error as 	%
, .  The spatial data generating process can then be 
rewritten as, 
  = 	%
,  + &	
,  − 	%
, ( + ) (1.7)  
 
Where in this case &	
,  − 	%
, (	is unobserved. 
 
2.4 Omitted Spatial Variables 
 
Given the myriad spatial processes that influence economic activity, a final concern 
with specifying a model for spatially organised data is the omission of relevant 
spatial variables. That omission may occur either because those variables are: i) 
overlooked, ii) assumed to be irrelevant or iii) impractical or impossible to measure.  
 
In this case the true spatial data generating process is, 
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 = 	 
, 	 + 	*
, + + )  (1.8)  
 
Where *
, +  represents the confounding spatial variable or variables that have 
been omitted from the econometric specification of the model.  Notice that as well as 
being dependent on location the values of 	 and * may also be functions of non-
spatial elements. 
 
2.5 A General Form for Spatial Processes 
 
It is straightforward to show that the SEM specifications in (1.5), the spatial 
misspecification illustrated in (1.6) and the spatial measurement error shown in (1.7) 
are all simply particular cases of the omitted spatial variable model in equation (1.8). 
 
Table 1 frames each of the four spatial-DGPs in the context of equation (1.8). 
 
DGP 	
,  *
, + 
Spatial Parametric 
Models: 
SAR 
 
SARAR 
	 
 * = Σ-./0 --	
,  + Σ-./0 --) 
 * = Σ-./0 --	
,  + Σ1.20 Σ3./0 --33+ Σ3./0 33) 
Spatial Misspecification 	 +$4 * = &−$( + − $ 
Spatial Measurement 
Error 
	% * = 5	
,  − 	%
, 6 
 
Omitted Spatial Variable 
	 * = 7
 + + 
 
Table  1.1: Spatial Data Generating Processes 
 
In the same manner as for  8,  * can be represented its orthogonal decomposition 
without loss of generality. Hence, *  can be expressed as additively separable 
functions of location and non-spatial elements, +,	that are orthogonal to space, 
, 
such that, 
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 *
, + = 	7
 + ν	 (1.9)  
 
By definition, 
 [+′
] 		= 	0	 (1.10)  
 
Such that it must also be the case that, 
 [′7
] 	= 	[] 	= 	0		[+′
] 	= 	[+] 	= 	0	 (1.11)  
 
Without loss of generality it is also assumed that, 
 [+] 	= 	0 (1.12)  
 
Such that the mean of * is treated as a constant in the spatial component		7
. 
 
For simplicity and to ensure that the model is identifiable, I make the following 
assumption, 
 
• Assumption 1: The non-spatial variables in X are orthogonal to the non-
spatial variables in Z,3 
 [′+] 	= 	0	 (1.13)  
 
This prevents omitted variable bias of a non-spatial nature. 
 
3.0 Estimation with Omitted Spatial Variables 
 
                                                      
 
3
 Note that this assumption does not imply that each vector within  is independent across 
observed variables, simply that they are not correlated with ν. 
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Let us now turn our attention to the issue of estimating parameters when the data are 
generated by equation (1.8).  In this section I consider the estimation of models with 
a broad range of omitted spatial variables using OLS, SEMs and SSE. In each case 
the objective is to identify the parameters, . For each estimator, the conditions 
under which these parameters can be identified are explored. 
 
For simplicity let us assume that the error, ), conforms to the following standard 
assumptions, 
 
• Assumption 2: The independent identically distributed innovations, ), are 
mean zero, 
 [)] 	= 	0 (1.14)  
 
• Assumption 3: The independent innovations, ), are homoskedastic and non 
auto-correlated, 
 [))′] 	= 	:;<=	 (1.15)  
 
• Assumption 4: The observed data, 	, and the confounding spatial process, Z, 
are independent of the innovations, ), 
 [	′)] 	= 	0	[*′)] 	= 	0		 (1.16)  
 
3.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
 
As is well known, if , 	 and * are perfectly observed, then unbiased and efficient 
estimates of the parameters, , can be recovered through the application of the OLS 
estimator. Unfortunately, when, for some reason, Z is omitted from the estimating 
equation, bias in the parameter estimates may result. 
 
Consider the parameter estimates obtained using OLS, 
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 % 									= 	>	?/	 ′ 																																					= 	>	?/	′	 + * + )	 
 
(1.17)  
Which under assumption 4 becomes, 
 																				% 		=  + 	>	?/	′* (1.18)  
 
The expected bias in the OLS parameter estimate is therefore given by, 
 7@A&%( 									= 	>	?/	 ′* 																																																										= 	>	?/
 + ′7
 + +	 
 
Which, from equation (1.11) becomes, 
 																																						= 	>	?/
′7
 
 
(1.19)  
The bias is non-zero when the spatial components of observed data 	 are correlated 
with the confounding spatial data generating process Z, [
>7
] ≠ 	0.  
 
When more than one observed variable is included in the analysis, equation (1.19) 
consists of a number of multiple regression coefficients and the direction of the bias 
is complex to deduce. Note that bias may be introduced into each of the parameter 
estimates, %, not just those relating to the observed variables that are correlated with 
relevant confounding spatial process, *  (Greene, 2003). As such, omitted spatial 
variables can cause bias in the estimates of parameters relating to non-spatial 
variables as well as spatial ones, undermining all aspects of the analysis. As a result, 
the findings of empirical investigations of spatially organised economic data that 
neglect to consider the potential influence of confounding spatial processes should 
be interpreted with caution. 
 
3.2 Estimating Spatial Econometric Models 
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An alternative to OLS is to estimate a SEM. In this paper I consider the two SEMs 
outlined in section (2.1), 
 
1. The Spatial Auto-Regressive Lag Estimator (SAR), 
 DEF:		 = 	 +  + ) (1.20)  
 
2. The Spatial Auto-Regressive Lag with Auto-Regressive Error Estimator 
(SARAR), 
 DEFEF:		 = 	  +  + H	 + )	 (1.21)  
 
Where ) and H are independent, identically distributed innovations. 4  
 
The parameters of these models can be estimated using either maximum likelihood 
or the general method of moments (GMM). The latter has been shown to be more 
robust to misspecification error (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998, 1999) and is the 
procedure used in the Monte Carlo analyses reported subsequently. 
 
One of the most significant challenges for identification of  when estimating SEMs 
comes from the potential for misspecification.  In many applications there is often 
little guidance for selecting an appropriate SEM (Bell and Bockstael, 2000).  At best, 
analysts can combine theoretical justifications and insights with extensions of the 
LM-test to guide a choice between potential models (a discussion of these tests is 
provided in Anselin (1988), and the performance of classical testing approaches 
against a number of SEMs is provided in Florax and Folmer (1992)).  In many 
existing applications the motivation for adopting a particular specification over 
others is not discussed (Leggett and Bockstael, 2000, Choumert and Salanié, 2008) 
and, as a result, the chosen spatial weights matrices may be a poor approximation to 
the true underlying spatial dependence structure (Pinkse and Slade, 2010).   
 
                                                      
 
4
 Comparable results were also obtained for the AR, MA and SARMA models and estimators. These 
results are also available from the author. 
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This is problematic because the asymptotic properties of SEMs rely on the 
assumption that the models are correctly specified (McMillen, 2010).  When this 
assumption is violated, ambiguity surrounds the interpretation of the results.  As was 
shown in the previous section, in the context of addressing spatial data problems, 
misspecification simply transforms the problem rather than overcoming it (Lee, 
2008).  Kelejian and Prucha’s (1998, 1999)  general methods of moments (GMM) 
estimation routine has been shown to produce parameter estimates that are more 
robust to misspecification error (Bell and Bockstael, 2000).  Similarly, an alternative 
approach is to allow the spatial weights to be non-parametric (Pinkse and Slade, 
2010), for example by estimating them through series expansion.  This more flexible 
approach allows the data to determine the restrictions placed upon the functional 
form of spatial dependence.   However, unlike the spatial smoothing estimator, 
which I will develop in the following section, the nonparametric estimation of spatial 
weights relies upon the correct specification of the structure of the model.  In 
particular, the analyst must determine whether the model is a spatial auto-regressive 
lag or spatial error component model.  The spatial weights of this specified model 
are then estimated nonparametrically and depend upon the standard conditional 
independence assumption on the error term.  Misspecification of the model structure 
or the presence of further omitted spatial variables violates this assumption. As a 
consequence the resulting parameter estimates continue to be at risk of bias. 
 
3.3 Spatial Smoothing Estimator (SSE) 
 
While the analyst may have little information on the exact form of omitted spatial 
processes generating the data, one thing that is known is that those spatial processes 
will have a similar impact on each of the observations in a particular region in space. 
The SSE exploits this commonality. In essence, the SSE proceeds by estimating, 
using a nonparametric estimator, that part of the data which an observation holds in 
common with other observations in its environs.  That nonparametric estimate is then 
subtracted from the data itself so as to sweep out the effects of spatial processes held 
in common across observations. The intention is that this spatial differencing will 
remove from the data any confounding omitted spatial processes.  
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4.0 Parameter Identification with Spatial Smoothing 
 
The mechanics of the SSE can be seen by taking expectations of equation (1.8) with 
respect to space and subtracting this from the original equation. Subtraction produces 
the transformed relationship, 
 	 − 		[|
] = 	 	
,  − 		[	
, |
]	+	&*
, + − 		J&*
, +(K
L( + 	) − 		[)|
]	
 
(1.22)  
Where [. |
] is hereafter referred to as a conditional spatial expectation.  Replacing 	 and Z with their orthogonal decompositions I arrive at, 
  − 	[|
] 			= 
 + 	 − 	[
 + |
]	+	7
 + + − 	[7
 + +|
] + )	– 	[)|
]	
 
(1.23)  
Since 
 and 7
 are purely functions of space and η and ν are orthogonal to 
space 
 + 		 − 	[
|
] 	= 	 and 	7
 	+ +	 − 	[7
|
] = + .  Then from 
assumption one, and assuming the conditional spatial expectations are known 
perfectly, the model reduces to, 
  − 	[|
] = 	 + + + )	 (1.24)  
 
Note that the process of spatial differencing reduces the observed regressors, 	, to 
their non-spatial components  and the omitted spatial process, *, to its non-spatial 
component +. Since by assumption 1		[′+] 	= 	0, spatially differencing the data 
removes the correlation between 	 and *  thereby removing the source of bias. It 
follows that, provided		 ≠ 	0, unbiased estimates of  can be recovered through 
simple OLS regression of the spatially differenced data.   
 
The development provided above does not, however, tell the full story of the SSE. 
For a start, it assumes that conditional spatial expectations are known, when in 
reality these must be estimated from data. It also suggests that the best strategy is to 
seek an unbiased estimate of those conditional spatial expectations. As I shall show 
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subsequently, however, under certain circumstances using biased estimates of those 
expectations may actually improve the efficiency of the SSE. It may also allow for 
identification of  even when	 = 	0. 
  
4.1 Empirical Estimation of Conditional Spatial Expectations 
 
In practice, conditional spatial expectations of the dependent and independent 
variables,   and 	 , with respect to space are not known and instead must be 
estimated empirically.  A number of different nonparametric estimation techniques 
(for example, local polynomial regression or smoothing splines), can be used to 
construct an estimate of these expected values.  Each of these methodologies 
depends upon some set of smoothing parameters, which determine how the estimate 
is constructed.  Let us represent a non-parametric empirical estimate of the 
conditional expectation with respect to space as,  
 NO[. |
] (1.25)  
 
Where P denotes the smoothing parameters.  Subtracting this estimated conditional 
expectation from equation (1.8) produces the transformed relationship, 
  −	NO[|
] = 	 −	NO[	|
]	 + * −	NO[*|
] + )	 (1.26)  
 
Where * −	NO[*|
]  can be interpreted as a transformed unobserved variable.  
Under some conditions, equation (1.26) can be estimated using OLS to identify  
parameters.  Let us now consider the set of conditions under which this is possible. 
 
4.2 Sufficient Conditions for Parameter Identification 
 
As was observed by Robinson (1988), unbiased estimates of the parameters of the 
model can be identified using an SSE if and only if,  
 [	 −	NO[	|
]′* −	NO[*|
]] = 0	 (1.27)  
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AND 
 
  Q&	 −	NO[	|
](>&	 −	NO[	|
](R A	STAUVW	XWYZUW	 (1.28)  
 
Robinsons first condition, (1.27), indicates that spatially smoothing the data must 
remove the correlation between 	 and *  thereby removing the source of omitted 
variable bias. The second condition indicates that the spatially differenced data must 
retain sufficient variation across the sample to allow for unbiased identification of 
the  parameters. 
 
To understand better these conditions, it is useful to consider the relationship 
between the spatial variables and their conditional spatial expectations.  To do this 
let us rewrite each variable as a linear combination of: i) its non-spatial components, 
ii) an empirical estimate of the conditional spatial expectation NO[. |
] and iii) a 
component, Y. |
, P , capturing the bias between the true conditional spatial 
expectation, [. |
], and the estimate provided by NO[. |
] , 
 	 =  + NO[	|
] + [	|
, P * = + + NO[*|
] + [*|
, P	 (1.29)  
 
Taking the conditional spatial expectations to the left hand side, 
 	 − NO[	|
] =  + [	|
, P * − NO[*|
] = + + [*|
, P	 (1.30)  
 
and substituting these into equation (1.28), 
 [ + [	|
, P′+ + [*|
, P] = 0 (1.31)  
 
And by expansion, 
 [>+] + J′[*|
, PL + \J[	|
, P′+L (1.32)  
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+J[	|
, P′[*|
, PL = 0 
 
To remove the correlation between the observed data and the confounding spatial 
process it is necessary that there exist some smoothing parameters, P, such that the 
smoothed observed data, which consists of the bias component from the estimated 
expectation and the non-spatial elements of X, and the smoothed confounding spatial 
data process, which also consists of a bias component and non-spatial elements of Z, 
are no longer correlated.  Under assumption 1 and by definition the first three terms 
in equation (1.32) are equal to zero, which leaves the following condition for 
identification, 
 [[	|
,P′[*|
, P] = 0 (1.33)  
 
Notice that this condition is expressed purely in terms of the bias in the empirical 
estimate of the conditional spatial expectations.  As was discussed in section 4.0, 
when the conditional spatial expectation of 	  is known accurately the spatial 
component of 	 can be smoothed out.  In this case equation (1.26) can be estimated 
by OLS without bias and equation (1.33) is met.   Likewise, if unbiased empirical 
estimates of the conditional spatial expectations are available then identification is 
possible.  
 
Moreover, it is clear from equation (1.33) that there are actually three possible ways 
to satisfy the expression, 
 
IC1. There exists some P whereby the empirical estimate of the conditional spatial 
expectation of 	 is unbiased, 
 [	|
, P = 0 (1.34)  
 
In this case the only variation remaining in 	  once the data has been spatially 
smoothed is provided by .  
 
IC2. There exists some P whereby the empirical estimate of the conditional spatial 
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expectation of * is unbiased, 
 [*|
, P = 0 (1.35)  
 
In some cases it may be possible to remove the spatial component of the 
confounding spatial data without removing all of the spatial variation in X, thus 
leaving additional information which increases the efficiency with which the 
parameter estimates can be made.  
 
IC3. There exists some P whereby the empirical estimate of the conditional spatial 
expectations of 	 and * are biased but the biases are uncorrelated, 
 [[	|
,P′[*|
, P] = 0 [	|
, P ≠ 0 [*|
, P ≠ 0 (1.36)  
 
Under this final condition, it may be possible to remove the correlated spatial 
components of 	 and * whilst leaving even further variation in 	, further increasing 
efficiency. 
 
5.0 Identification using Local Polynomial Regression  
 
One method for estimating the conditional spatial expectations is by means of local 
polynomial regression (LPR). LPR provides an estimate of the conditional spatial 
expectation at any particular location by plotting a local polynomial of order ] 
through neighbouring observations. What constitutes ‘neighbouring’ is determined 
by the bandwidth parameter, h, in conjunction with the kernel function, K, which 
weights each observations contribution to the estimation of the expectation. 
Accordingly, for LPR,  
 
NO[	|
] = N^_`,ab[	|
]	 (1.37)  
 
The LPR estimator is defined by the kernel, c, the smoothing bandwidth, ℎ, and the 
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order of local polynomial regression, ].   
 
The order of local polynomial regression, ], determines the order of the polynomial 
plotted through the observations.  Local constant	] = 0) estimation refers to the 
case where the average value is taken, local linear ] = 1 ) refers to the value 
obtained by plotting a straight line through the values and so on. The choice of the 
order of local polynomial estimation affects identification in conflicting ways. 
Choosing a higher order reduces the bias in the estimation of the confounding spatial 
data process, *, and thus reduces the bias in the parameter estimates. On the other 
hand it also reduces the amount of variation left in the smoothed observed data, 
increasing the variance of the parameter estimate. 
 
5.1 Bias in Kernel Density Estimation 
 
The accuracy with which LPR can recover conditional spatial expectations depends 
primarily on how well the bandwidth, h, and order of local polynomial, ], allow the 
LPR to capture the curvature of the spatial function at each location in space. 
Intuitively, contracting the bandwidth puts greater weight on more proximate 
observations in estimating the expectation at some location. As a result smaller 
bandwidths tend to reduce bias. At the same time, however, in reducing the quantity 
of data upon which the estimate is made, smaller bandwidths also increase the 
variance of that estimate (Ruppert et al., 1995, Boente and Rodriguez, 2008). 
Similarly, increasing the order of the local polynomial allows the local regression to 
approximate the curvature of the spatial function more accurately and, as such, 
reduces bias in the estimate. That increased flexibility comes at the cost of estimating 
more parameters from limited data that, in turn, increases the variance of the 
estimate. 
 
Accordingly, in LPR the analyst must trade off bias and variance when selecting the 
bandwidth parameter or the order of the local polynomial fitted to the data.  For this 
purpose, a number of selection criteria have been developed (See Hardle and Marron 
(1985), Mallows (1973), Akaike (1974), Moran (1950), Lee (2003), Lee and Solo 
(1999) and Hall et al.(1992)).  These selection criteria include leave one out cross 
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validation, partitioned cross validation, Speckman’s rule of thumb, exact plug-in, 
asymptotic plug-in and bootstrapping (Francisco-Fernández and Vilar-Fernández, 
2005).  In practical applications the analyst with fix either the bandwidth or the order 
of polynomial regression and use one of the selection criteria above.  These selection 
criteria are derived from various measures of best fit and do not explicitly consider 
the issue of parameter bias.  As an alternative, it is possible to utilise Taylor series 
approximation to construct polynomial approximations of X and the residuals,  )̂, 
from OLS regression of Y on X.  Under the two identification conditions derived in 
this paper it is then possible to construct a set of hypotheses that place restrictions on 
the coefficients on the higher order terms of these polynomial approximations which 
can be tested using the delta method.  The results of these tests determine the order 
of local polynomial regression that is required to attain unbiased parameter 
estimates.  In practice, this test can be combined with a selection criterion for 
choosing the bandwidth to minimise the mean squared error (Binner and Day, 2010).  
 
Our primary concern with regards to understanding the identification conditions in 
(1.34). (1.35) and (1.36) in the context of LPR is the issue of bias. Ruppert and 
Wand (1994) derive general expressions for that bias.  Consider, for illustration, the 
orthogonal decomposition of one of the variables in 	, 
 8 = 	@
 + g	 (1.38)  
 
For a model of this type the bias in conditional spatial expectations is given by, 
 
For even h: 
 Y@
|
, ], ℎ = @
 − ^_`,ab[@
|
] 
= iHjk<cjHXH	 l@jk/
m′
m
] + 1! + @jk<
] + 2!p ℎjk< + Tjℎjk< 
 
For odd h: 
(1.39)  
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Y@
|
, ], ℎ = @
 − ^_`,ab[@
|
]
= iHjk/cjHXH	 l@jk/
] + 1!p ℎjk/ + Tjℎjk/ 
 
 
(1.40)  
Where @j
  denotes the ] !  derivative of @
  and m
  is the probability 
distribution of 	
 .  Using equations (1.39) and (1.40), Table 1.2 presents the 
approximate bias for local constant, local linear (Racine, 2001) and local quadratic 
estimation. These expressions show how the magnitude of the bias depends on the 
derivatives of the function @
  (the source of the curvature-based bias), the 
probability distribution of 
, m
 (the source of the boundary-based bias), and the 
order of local polynomial estimation, ]. The choice of bandwidth also affects the 
magnitude of the bias, scaling the bias introduced as a result of selecting too small an 
order of local polynomial regression.  
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Estimator Bias 
Local Constant  
(Nadaraya-Watson) 
ℎq< r12@>>
 + @>
m>
m
 siH<HXH 
Local linear ℎq< r12@>>
siH<HXH 
Local Quadratic ℎqt r12@>>′′
 + @>′′
m>
3! m
 siHtHXH 
 
Table  1.2: Pointwise bias in kernel density estimation with second order kernels 
 
Two sources of bias, boundary-based and curvature-based bias, are evident in 
equations (1.39) and (1.40) (Ruppert and Wand, 1994).  Boundary-based bias is 
driven by changes in the density and marginal density of 
 at the boundaries of the 
data range, seen through the term m’
, and is only associated with even order local 
polynomial estimation, i.e. local constant, quadratic estimation etc. When the density 
of observations becomes small, the expression becomes large and introduces 
significant bias in the estimate. Odd order local polynomial regressions 
automatically induce a boundary bias correction.  
 
Curvature-based bias, represented by the term in square brackets in equation (1.40), 
is driven by a difference between the local order of polynomial regression and the 
local curvature of the function.   When the order of polynomial regression is lower 
than the local order of the function it is impossible to plot the polynomial accurately 
through the function.  In particular, the estimated function will differ more markedly 
at points where the curvature of the function is high.  As an illustration, consider 
plotting a straight line through a quadratic function. 
 
5.2 Sufficient Conditions for Parameter Identification with LPKD 
estimation 
 
The identification conditions (1.34), (1.35) and (1.36) show us that increasing the 
bandwidth or order of LPR in order to reduce bias in the conditional spatial 
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expectations affects identification in conflicting ways. Less bias in the spatial 
expectation of the confounding spatial data process, * , reduces the bias in the 
parameter estimates. On the other hand, less bias in the spatial expectation of X, 
reduces the variation left over in the smoothed observed data, increasing the variance 
of the estimates of the parameter estimates, . 
 
While bias can be reduced by either increasing the order of local polynomial 
regression or reducing the bandwidth, for simplicity of exposition I focus just on the 
case where the analyst selects a fixed bandwidth, ℎw, 5 but adjusts ] . 6 Accordingly, 
let us define three orders of local polynomial regression ]∗, ]∗∗and ]∗∗∗ as the lowest 
orders that satisfy the identification conditions relating to IC1, IC2 and IC3 in 
section 4.4. As such,  
 
IC SSE 1: There exists some ]∗ whereby the LPR estimate of the conditional spatial 
expectation of 	 is unbiased, 
 [	|
, ℎw, ]∗ = 0 (1.41)  
 
In this case all of the spatial variation in 	 is removed. 
 
IC SSE 2: There exists some ]∗∗ whereby the LPR estimate of the conditional spatial 
expectation of * is unbiased, 
 [*|
, ℎw, ]∗∗ = 0 (1.42)  
 
If ]∗∗ < ]∗ it is possible to remove all of the spatial variation in * whilst leaving 
                                                      
 
5
 This can be chosen using an automatic bandwidth selection criterion. 
6
 A smaller bandwidth can be adopted in local linear estimation to take into account only 
closer neighbours where a linear fit is more accurate and in local quadratic estimation a 
larger bandwidth will be adopted to utilise the available data.  As a result, in absolute terms 
the difference in bias between local linear and local quadratic estimation will be smaller 
when an automatic bandwidth selection criteria is used as opposed to a fixed bandwidth.   
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some spatial variation in 	 .  Remaining spatial variation in 	  aids in the 
identification of parameters and provides more efficient parameter estimates than is 
obtained using	]∗. 
 
IC SSE 3: There exists some ]∗∗∗  whereby the LPR estimate of the conditional 
spatial expectations of 	 and * are biased but the biases are uncorrelated,  
 [[	|
, ℎw, ]∗∗∗′[*|
, ℎw, ]∗∗∗] = 0 [&	K
, ℎw, ]∗∗∗( ≠ 0 [&*K
, ℎw, ]∗∗∗( ≠ 0 (1.43)  
 
If ]∗∗∗ ≤ ]∗, ]∗∗ then it is possible to remove the source of bias in the parameter 
estimates whilst further increasing the efficiency of the estimator by leaving 
additional spatial variation in	 . 
 
These results translate into conditions regarding the nature of 	  and * . If it is 
possible to represent 	  and *  by their polynomial expansions then parameter 
identification is possible using a LPR SSE of order ]∗  when either one of two 
suﬃcient conditions holds, 
 
CONDITION 1 (C1): *  is a ]∗  times differentiable function AND 	  are NOT 
purely spatial variables, such that	 ≠ 	0. 
 
CONDITION 2 (C2): 	  is ]∗ + 2  times differentiable 7  AND the bias in the 
conditional spatial expectations of 	 and * are uncorrelated. 
 
IC SSE 1 and IC SSE 2 map into C1, whilst IC SSE 3 is the equivalent of C2. 
 
                                                      
 
7
 Here the (+2) is required so that the ]∗th derivative of X is not constant and variation 
remains in the smoothed data for identification.  In the multivariate case it is necessary that Z + 2 is the lowest order of 8 ∈ 	 . 
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In the context of hedonic house price estimation, Condition 1 will be met by 
observed property characteristics that are not purely spatial. Using the same 
example, road noise is exacerbated by factors such as double-glazing, the aspect of a 
property and the presence of trees and other buildings that cause echoing. 
Contrastingly, aircraft noise is determined purely by the location of a property with 
respect to the flight path.  
 
Condition 2 implies that observed property characteristics are more variable over 
space than the components of the spatial data process with which they are correlated. 
As an illustration, consider the estimation of a model where house prices are a 
function of transport noise and some omitted amenity effect. The omitted amenity 
variable is likely to vary from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Now consider some 
different possible sources of transport noise: i) aircraft noise exhibits little variation 
(under the flight path), ii) railway noise varies from neighbourhood to 
neighbourhood and iii) road noise is highly variable, differing from street to street. 
Condition 1 is likely to be met in the case of road noise but not for aircraft or railway 
noise in this example. 
  
Unfortunately ]∗ is unknown and, at present, little guidance on selecting the order of 
local polynomial estimation is available from the literature on semi-parametric 
estimation. This paper adopts both local linear and local quadratic estimation in its 
simulations. These are fairly low orders that challenge the spatial smoothing 
estimator. Considering both orders enables us to investigate the importance of the 
chosen order of polynomial regression and the relevance of the identification 
conditions derived above. 
 
6.0 Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
The performances of OLS, SEMs and SSEs, in dealing with various spatial data-
generating processes are investigated through a series of Monte Carlo experiments.  
In those simulations, the true data-generating process is given by the linear model, 
  = 	 
, 	 + 	*
, + + ) (1.5) 
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where  
 = _D/, D<b are two-dimensional locations drawn from a plane in sample 
sizes of 500.  The innovations, ) , are generated as normally distributed random 
variable.  		 = 	 _8/, 8<b  is a matrix of two regressors where 8/  is a non-spatial 
variable simulated as draws from a standard normal, 
 8/ = g/~0,1  (1.44)  
 
While 8< is a spatial variable simulated as the sum of a spatial polynomial of order Z 
and some non-spatial element, g<, 
 
8< = }}@~,-D/~D<-q-.2
q
~.2 + g< 
(1.45)  
 
Here the @~,- are constants and the exact value of Z and the definition of g< differs 
across simulations.  
 
As I will demonstrate through simulations, the relative scale at which the observed 
data and confounding spatial data generating process vary (often referred to as their 
spatial scales) is an important determinant of the magnitude of bias when spatial 
models are estimated (Paciorek, 2010).  As such I consider two different orders of 8< 
(order 5 and order 1).  Each simulation was completed both for g< 	= 	0  and g<~	0,1.  
  is a vector of parameters of interest relating to the observed characteristics, 	.  In 
each of the Monte Carlo simulations these are defined as, 
 
 =	/< =  1−1 
  
(1.46)  
The Monte Carlo experiment proceeds by simulating data imitating each of the four 
different processes (discussed in Section 2) by which * , the confounding spatial 
process, might arise in data.  
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6.1 Spatial Data Generating Processes  (DGPs) 
 
Table 1.3 summarises the data generating processes used in the Monte Carlo 
simulations and their corresponding parameter values.  
 
DGP 1. A Spatial Autoregressive Lag (SAR) 
 *
, + 	= 	Σ-./∞ --	
,  +Σ-./∞ --) (1.47)  
 
DGP 2. A Spatial Autoregressive Lag with Autoregressive Spatial Error Dependence 
(SARAR) 
 *
, + =Σ-./∞ --	
,  + Σ1.2∞ Σ3./∞ --33+Σ3./∞ 33) 
(1.48)  
 
In both cases 	 = 	0.6 and   was generated as an Epanechnikov spatial weights 
matrix with limits of 3.  In the SARAR model 	 = −0.6 and  was generated as an 
Epanechnikov spatial weights matrix with limits of 0.5.   
 
DGP 3. To examine spatial misspecification I consider the estimation of a spatial lag 
process.  The estimation model is, 
 
	 = 	  + $ + ) (1.49)  
 
When the true data generating process is, 
 
	 = 	  +  + ) (1.50)  
 
As was discussed in section 2.2 (see Table 1.1) the confounding spatial DGP, Z, in 
this case is,  
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*	 = 	−$ (1.51)  
 
Two versions of this model were generated for the Monte Carlo simulations. First  
and $ were specified with broad limits of 3, such that the confounding spatial data 
varies less than the observed variables over a localised area and, thus, Condition 2 is 
likely to be met.  Second,  and $ were specified with narrow limits of 0.4 such 
that the confounding spatial data process is more variable over local areas and 
Condition 2 is less likely to be met.  In both cases, λ = −0.6 and $ is a misspecified 
version of	 in that the former specifies binary weights when the true weights in	 
are Epanechnikov.  The parameter values are presented in Table 1.3. 
 
DGP 4. In the spatial measurement error model, the measured values of 8< were 
generated as, 
 8<∗ 	= 	8< 	+ 	*
 (1.52)  
 
Where * is generated as a spatial polynomial of order 1, 
 * = 7/,2D/ + 72,/D< + 7/,/D/D< (1.53)  
 
Recall that two versions of 8< are considered in the Monte Carlo simulations.  When 8<is a polynomial of order 5, Condition 2 is met and it is possible to smooth out the 
measurement error, Z, and identify the parameters of the model even when 8< is 
purely spatial (Condition 1 is violated).  In contrast, when 8< is a polynomial of 
order 1, Condition 2 is not met and spatial smoothing may not be able to identify 
unbiased parameter estimates.   
 
DGP 5. For the spatial omitted variable, a spatial polynomial of order 2 was 
generated, 
 
43 
 
* = }}7~,-D/~D<-<-.2
<
~.2  
(1.54)  
 
Where b,1 are constant parameters. 
 
Table 1.3 summarises the parameter values used in the simulations for each DGP. 
 
DGP 8
, g *
, + 
Spatial 
Parametric 
Models: 
SAR 
 
SARAR 
Polynomial of order 5 
 
Polynomial of order 5 
 = 0.6, = 3  
(Epanechnikov)  = 0.6, = 3  
(Epanechnikov)  = 0.6, = 0.5  
(Epanechnikov) 
Spatial 
Misspecification: 
Condition 2 violated 
 
 
 
Condition 2 met 
Polynomial of order 1 
+SAR: = 0.6,% = 0.4 
(Binary) 
 
Polynomial of order 1 
+SAR:  = 0.6,% = 3 
(Binary) 
 = 0.6, = 0.4  
(Epanechnikov) 
 
  = 0.6, = 3  
(Epanechnikov) 
Spatial 
Measurement 
Error: 
Condition 2 violated 
 
Condition 2 met 
Polynomial of order 1 
 
Polynomial of order 5 
Polynomial of order 1 
 
Polynomial of order 1 
Spatial Omitted 
Variables: 
Condition 2 violated 
 
Condition 2 met 
Polynomial of order 1 
 
Polynomial of order 5 
Polynomial of order 2 
 
Polynomial of order 2 
 
Table  1.3: Parameter Values in the Monte Carlo Simulations (N=500) 
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7.0 Results 
7.1 OLS Estimation 
 
Table 1.4 reports the results using OLS estimation when the estimating equation fails 
to include the confounding spatial data generating process.  The left column presents 
results when 8< is a purely spatial regressor (g = 0) and the right presents results 
when there is some non-spatial variation in 8<, (g ≠ 0).  Note that if 8< is a purely 
spatial regressor (g = 0) it is anticipated that the parameters of the model cannot be 
identified under identification condition 1. 
 
Model 
Condition 1 violated g = 0 Condition 1 met g ≠ 0 / / = 1 < < = −1 / / = 1 < < = −1 
Spatial Parametric Models 
SAR 
1.2256 
(0.4395) 
-1.4011 
(0.0105) 
1.2355 
(0.4409) 
-1.4009 
(0.0105) 
SARAR 
1.2256 
(0.4395) 
-1.4011 
(0.0105) 
1.2356 
(0.4410) 
-1.4009 
(0.0105) 
Spatial Measurement Error Models 
Condition 2 violated 
(Order(X)<Order(Z)) 
0.9990 
(0.0223) 
-0.0327 
(1.0421) 
0.9809 
(0.0497) 
-0.0414 
(0.0031) 
Condition 2 met 
(Order(X)>Order(Z)) 
0.9927 
(0.1040) 
-0.9173 
(0.0023) 
0.9909 
(0.1041) 
-0.9175 
(0.0023) 
Spatial Omitted Variables 
Condition 2 violated 
(Order(X)<Order(Z)) 
1.0279 
(0.1305) 
30.8516 
(0.2665) 
1.4068 
(0.6158) 
6.1906 
(0.5574) 
Condition 2 met 
(Order(X)>Order(Z)) 
0.9399 
(0.2950) 
-0.6562 
(0.0070) 
0.9325 
(0.2957) 
-0.6572 
(0.0070) 
 
Table  1.4: OLS Estimation 
 
The OLS estimator neglects to account for the spatial endogeneity (SAR) and auto-
correlated autoregressive error (AR) components of the spatial interaction DGPs.   
As is shown in rows 1 and 2, for both the SAR and SARAR processes there is 
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significant bias in the OLS parameter estimates of < both when 8< is purely spatial 
(Condition 1 is violated) and when it is not. /is also biased with very large standard 
errors.  The marginal effect of 8<, <, is overstated by roughly 40 percent in each 
case.  
 
Again as anticipated by (1.19), spatial measurement error leads to bias in the OLS 
parameter estimate of < .  As with the omitted spatial covariates model, the 
magnitude of the bias differs when Condition 2 does and does not hold.  When 
Condition 2 holds, that is when 8< is a polynomial of order 5 and * is a polynomial 
of order 1, the bias in the parameter estimate is small.  In contrast, when Condition 2 
does not hold (that is 8< and * are both polynomials of order 1) the OLS parameter 
estimates suggest that 8< has a negligible marginal effect.   
 
When the data is generated with an omitted spatial variable, taking the form of a 
polynomial over space, in the case where Condition 2 does not hold the bias in < is 
severe.  However, the bias is reduced when there is some non-spatial variation in 8< 
(column 4).   When Condition 2 holds < is biased (by 35%) and there is also a small 
bias in /.   
 
7.2 Spatial Econometric Estimation 
 
Table 1.5 reports the results of SAR and SARAR estimation for each of the DGPs. 
Columns 1-2 and 3-4 relate to SAR and SARAR estimation respectively.8  
                                                      
 
8
 Confounding spatial processes often leave a tell-tale indicator in the form of spatially 
dependent residuals.  This enables their presence to be detected through post-estimation 
tests.  A number of tests have been developed; Moran's I provides a test for general spatial 
dependence (Cliff and Ord 1972), whilst LM-tests can be used to test the null hypothesis of 
no spatial auto-correlation against the alternative hypotheses of specific parametric models 
of dependence (Anselin 1988).  Likewise, Kelejian and Robinson (1992) develop 
specification robust tests that allow an analyst to test, for example, for the presence of a 
spatial lag when spatial error dependence may also be present and vice versa.   
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Consider first the two spatial interaction models.  Rows 1 and 2 present the results 
when the spatial weights matrices are correctly specified. In both cases the 
endogenous component of the model is correctly accounted for.  This removes the 
source of bias and allows both models to recover unbiased estimates.  However, 
whilst the SARAR estimator is sufficient for estimating the SAR model, the SAR 
estimator lacks the auto-regressive error component of the SARAR model.  As a 
result, the standard errors obtained by SAR estimation of the SARAR model are 
biased and inflated.   
 
It is well known that spatial parametric estimators perform most effectively when 
they are correctly specified.   In contrast, rows 3 and 4 of Table 1.5 present the 
results obtained when the spatial weights matrices are incorrectly specified as binary 
when the true spatial lag is generated by a matrix with Epanechnikov weights. Row 3 
presents the results when the spatial weights matrices have narrow limits such that 
Condition 2 is not met.   The simple misspecification of the weightings as binary 
causes the SAR estimator to return biased parameter estimates.  Row 4 presents 
results for a further SAR model when the lag process is broad.  Again the weights 
matrix is misspecified as binary rather than Epanechnikov.  As before, the parameter 
estimates of < obtained using a misspecified SAR estimator are significantly biased 
in all cases.  The simulation results in rows 3 and 4 confirm that SEMs are sensitive 
to specification errors. 
 
These general spatial data problems are indicative of the sort of real world problems 
that plague econometric analysis, such as hedonic analysis.  Our simulation results 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
For completeness I employed these robust–LM tests against each DGP.  The results 
uniformly demonstrate the ability of the tests to detect the presence of a spatial data 
generating process, however in almost all cases there is not enough information to guide a 
choice between specifications, even when the true DGP is a SPM and the spatial weights 
matrices are correctly specified in the tests.  This is consistent with the findings of Anselin 
and Griffith (1988).  
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clearly illustrate the continuing challenges that they pose for spatial econometric 
estimators (Brady & Irwin 2010, McMillen 2010, Pinske & Slade 2010).
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 SAR SARAR 
Model 
Condition 1 violated g = 0 Condition 1 met g ≠ 0 Condition 1 violated g = 0 Condition 1 met g ≠ 0 / / = 1 < < = −1 / / = 1 < < = −1 / / = 1 < < = −1 / / = 1 < < = −1 
Spatial Parametric Models 
SAR 
0.9999 
(0.0219) 
-0.9999 
(0.0010) 
0.9997 
(0.0219) 
-1.0001 
(0.0010) 
0.9999 
(0.0219) 
-1.0000 
(0.0010) 
0.9998 
(0.0219) 
1.0001 
(0.0010) 
SARAR 
0.9997 
(0.0229) 
-1.0000 
(0.0011) 
0.9998 
(0.0229) 
-1.0001 
(0.0011) 
0.9999 
(0.0222) 
-1.0000 
(0.0007) 
0.9998 
(0.0222) 
-1.0001 
(0.0007) 
Spatial Misspecification Models 
Condition 2 violated 
(i.e. narrow lag process in Z) 
1.0416 
(0.0097) 
-0.8230 
(0.0193) 
1.0402 
(0.0098) 
-0.8378 
(0.0193) 
- - - - 
Condition 2 met 
(i.e. broad lag process in Z) 
0.9863 
(0.0185) 
-0.9314 
(0.0422) 
0.9861 
(0.0186) 
-0.9341 
(0.0420) - - - - 
Spatial Measurement Error Models 
Condition 2 violated 
(Order(X)<Order(Z)) 
1.0035 
(0.0232) 
-0.0253 
(0.0073) 
0.9279 
(0.1001) 
-0.1882 
(0.0207) 
0.9992 
(0.0239) 
-0.0256 
(0.0072) 
0.5863 
(0.0552) 
-0.1974 
(0.0168) 
Condition 2 met 
(Order(X)>Order(Z)) 
0.9999 
(0.1165) 
-1.0763 
(0.0318) 
1.1417 
(0.0885) 
-1.0584 
(0.0050) 
1.0187 
(0.0243) 
-0.9727 
(0.0072) 
1.0173 
(0.0243) 
-0.9756 
(0.0070) 
Spatial Omitted Variables 
Condition 2 violated 
(Order(X)<Order(Z)) 
1.0317 
(0.1045) 
24.1248 
(5.2237) 
1.0528 
(0.0441) 
-1.1007 
(0.0477) 
0.9884 
(0.0306) 
30.0920 
(1.8795) 
1.1424 
(0.0403) 
-1.1942 
(0.0410) 
Condition 2 met 
(Order(X)>Order(Z)) 
0.9824 
(0.2063) 
-0.3579 
(0.0401) 
1.0025 
(0.1142) 
-1.0720 
(0.0309) 
1.0330 
(0.0292) 
-0.8351 
(0.0071) 
1.0173 
(0.0243) 
-0.9756 
(0.0070) 
Table  1.5: SPE Estimation 
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The results for the spatial measurement error model in rows 5 and 6 highlight how 
parametric spatial weights matrices fail to correct the bias when 8< does not have 
any non-spatial variation and the measurement error is highly localised (Condition 2 
is not met).  This results from the poor approximation of the measurement error 
made by the spatial weights matrices.  
 
Rows 7 and 8 present parameter estimates from SAR and SARAR estimating models 
when the data are generated by an omitted spatial process that takes the form of a 
polynomial over space and not a spatial lag process.  The most striking result is the 
degree of bias that remains in the parameter estimates when 8< is a purely spatial 
regressor.  In these cases the spatial weights matrices poorly approximate the 
structure of the omitted spatial covariates and do little to remove bias.  In addition, 
when the unaccounted-for spatial process, Z, exhibits highly localized spatial 
dependence (i.e. Condition 2 is not met) an overly broad spatial weights matrix 
provides only a poor approximation to the true spatial data-generating process  and 
parameter estimates continue to be biased even when there is non-spatial variation in 8<. 
 
7.3 Spatial Smoothing Estimation 
 
Thus far I have demonstrated the poor performance of OLS when the econometric 
model does not account for a variety of confounding spatial data generating 
processes.  Likewise, the results in section 7.2 demonstrate that SEMs also fail to 
identify unbiased parameter estimates when the model is misspecified.  The final set 
of results, presented in this section, explore the performance of local linear and local 
quadratic SSEs against these DGPs.  In these simulations the bandwidth is selected 
using leave one out cross validation (Hardle and Marron, 1985). 
  
Table 1.6 presents the parameter estimates obtained using local linear (columns 1 
and 2) and local quadratic (columns 3 and 4) SSEs for each of the models.  For the 
spatial misspecification model I combine spatial smoothing and a SAR component to 
estimate a model with spatial interactions where the structure of the interaction is 
anticipated but not known with certainty.   In each case I pay particular attention to 
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whether either of the sufficient conditions for identification are met.  
 
In the spatial interaction models, the results of which are presented in rows 1 and 2, a 
local linear SSE has clear advantages over OLS even when there is no independent 
variation 8<  but does not return completely unbiased estimates.  This bias is 
dispelled when there is some independent variation in 8< (such that Condition 1 is 
satisfied).  The local quadratic SSE is able to capture and extract the spatial 
interaction processes more accurately, and presents unbiased parameter estimates. 
 
Rows 3 and 4 present results for the spatial misspecification model.  In this case the 
estimation first smoothes the data and then estimates the SAR model using the 
smoothed data.  When Condition 2 holds, it is possible to smooth out * and leave 
some variation in	 , allowing the SSEs to return unbiased parameter estimates both 
with and without additional non-spatial variation (Condition 1).  The addition of 
non-spatial variation reduces the standard errors. When neither of the identification 
conditions is met, both spatial smoothing estimates are biased. When only Condition 
1 holds the order of local polynomial estimation is lower than the order of the spatial 
data problem.  As a result, the bias in the spatial smoothing estimates is reduced but 
not completely removed9. Again, this is in line with the expectations that can be 
drawn from theory. 
 
 
Rows 5 and 6 of Table 1.6 present the spatial smoothing estimates for the spatial 
measurement error model and rows 7 and 8 present those for the omitted spatial 
covariates models.  In line with the theoretical results, when neither Condition 1 or 2 
hold these estimators cannot correctly identify the parameters of the model.  It is 
noticeable that when the identification conditions are not met, the parameter estimate 
for <is large, with large standard errors.  The reason for this is that under these 
conditions a SSE removes almost all of the variation in 8<.10 
                                                      
 
9
 Further simulations revealed that the bias is removed using a local cubic smooth. 
10
 Although in these cases the parameters of the model are not identified, the large estimated 
values and standard errors signal that the parameters are unidentifiable. 
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In contrast, when Condition 2 holds the SSEs perform well.  Although some bias 
remains in the parameter estimates obtained using a local linear smooth, this is 
expected since the omitted data is of order 2 and consequently there is bias in the 
local linear regression estimate of Z.  The bias is correlated with the smoothed 
observed data and results in a small bias in the parameter estimate.  Consistent with 
the derived identification conditions, the local quadratic estimator removes this 
problem and obtains unbiased parameter estimates.  Columns 2 and 4 confirm that 
non-spatial variation in X (condition 1) facilitates the identification of the parameters 
enabling both SSEs to return unbiased parameter estimates.  
 
8.0 Discussion 
 
As more and better spatially organised micro-datasets become available to 
economists, the problem of confounding spatial processes is likely to become of 
more prominent concern to empirical analysts.  This paper has explored issues of 
parameter identification and estimation of linear models in the presence of a broad 
range of underlying spatial DGPs. Four types of problems were considered: spatial 
lag processes, omitted spatial covariates, spatial measurement error and spatial 
misspecification. These problems are shown to undermine OLS estimation, 
potentially introducing bias into the parameter estimates 
 
Whilst some progress has been made to address the issues associated with spatial 
data through the development and implementation of spatial econometric estimators 
there are some serious limitations to these approaches.  In this paper I have 
considered and contrasted the ability of commonly employed spatial econometric 
estimators (SAR and SARAR) and alternative local linear and local quadratic SSEs 
in handling a variety of confounding spatial data generating processes.  
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 Local Linear SSE Local Quadratic SSE 
Model 
Condition 1 violated g = 0 Condition 1 met g ≠ 0 Condition 1 violated g = 0 Condition 1 met g ≠ 0 / < / < / < / < 
Spatial Parametric Models 
SAR 
0.9971 
(0.0226) 
-1.2993 
(0.0186) 
0.9976 
(0.0225) 
-1.0160 
(0.0147) 
0.9984 
(0.0226) 
-1.0172 
(0.0146) 
0.9944 
(0.0222) 
-0.9951 
(0.0032) 
SARAR 
0.9975 
(0.0247) 
-1.0300 
(0.0168) 
0.9981 
(0.0247) 
-0.9994 
(0.0142) 
0.9985 
(0.0231) 
-1.0175 
(0.0148) 
0.9943 
(0.0239) 
-0.9969 
(0.0233) 
Spatial Misspecification Models 
Condition 2 
violated 
1.1274 
(0.0081) 
-0.8292 
(0.0941) 
1.1310 
(0.0080) 
-0.9166 
(0.0951) 
1.1353 
(0.0077) 
-5.0898 
(2.7766) 
1.1476 
(0.0073) 
-1.4138 
(0.3586) 
Condition 2 met 
1.0032 
(0.0023) 
-0.9565 
(0.0150) 
1.0031 
(0.0023) 
-0.9589 
(0.0147) 
1.0036 
(0.0022) 
-0.9794 
(0.0745) 
1.0036 
(0.0022) 
-0.9906 
(0.0539) 
Spatial Measurement Error Models 
Condition 2 
violated 
0.9992 
(0.0219) 
-0.0009 
(0.0224) 
0.9986 
(0.0224) 
-0.9984 
(0.0233) 
0.9994 
(0.0219) 
-1.32x10/2 
(1.39x10//) 0.9993 (0.0220) -0.9998 (0.0230) 
Condition 2 met 
0.9993 
(0.0220) 
-1.0001 
(0.0014) 
0.9992 
(0.0220) 
-0.9999 
(0.0045) 
1.0004 
(0.0219) 
-1.0028 
(0.0461) 
1.0004 
(0.0219) 
-1.0001 
(0.0201) 
Spatial Omitted Variables 
Condition 2 
violated 
1.1274 
(0.0081) 
-0.8292 
(0.0941) 
1.1310 
(0.0080) 
-0.9166 
(0.0951) 
1.1353 
(0.0077) 
-5.0898 
(2.7766) 
1.1476 
(0.0073) 
-1.4138 
(0.3586) 
Condition 2 met 
0.9972 
(0.0223) 
-0.9240 
(0.0122) 
0.9957 
(0.0224) 
-0.9412 
(0.0112) 
0.9997 
(0.0219) 
-1.0000 
(0.0471) 
1.0001 
(0.0219) 
-0.9999 
(0.0230) 
Table  1.6: SSE Estimation
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The primary contribution of this paper is to define three identification conditions 
which establish when parameter identification is possible using a general 
nonparametric SSE.  Furthermore, I show the specific form of these 
identification conditions for a SSE using local polynomial regression and derive 
from them two sufficient identification conditions in terms of the structure of the 
data.  
 
A second contribution is to present a series of Monte Carlo simulations, which 
confirm that those Conditions are sufficient for identification of the parameters. 
Under either Condition, a SSE provides a simple and robust approach to dealing 
with spatial data generating processes. The results also highlight the importance 
of selecting an appropriate order of local polynomial estimation.  
 
In the Monte Carlo experiment, SEMs are shown to be more efficient than SSEs 
when the SEM correctly anticipates the form of spatial lag process and correctly 
specifies the spatial weights matrices. However, SEMs are shown to not be 
robust to misspecification and perform poorly when the spatial data generating 
process is not a spatial lag.  
 
Accordingly, when there is little guidance on the nature of unaccounted-for 
spatial processes, the SSEs offers an attractive alternative to SEMs even when it 
is suspected that that spatial process may be in the form of a spatial lag.  The 
SSE does not impose restrictive assumptions on the form of the spatial data-
generating process and has been shown to produce unbiased parameter estimates 
when either of two identification conditions is met.  Moreover, by adopting a 
spatially smoothed SAR estimator in the misspecified model, I demonstrate that 
spatial smoothing can be combined with other estimation methods, such as two-
stage least squares, in the estimation of spatial models11. Again, when Conditions 
                                                      
 
11
 Although this is not the primary objective of this chapter, additional simulations were 
conducted to examine the ability of spatially smoothed SAR estimators to recover 
unbiased estimates of the spatial multiplier when the true underlying DGP is a SAR with 
an omitted spatial variable.  The results confirm that when the spatial weights matrix is 
correctly specified the spatial smoothing estimator returns unbiased parameter estimates, 
including an unbiased estimate of the spatial multiplier.  In contrast, a SAR estimator 
 54
1 or 2 are met, the spatial smoothing estimator can be adopted to overcome 
spatial misspecification problems, combining the advantages of the two 
approaches.   
 
In conclusion, this paper has sought to demonstrate the flexibility and simplicity 
of SSEs and to provide a clear and intuitive understanding of the conditions 
under which this estimator can be used to identify the parameters of the model.   
This paper has demonstrated how it is possible to facilitate identification and 
further improve the efficiency properties of estimators through better matching 
the demands of economic analysis with developments in non-parametric 
econometric techniques.  It is my hope that this work, in conjunction with the 
increasing availability of non-parametric code in statistical packages, will 
support the increased utilisation of SSEs in economics.  Future work should 
extend this principle and further explore the potential for econometric theory to 
contribute to achieving the objectives of applied analysis.  In particular, in the 
next chapter I will explore the potential for further identification and efficiency 
gains through the implementation of local adaptive spatial smoothing estimators. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
returns biased parameter estimates even when the spatial weights matrix is correctly 
specified.  Results are available from the author upon request. 
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A Locally Adaptive Spatial Smoothing Estimator 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, this thesis focused its attention upon estimating partial 
linear models using a spatial smoothing estimator (SSE) with fixed smoothing 
parameters, P, hereafter referred to as a Fixed SSE.  In this chapter, I focus on a 
refinement of that estimator which improves its efficiency and potentially 
expands the range of spatial data-generating processes from which it can 
successfully identify unbiased parameter estimates.  
 
As per the previous chapter, the general form for the data-generating process is 
given by equation (1.5), which is repeated below,   
  = 	 
, 	 + 	*
, + + ) (1.8) 
 
Recall that the dependent variable, , is an additively separable function of an 	 × 	 vector of observed data, 	
, g, a confounding spatial process, *
, +, 
and independent, identically distributed innovations, ) .  Also, 
 , represents 
spatial location as defined by a vector of Cartesian co-ordinates, 
 = 	 _D/, D<b. 
Finally, β is a k × 1 vector of parameters relating to the observed data. The 
objective of the analysis is to recover unbiased estimates of these parameters. 
 
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the parameters of the model can be 
identified when equation (1.33) is satisfied, that is, 
 [[	|
,P′[*|
, P] = 0 (1.33) 
 
Where Y. |
, P is the bias component associated with the empirical estimate of 
the conditional spatial expectation.  From this expression I derived three 
identification conditions relating to the estimation of models within this 
framework using a Fixed SSE.  These conditions are as follows, 
 
IC1. There exists some P whereby empirical estimate of the conditional spatial 
expectation of 	 is unbiased, 
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 [	|
, P = 0 (1.34) 
 
In this case spatial smoothing works so as to remove all spatial variation in 	, a 
process that addresses the omitted variable bias problem but limiting 
identification of the parameters to variation provided by g , the non-spatial 
elements of 	.  
 
IC2. There exists some P  whereby the empirical estimate of the conditional 
spatial expectation of * is unbiased, 
 [*|
, P = 0 (1.35) 
 
In this case spatial smoothing works so as to remove the spatial component of the 
confounding spatial process without removing all of the spatial variation in X. 
 
IC3. There exists some P  whereby the empirical estimate of the conditional 
spatial expectations of 	 and * are biased but the biases are uncorrelated, 
 [[	|
,P′[*|
, P] = 0 [	|
, P ≠ 0 [*|
, P ≠ 0 (1.36) 
 
In this case, smoothing works so as to remove just the correlated spatial 
components of 	 and *. 
 
2.0 Spatially Inhomogeneous Data 
 
When the functions that underlie the model are spatially homogeneous (i.e. their 
variability is similar across different regions) and one of the identification 
conditions is met, the Fixed SSE provides unbiased estimates of the parameters 
of interest.  In this chapter I consider situations in which the observed data, 	
,  and confounding spatial process, *
, + are spatially inhomogeneous.  
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First it is prudent to define what is meant by spatially inhomogeneous.  A simple 
definition is to say that a function is spatially inhomogeneous if it is highly 
variable over some regions of space and less variable over others.  More 
formally, consider a function that can be expressed as a function of space using 
polynomial approximation.  This function is spatially homogeneous when the 
order of the approximated polynomial is the same when approximated using any 
local subset of the function.  An example of a spatially homogeneous function is 
provided in Figure 2.1.  Note that a polynomial approximation would have the 
same order whether evaluated over region 1, region 2 or both regions 
simultaneously.  
 
 
 
Figure  2.1: An example of a spatially homogeneous function 
 
In contrast, a spatially inhomogeneous function exhibits different orders across 
different local regions.  An example of a spatially inhomogeneous function is 
presented in Figure 2.2.  Note that this function can be approximated by a high 
order polynomial over region 1 and a low order polynomial over region 2.  
 
 
 
Figure  2.2: An example of a spatially inhomogeneous function 
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I demonstrate that in these cases a Fixed SSE is inefficient and may produce 
misleading results.  I show that the implementation of a Local Adaptive SSE, 
which applies locally varying smoothing parameters, can increase efficiency and 
permit identification in cases where a Fixed SSE cannot.  
 
3.0 Parameter Identification with Locally Adaptive Spatial Smoothing 
Estimation 
 
In essence the innovation of the Locally Adaptive Spatial Smoothing Estimator 
(LASSE) is to allow the degree of smoothing to vary from locality to locality 
across space. The degree of smoothing at any particular location is selected so as 
to generate efficiency in the estimation of the parameters. Taking Figure 2, for 
example, a locally adaptive smooth might adopt one set of smoothing parameters 
over region 1 and another over region 2.   
 
3.1 Improving efficiency through LASSE 
 
Building on the presentation in the previous chapter, let us now consider how 
allowing for locally adaptive smoothing might impact on the three identification 
conditions previously derived for SSE. Again, the focus will be on smoothing 
implemented using local polynomial regression (LPR). In particular, I examine 
the case in which the analyst adopts some fixed bandwidth,  ℎw, but allows the 
order of LPR to vary across locations12. I denote the N-vector of location-specific 
orders of polynomial regression by	h. Of course, it is possible to set each 
local order of polynomial regression to the fixed order that is known to achieve 
each of the identification conditions.  As such, this optimal fixed order defines 
the highest order that will be used at any location such that h∗ Z ≤ ]∗ for 
any Z. 
 
 
                                                      
 
12
 An alternative would be to hold the order of polynomial regression constant while 
varying the bandwidth locally.  
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In the LASSE, the identification conditions becomes, 
 
IC LASSE 1: There exists some h∗  whereby LPR estimate of the conditional 
spatial expectation of 	 is unbiased, 
 [	|
, ℎw, h∗  = 0 (2.1)  
 
As with a Fixed SSE, all of the spatial variation in 	  is removed even if h∗ Z < ]∗ for some Z.  As a result, moving to a LASSE does not provide 
any efficiency gains over the Fixed SSE. 
 
IC LASSE 2: There exists some h∗∗  whereby LPR estimate of the spatial 
expectation of * is unbiased, 
 [*|
, ℎw, h∗∗  = 0 (2.2)  
 
In this case it is possible to remove all of the spatial variation in * whilst leaving 
some spatial variation in 	.  Moreover, recall that	]∗∗ is the lowest fixed order of 
polynomial regression that satisfies IC SSE 2.  If h∗∗ Z < ]∗∗ for some	Z, 
then the locally adaptive estimator results in a greater bias in the estimate of the 
conditional spatial expectation of 	 . Of course, greater bias in that estimate 
results in more variation in the smoothed X and this variation provides additional 
data with which to identify the parameters of the model.  As a result, under this 
condition, LASSE parameter estimates are likely to be more efficient than the 
Fixed SSE. 
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Figure  2.3: IC 2 Spatially inhomogeneous data where  >                                                  
(Local order in paretheses) 
 
Figure 2.3 presents an example of spatially inhomogeneous data for which a 
LASSE would provide efficiency gains over Fixed SSE.  For clarity, this 
example presents a simple two-dimensional representation where the variability 
of two functions, 8 and		*, differs across two distinct regions, 1 and 2. The order 
of 8 is high across region 1 but lower across region 2 and the opposite is true of 
function	*.  The order of the local polynomial approximations of X and Z are 
shown in parentheses in the Figure. 
 
If the estimating model assumes the data-generating process to be 	 = 	8	 + ), 
and is estimated using the Fixed Order SSE then both 8  and *  would be 
smoothed at the same level across both regions 1 and 2.  If @ > X then the second 
identification condition is met and  is identifiable using Fixed SSE with order 7.  However, a more efficient estimate could be obtained by smoothing using a 
local order of polynomial regression of  over region 1 and X over region 2.  This 
locally adaptive approach would still achieve the objective of removing the 
omitted variable and eliminating the bias in the parameter estimates but would 
also leave greater variation in the smoothed observed variable over region 1, 
which enhances the efficiency of the estimator. 
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IC LASSE 3: There exists some h∗∗∗  whereby the LPR estimate of the 
conditional spatial expectations of 	  and *  are biased but the biases are 
uncorrelated, 
 [[	|
, ℎw, h∗∗∗ ′[*|
, ℎw, h∗∗∗ ] = 0 [&	K
, ℎw, h∗∗∗ ( ≠ 0 [&*K
, ℎw, h∗∗∗ ( ≠ 0 (2.3)  
 
Recall that	]∗∗∗ is the lowest fixed order of polynomial regression that satisfies 
IC SSE 3.  If h∗∗∗ Z < ]∗∗∗ for some Z then it is possible to remove the source 
of bias in the parameter estimates whilst further increasing the efficiency of the 
estimator by leaving additional spatial variation in	 .  Consider Figure 2.3, while 
it is known from identification condition 2 (IC 2) that it would be possible to 
smooth out * using orders c and d over regions 1 and 2 respectively, 
identification condition IC LASSE 3 shows that it may also be possible to 
remove the correlation between the bias components and increase the efficiency 
of the estimates by smoothing at orders less than   and X  over region 1 and 
region 2 respectively. 
 
3.2 Relaxing the Identification Conditions through LASSE  
 
If 	 are purely spatial functions, and by using a fixed bandwidth it is impossible 
to smooth out the correlation between 	 and * without perfectly predicting 	, 
then identification using a Fixed SSE is impossible.  However, it is possible to 
identify the parameters of the model using a LASSE if the local order of 	 is 
greater than the local order of * over some localised regions. In this case, a lower 
order of polynomial regression is adopted in some regions.  Across those regions, 
smoothing no longer perfectly predicts X such that variation is left in the 
smoothed data from which the  parameters can be estimated. 
 
Figure 2.4 presents a second example of spatially inhomogeneous data for which 
a LASSE would provide efficiency gains over Fixed SSE.  If @ < X and ]∗∗∗	 =]∗ = @ , it is impossible to remove the correlation between the smoothed 
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observed data and the smoothed confounding data without removing all of the 
spatial variation in 	 .  In this case, the parameters of the model cannot be 
identified using a Fixed SSE if 	  is a purely spatial function.  However, 
identification is possible using LASSE with a local order of polynomial 
regression of  over region 1 to remove the spatial component of *, and 7 over 
region 2 to remove the spatial component of 	 , leaving the smoothed data 
uncorrelated.  This locally adaptive approach would achieve the objective of 
eliminating the bias in the parameter estimates, providing additional 
identification over the Fixed SSE. 
 
 
Figure  2.4: Identification under IC 3 with Spatially Inhomogeneous 
Functions             
(Local order in parentheses) 
 
This intuition underpins the adaptive order approach developed by Fan and 
Gijbels (1995) for non-parametric kernel density estimation of functions.  The 
methodology can be combined with the properties of the compound error,  Ŵ =  − 	% , to develop an Local Adaptive SSE which not only achieves 
efficiency savings over the Fixed SSE but also enables identification for a 
broader range of data.   
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In chapter 1 (section 5.2) I derived two sufficient conditions for identification 
using a Fixed SSE, 
 
CONDITION 1 (C1): * is a ]∗ times differentiable function AND 	 are NOT 
purely spatial variables, such that	 ≠ 	0. 
 
CONDITION 2 (C2): 	 is ]∗ + 2 times differentiable13 AND the bias in the 
conditional spatial expectations of 	 and * are uncorrelated.14 
 
For the LASSE, IC LASSE 3 also translates into a third sufficient condition for 
identification, 
 
CONDITION 3 (C3): There exists some set of local adaptive smoothing orders, h , such that [	|
, ℎw, h  and [*|
, ℎw, h are uncorrelated AND 
variation remains in [&	K
, ℎw, h( + . 
 
This condition is automatically met when either CONDITION 1 or CONDITION 
2 are met and may hold independently. 
 
4.0  Methodology 
 
Fan and Gijbels (1995) develop a method for non-parametrically estimating a 
function using an order that adapts locally.  Consider the model, 
                                                      
 
13
 Here the (+2) is required so that the ]∗th derivative of X is not constant and variation 
remains in the smoothed data for identification.  In the multivariate case it is necessary 
that Z + 2 is the lowest order of 8 ∈ 	 . 
14
 A smaller bandwidth can be adopted in local linear estimation to take into account 
only closer neighbours where a linear fit is more accurate and in local quadratic 
estimation a larger bandwidth will be adopted to utilise the available data.  As a result, 
in absolute terms the difference in bias between local linear and local quadratic 
estimation will be smaller when an automatic bandwidth selection criteria is used as 
opposed to a fixed bandwidth.   
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 8	 = 	@
 + g (2.4)  
 
Where 8 is the dependent variable, 
 is a two dimensional explanatory variable 
denoting location such that 
 = _D/, D<b, [g] = 0 and [
>g] = 0.  
 
Since @
 can be approximated by the Taylor series expansion for @
 in the 
neighbourhood of	82, the objective is to estimate @
 by polynomial regression 
with a fixed bandwidth,  ℎw, 
 
@
 	≈ 	@
 	+ 	@′
	
 − 
 +	@>>
2! 	 
 − 
< +⋯	
+	@
S!  
 − 
 
(2.5)  
 
It is convenient to rewrite this using matrix notation as, 
 min 	 8	 −	
′8	 −	
 (2.6)  
 
Where  is a diagonal matrix of kernel density weights,  is a vector of terms 
relating to the coefficients on the terms in the polynomial regression, 
 
 = /⋮q 	@ZX	 = X@m	c!
 − 
 (2.7)  
 
 And 
 is an &	 × ∑ j~./ ( matrix where the S +  ! column is given by, 
 D¡S +  = &D/ − D/,2(~&D< − D<,2(-  (2.8)  
 
For 0 ≤  ≤ ¢ and 0 ≤  ≤ ¢. 
 
The solution vector £	is estimated by weighted least squares regression and is 
given by, 
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 £ = &Sp>Sp(?/Sp′	 (2.9)  
 
The first term in £ relates to the parameter on a vector of ones in the regression.  
This provides a local estimate of @
 at 
.   
 
The objective of the adaptive order method is to construct the best estimate of @
, defined as the estimate that minimises the mean square error (MSE).  The 
MSE is calculated as the sum of the squared bias and variance of the estimate.  
The optimal set of local smoothing parameters is therefore chosen using a 
minimum MSE criterion. 
 
From equation (2.9) Fan and Gijbels (1995) derive their bias and variance 
expressions.  The sum of the bias squared and the variance is then minimised 
with respect to the order of local polynomial regression to obtain an estimate of @
 which trades off the bias and variance at each individual point, 
 J£KSpL = &Sp>Sp(?/Sp> 																							=  + &Sp>Sp(?/Sp>¥	 (2.10)  
 ¦@§&£KSp( = 	 &SpSp(?/Sp>¨Sp&Sp>Sp(?/ 
 
(2.11)  
Where  = _@D/,… , @D¡b, ¥ is a vector of polynomial regression residuals, ¥	 =  − Sp , and ¨  is the diagonal matrix X@m_c!<
 − 
:<
b  both of 
which are unknown quantities.  To construct an estimate of the mean squared 
error, Fan and Gijbels replace these unknown quantities with approximations 
constructed using the data. 
 ¥ is estimated by S + @ ! order polynomial regression where S is the order of 
local polynomial regression adopted and @  is chosen such that the S + @ ! 
order polynomial regression provides an unbiased approximation of @
.  An 
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estimate of the conditional variance is obtained first by assuming local 
homoscedasticity of ) such that, 
 ¦@§&KSp( = 	 &Sp>Sp(?/Sp>ª«Sp&Sp>Sp(?/:<D2 (2.12)  
 
An estimate of :D2 is then constructed from the normalised weighted residual 
sum of squares from the S + @ !  polynomial fit of the data with a fixed 
bandwidth, ℎ, 
 
:¬<D2 = 	 ­&8 − 8N(<c!
 − 
U§_∗ −∗Sp∗&Sp∗>∗Sp∗(?®Sp∗b (2.13)  
 
Where * denotes a design matrix, similar to 
 and , with elements up to the S + @ ! order. 
 
These approximations of the conditional bias and variance can then be combined 
to estimate the mean squared error (MSE) of the fit of equation (2.4) at each 
location for local polynomial regression of various orders. The optimal local 
order, or adaptive order, can then be chosen by finding the order that minimises 
the MSE at that point. 
 
5.0  The Adaptive Order Procedure 
 
The procedure detailed by Fan and Gijbels (1995) for adaptive order selection for 
estimating the density of a function is as follows, 
 
Step 1: For each order ]	[0] < ] ≤ 	F  and for each location 
obtain	D¯[2],jD, ℎw. 
Step 2: For each order ], and for each location calculate the smoothed 
estimated MSE by taking the weighted local average of the estimated 
MSE in the neighbouring 2ℎw/Δ + 1 locations. 
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Step 3: For each location 
 choose the order ]-  which has the smallest 
smoothed estimated MSE and use a ]- order polynomial approximation 
to estimate @
. 
 
Where the analyst is interested only in approximations up to order F.  Fan and 
Gijbels note that this adaptive order approach reduces the sensitivity of the 
estimate to the choice of bandwidth allowing the adoption of a plug-in 
bandwidth. 
 
6.0  Extension to Spatial Smoothing 
 
The insights and general methodology proposed by Fan and Gijbels can be 
transferred to the method of spatial smoothing to obtain a good estimate of the 
confounding spatial data generating process, *.  In this instance the analyst is 
faced with the additional complication of * being unobserved.  In this section, I 
propose a LASSE, which incorporates Fan and Gijbel’s adaptive order procedure 
in a SSE. 
 
The objective, as before, is to identify the	 parameters in the model, 
  = 	 
, 	 + 	*
, + + ) (1.8) 
 
One approach would be to use Robinson’s (1988) approach and adopt Fan and 
Gijbels’ MSE criterion to select locally adaptive smoothing parameters in 
estimation.  However, this approach is problematic since the MSE criterion is 
attempting to find a best fit for Y, which can be achieved by selecting local 
smoothing parameters that remove all of the spatial variation from both 	 and *.  
To achieve greater identification and efficiency an alternative approach is 
needed.  To address this problem I develop an alternative procedure that 
resembles a back-fitting algorithm (Müller, 2001) to augment the methodology 
of Fan and Gijbels. 
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The LASSE procedure begins by constructing an initial estimate of the 
confounding spatial data, *.  Consider an initial choice of fixed bandwidth, ℎw15 
and set of orders of local polynomial regression (LPR) for each point which are 
initially set to zero,	h.  An initial estimate of * is then provided by taking the 
conditional spatial expectation of the residuals by LPR with local orders, h, 
 *h = h,!²[ − 	%|
] 																												= h,!²[& − %(	 + * + W|
] (2.14)  
Where, 
 % =		>	>	?/ (2.15)  
 
The initial estimate of *  is then used to obtain a revised estimate of %  by 
subtracting *  from	and re-estimating, again using LPR, such that, 
 %® =		> − *h	>	?/ (2.16)  
 
At this point, the procedure then uses the mean squared error criteria developed 
by Fan and Gijbels (1995) to determine whether to increase (by one) the local 
order of smoothing at each point.  The new set of orders, h®, is then used to 
revise * .  This process is repeated until the adaptive order converges.  The 
intention is to hone in on an unbiased estimate of  before removing all of the 
spatial variation in 	. 
 
If the estimate of  at iteration	U, %h³, is biased then *h³ will contain both * itself 
and a multiple of		 .  In these cases it must be true that at some points the order 
of * or 	 exceed the current local order of spatial smoothing.  Hence, the mean 
squared error of the estimate *h³  at these local points will be smaller under a 
larger order of spatial smoothing.  This process will continue until the point 
where either i) the bias in %h³ is removed and the method selects the appropriate 
                                                      
 
15
 This could be selected, for example, by a plug in bandwidth, an asymptotic plug in, 
cross validation etc (Hardle and Marron (1985).  
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local orders required to smooth out * or ii) 	 is completely smoothed and the 
estimate of  will be distinct in that it will be mean zero with large standard 
errors. 
 
The iterative approach is necessary in order to avoid both 	 and * being entirely 
smoothed out in the first stage.  The adaptive method has the potential to provide 
improvements in efficiency and also enables identification under a third 
condition: where, for a fixed bandwidth,  ℎw and a set of local adaptive orders,	h∗, 
the global correlation between the smoothed 	  and  *  is zero but variation 
remains in the smoothed 	. 
 
This condition guarantees that the iterative procedure will achieve an unbiased 
estimate of *  from which the optimal adaptive order of smoothing can be 
determined and an efficient estimate of  can be obtained. 
 
7.0 Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
To investigate and compare the performance of Fixed SSE and LASSE, I 
undertake a number of Monte Carlo simulations.  Each simulation comes from 
the spatial data-generating process,  
  = 	8D, g	 + 	*
, + + ) (2.17)  
 
Where 8 and * are generated as polynomial functions of space.  The observed 
and unobserved variables were generated as polynomial functions of two-
dimensional location; this is the same approach as was adopted in the Fixed 
Order SSE simulations presented in Chapter 1 (see section 6.0).  Two types of 
data generating processes were adopted: i) spatially homogeneous polynomials 
and ii) spatially inhomogeneous polynomials16  
                                                      
 
16
 Joining two polynomials creates a point where the resulting joint function is not 
continuous and differentiable with finite moments, violating Robinson’s (1988) 
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In each Monte Carlo simulation I set, 
  = −1	 g = 0 	+ = 0 
(2.18)  
 
Three versions of the model were constructed by varying the maximum local 
orders of 	  and ´ to create data relating to conditions C1, C2 and C3 (page 62). 
 
 
Fixed Order SSE 
Locally Adaptive 
Order SSE 
Identification 
Condition 
Maximum Local 
Order 
µ¶¶· ¸¹¶¶· 
Spatially Homogeneous Functions 
Condition 2 
X=5 
Z=3 
-1.039 
(0.345) 
-1.015 
(0.111) 
Spatially Inhomogeneous Functions 
Condition 2 
X=5 
Z=2 
-0.928 
(0.273) 
-0.955 
(0.071) 
Condition 3 
X=5 
Z=6 
16.190 
(57.357) 
-0.902 
(0.169) 
 
Table  2.1: Simulation results for Fixed Order SSE and Local Adaptive 
Order SSE 
 
 
Table 2.1 presents the maximum local orders of 8  and *  in each set of 
simulations alongside the results from the Monte Carlo simulations.  The results 
in Table 2.1 demonstrate the scope of the potential efficiency gains that can be 
achieved by employing the adaptive order estimator when the second 
                                                                                                                                               
 
assumptions.  A gap in the data was therefore inserted between the join of the 
polynomials to ensure that the functions maintained an analytic quality.   
 72
identification condition is met17. Even in the example where both functions are 
spatially homogeneous the Adaptive Order SSE achieves a reduction in the 
standard errors of 68 per cent by adopting a lower order of smoothing at local 
points where *  is less variable.  Similar results have also been obtained for 
differing polynomial orders for 8  and * , although the magnitude of the 
efficiency savings varies depending on the degree of inhomogeneity in the 
omitted spatial variable.  Row 3 of Table 2.1 illustrates estimation under the third 
identification condition.  Here, the Fixed SSE fails to identify the parameters as it 
is forced to smooth out all of the variation in the observed variable, 8 . In 
contrast, the LASSE is able to identify   through adopting a lower order of 
smoothing in some locations, thus leaving variation in 8  to facilitate 
identification of the parameter. 
 
8.0  Discussion 
 
The Fixed Order SSE can be implemented to identify  when either of the two 
identification conditions, CONDITION 1 and CONDITION 2, derived in 
Chapter 1 of the thesis, are met.  In these cases, fixed order SSE overcomes 
many of the limitations of the traditional spatial econometric estimators.  
However, it then becomes important to be able to identify whether these two 
conditions are met, since if they are not, the parameter estimate,	 , may not be a 
reliable estimate.  An alternative approach is to employ a Locally Adaptive SSE 
(LASSE).  In this chapter I have developed a LASSE in which adaptation is 
achieved through choosing a location-specific order of local polynomial 
regression. That choice is based on the method suggested by Fan and Gijbels 
(1995).  The LASSE has the potential to provide efficiency gains over the Fixed 
Order SSE and enables identification under a relaxed set of conditions. 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
17
 I do not discuss the second identification condition here but would like to note that the 
conclusions remain unchanged.  Further results are available from the author upon 
request. 
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PART II 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
 
 
Part I of the thesis was concerned with an examination of how the spatial nature 
of economic problems can affect analysis and inference in the context of 
estimating parameters from a reduced form equation. The adoption of semi-
parametric estimators, which address potential omitted variable bias, is beneficial 
when the primary objective lies in recovering a particular parameter value, for 
example, in estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for a marginal change in a non-
market good from a hedonic price function. In the context of Part I, the objective 
was to eliminate confounding spatial variables and identify unbiased and 
efficient parameter values. Part II moves on to consider situations that are 
explicitly concerned with understanding the spatial processes, which determine 
the distribution of households.  In particular, Part II considers how to model such 
spatial processes in order to evaluate the impact of policy changes on the 
provision of endogenous public goods and, ultimately, on household welfare.  To 
facilitate this Part II progresses from the reduced form representation of 
equilibrium to a class of Equilibrium Sorting Models (ESMs), which provide an 
agent based modelling approach that considers the interaction of households, 
landlords and governments across the urban landscape.  Part II extends the 
framework of ESMs to include endogenous tenure choice and uses this new 
model to examine the magnitude and distribution of welfare changes resulting 
from policy changes. 
 
These models were originally developed in attempts to explain observed patterns 
of socioeconomic and racial segregation, however the flexibility of the modelling 
framework lends them to the analysis of many other economic problems 
including addressing questions about environmental justice, deriving estimates of 
willingness to pay for non-market goods and predicting general equilibrium 
adjustments to policy changes.  
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In previous applications of ESMs the tenure choice of households has not been of 
primary concern.  As a result the models have developed under the assumption 
that all households rent properties from absentee landlords.  In a static context 
this simplifying assumption does not appear remarkably unwarranted, however 
consider the distinction between renters and owners in the face of a policy 
change that improves the quality of a neighbourhood.  For simplicity let us 
assume that property prices would rise in response to increased competition.  For 
renters this is a burden that reduces the gains in utility from the improved quality 
and may even force them to relocate to an area with lower quality.  In contrast, 
an owner would experience a rise in the value of their asset.  This could enable 
them to move to an area with even greater quality.  It is clear from this simple 
example that the tenure status of a household will alter how it is affected by a 
policy change.   
 
Building upon the existing literature, I develop a spatially explicit 
microeconomic model that unites household location decisions, landlord supply 
decisions and government policy decisions, whilst simultaneously accounting for 
the endogenous provision of local public goods.  The model developed in this 
thesis extends beyond the current literature by incorporating an endogenous 
tenure choice and exploring the disparate impact of policy changes on renters 
and owners.  Introducing homeownership leads to path dependency through 
capital gains.  This is complemented by the introduction of housing stock 
constraints that determine how the stock of properties can adjust in response to 
policy changes. 
 
The work presented in the following sections is the product of research that was 
undertaken with the involvement of two institutions: Arizona State University 
(ASU) and The Department for Transport.  My work on ESMs began with an 
interest in the work of Nesheim (2002), which presents an ESM exploring the 
sorting of heterogeneous households across locations based on differences in 
school quality.  In the same paper, Nesheim addresses the hedonic estimation 
problem in a single market, using restrictions developed from his ESM to 
introduce non-linearity into the system, which supports the identification of 
parameters from the hedonic price function.  However, my interest in ESMs 
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developed with a greater focus upon their usefulness for exploring feedbacks and 
endogeneity within the system and the implications of these processes for the 
magnitude and distribution of impacts upon households.  This led to an interest 
in understanding the role of the property market in the mediation and 
redistribution of welfare gains.  Of course, the property market influence occurs 
through adjustments in prices. In understanding how the property market can 
redistribute across households, it is therefore natural to explore how these price 
adjustments affect individual households.  A key determinant of this is tenure 
choice.  Indeed, tenure choice plays two central roles: First, initial tenure status 
determines how a household is affected by a change in price that alters the cost 
of its current consumption bundle.  More specifically, renters face a higher cost 
when rental prices rise whereas homeowners are shielded from such burdens and 
may instead benefit from capital gains when prices rise.  Second, tenure choice 
presents households with the flexibility to switch between tenure options in 
response to changes in prices. 
 
My work on ESMs began with an exploration of the existing literature with the 
intention of considering tenure choice within this context.  The work presented in 
this thesis was part funded by the Department for Transport, as such my initial 
objectives were driven by an interest in transport policy and the environment.  
However, at the onset of my research into ESMs I was fortunate in successfully 
obtaining an Overseas Institutional Visit award from the ESRC. The award 
enabled me to attend a series of advanced lectures on environmental economics 
and work on developing an ESM paper at Arizona State University.  This was an 
incredible opportunity to work with academics at the forefront of the current 
research into ESMs including Professors Kerry Smith and Nicolai Kuminoff.  
During my visit I made significant headway in developing my ESM with an 
endogenous tenure choice and was inspired to undertake an application of this 
model to the issue of Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) in the United States.  
This led to the third paper presented in this thesis.   
 
Upon my return to the UK I returned to working on applying the ESM with 
endogenous tenure choice to problems involving localised changes in 
environmental quality.  This included collaborating with the Department for 
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Transport to explore the usefulness of ESMs for analysing policy changes over 
medium to long-term time horizons.  To provide a more fluid transition from part 
I to part II of the thesis the ESM papers are not presented chronologically.  
Instead, the work developed with the Department for Transport is presented first 
and the application of the model to the more general economics problem of 
reforming MID policy follows. 
 
The first paper develops an ESM with endogenous tenure choice and uses it to 
explore the divergence between conventional welfare analysis based on a static 
partial equilibrium approach and a general equilibrium analysis which accounts 
for adjustments in the property market as households relocate in response to 
policy changes.   To explore policy questions using this framework it is 
necessary to either estimate or calibrate the model.  This involves making 
specific assumptions about the structure of the economy, for example, the 
number of neighbourhoods, the distribution of income and preferences, the 
definition of environmental quality and local public goods etc.  To illustrate the 
mechanics of the framework, I calibrate a stylized two-neighbourhood version of 
the ESM model.  Although this stylized model could be calibrated to any 
location, I calibrate it to the town of Polegate, East Sussex in 2001 using data 
from the Census, Expenditure and Food Survey, house price databases and 
Ordnance Survey GIS data layers.  The choice of Polegate was motivated 
partially arbitrarily and partially as a result of the construction of the A27 
Polegate Bypass which provides a suitable policy motivation for the analysis.  
The two neighbourhoods are labelled “Town Centre” and “Suburbs” and 
households have preferences defined over proximity from the centre of the town 
and exposure to road noise from traffic.  I consider the impact of constructing a 
bypass, which runs around the outside of the suburbs and diverts traffic from the 
main road that runs through the town centre. 
 
This policy application serves to demonstrate the ability of the model to capture 
the magnitude and distribution of welfare changes as the initial policy change 
induces behavioural responses that propagate through the property market 
affecting capital gains, housing supply and income from rental properties.   The 
simulations illustrate the complex nature of these adjustments and indicate that a 
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partial equilibrium analysis provides an incomplete picture of the resulting 
welfare effects.  Furthermore, these complex adjustments distort targeted policies 
and redistribute benefits from renters towards owners.  This suggests that 
environmental policies may be a poor tool for redistribution. 
 
The second paper presented in Part II uses a calibrated version of the model to 
investigate the impact of reforming Mortgage Interest Deduction in the US.  The 
model is extended further to allow homeownership to affect the provision of 
local public goods, leading to a model in which the provision of local public 
goods is endogenously determined.  I simulate and compare the distributional 
impacts of four policy reforms: a Cap on MID, a Flat Rate MID, a Tax Rebate 
and a New Owner Payment.  The results highlight a number of interesting issues: 
first, they highlight the disparity between renters and owners.  Second, they 
illustrate the prevalence of path dependency caused through homeownership and 
housing stock constraints.  Finally they demonstrate how the features of the 
model can interact with policies and create a discord between policy design and 
policy outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3  
 
Why welfare analysis in environmental economics simply cannot 
afford to ignore tenure 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
Many projects and policies result in environmental impacts that differ across 
space. Consider as examples, the construction of a new park, the closure of a 
landfill site or the project that motivates this paper, the building of a bypass that 
directs road traffic around rather than through a town, In evaluation such 
projects, policymakers often wish to quantify the benefits of the change in local 
environmental quality in such a way as to enable a Hicks-Kaldor type 
comparison of the costs and benefits to be made.   In addition, the importance of 
distributional impacts of environmental changes has become the subject of 
increasing attention and concern (Liu, 2000).  Indeed, the remit of policymakers 
is increasingly driven by the environmental justice agenda (Walker, 1998, 
Walton and Shaw, 2003, Poustie, 2004) and has begun to consider how 
environmental planning and policy can be utilised as a tool for redistribution.  In 
the US this process has been underway for the last two decades following the 
publication of the Commission for Racial Justice’s 1987 Toxic Wastes and Race 
in the United States, with the incorporation of environmental justice 
considerations into the working directives of the Environmental Protection 
Agency and other environmental planning agencies (Walker).   In the UK, 
environmental justice concerns have developed more slowly.  Following the 
publication of the Friends of the Earth (FoE) (1999) report on pollution injustice, 
there has been a growing body of evidence linking environmental problems and 
social injustices in the UK (ESRC Global Environmental Change Programme, 
2001, Walker, 2003).  In addition, increased attention to environmental justice in 
EU and UN18 directives and initiatives like the Aarhus Convention (1998)19 have 
                                                      
 
18
 Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm  
World Charter for Nature UNGA  
19
 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (1998). 
Convention on Biological Diversity 31 ILM (1992) 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment, 32 ILM (1993) 
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raised the profile of these issues and encouraged the UK government to 
incorporate environmental justice into its policy and decision making (Walker 
and Bickerstaff, 2000). 
 
To illustrate the challenges involved in assessing the magnitude and distribution 
of welfare effects, consider the example  of the construction of a bypass road that 
seeks to reduce the flows of through traffic from the centre of a town.  
Implementation of that policy would result in a variety of spatially defined 
impacts.  Those living closest to the town centre, for example, might enjoy the 
greatest improvements in quality while those living closest to the new bypass 
might experience the largest losses.  Conventional project appraisal would seek 
to establish the benefits of building the bypass by estimating how much residents 
in those different locations would be willing to pay, (or potentially willing to 
accept in compensation) for the changes in environmental quality that they 
experience.  I shall refer to this standard practice as the static approach since it 
assumes that the residents make no behavioural changes in response to the 
changing conditions brought about by the construction of the bypass.  The 
suitability of this static approach for evaluating policy changes that precipitate 
wider behavioural responses is the subject of an on-going debate (Just et al., 
2004, Klaiber and Smith, 2010) with many arguing that the approach is 
insufficient and inaccurately represents the underlying welfare effects (Goulder 
and Roberton C. Williams, 2003, Smith and Carbone, 2007, Carbone and Smith, 
2008, Bayer et al., 2009, Klaiber and Phaneuf, 2010). In particular, as a result of 
Tiebout’s (1956) hypothesis stating that households purchase environmental 
quality through their location, environmental changes may alter household 
behaviour through, for example, relocation in the property market, adjustments in 
the labour market and changes in recreation site choices (Kerry Smith et al., 
2004, Sieg et al., 2004, Tra, 2010). 
 
Residential location, for example, is mediated through a set of adjustments in the 
property market.  These adjustments are extremely complex and can have a 
substantial impact upon both the magnitude and distribution of welfare effects 
resulting from an environmental policy.  Environmental economists are 
beginning to get a handle on the mechanisms at work through the estimation and 
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simulation of equilibrium sorting models (ESMs).   These models are particularly 
suited to this area as they explicitly model and characterise the equilibria 
resulting from the interaction of households, landlords, government and property 
suppliers in a system of local neighbourhoods (Epple and Platt, 1998, Bayer et 
al., 2004, Ferreyra, 2007, Kuminoff et al., 2010).   Over the last decade, the 
complexity of ESMs and the range of applications has expanded very rapidly 
(see (Kuminoff et al., 2010) for a thorough review of the development of this 
literature).  Smith et al. (2004) , Sieg et al (2004) and Tra (2010), for example, 
use the ESM framework to evaluate policies relating to air quality in the Los 
Angeles area. Ferreyra (2007) explores the impact of large-scale private school 
voucher programs in the Chicago metropolitan area using an ESM approach. 
Likewise, Walsh (2007) uses the ESM framework to examine policies aimed at 
preventing urban sprawl in North Carolina. In each of these cases, the authors 
have demonstrated how feedback effects have major policy implications. For 
example, Walsh’s policy simulation shows how increasing the amount of land in 
public preserves can actually decrease the total amount of land in open space in 
the metropolitan area.  The structure of ESMs permits them to be used not only 
to estimate preference parameters, but also to use these estimates (or calibrated 
values in their place) to solve the model under counterfactual policy scenarios, 
taking into account the general equilibrium impact of policy change through 
spill-overs, feedbacks and endogeneity.  
 
ESMs attempt to reflect the true complexity of the underlying problem being 
studied.  The purpose of this paper is to contribute to that endeavour.  In 
particular, while much progress has been made in terms of developing the ability 
of the ESMs to capture the discrete nature of the supply of environmental 
amenities and reflect a wide range of household heterogeneity, other important 
aspects remain undeveloped.  Specifically, this paper seeks to extend the ESM 
framework to incorporate two important elements of the property market: 
housing supply and tenure choice.  
 
In an ESM of a property market, an equilibrium of the model is defined as a set 
of set of prices that equate the quantities of housing supplied and quantities of 
housing demanded.  Whilst the specification of the demand side of the model has 
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been well-studied (Epple and Platt, 1998, Bayer et al., 2004, Ferreyra, 2007), the 
supply side has often been specified in a highly simplified manner.  In most 
empirical applications of ESMs the usual assumption is that  either the total stock 
of housing remains fixed (Bayer et al., 2004, Kerry Smith et al., 2004, Ferreyra, 
2007, Tra, 2010), or there exists some constant elasticity of supply function for 
the construction of new housing (Sieg et al., 2004, Walsh, 2007, Epple and 
Ferreyra, 2008, Epple et al., 2010).  The implications of simplifying the housing 
supply function depend upon the way in which housing is defined within the 
model.  Different approaches have been adopted in different ESMs, in this paper 
I focus upon the model developed by Epple and Platt (1998).  In this model 
housing is defined as a continuous good using an indexing procedure to convert 
expenditure on housing into a quantity measure defined in terms of homogeneous 
quality units of housing (the mechanics of this conversion is detailed in Sieg et al 
(2004)).  In this context, fixing the total stock of housing implies restricting the 
total number of homogeneous quality blocks.  In many of the empirical 
applications these blocks can be repackaged at no cost into any of the other 
possible combinations.  This allows blocks to be transferred between households 
but with a fixed housing supply new development is not permitted.  The first 
objective of this paper is to develop a more realistic medium to long run housing 
supply specification. 
 
Secondly, the majority of empirical ESMs assume that all households are renters 
who pay rents to an absentee landlord (or landlords).  While this approach 
reduces the computational complexity of the model to be solved, there are a 
number of good reasons to believe that renters and owners might be affected 
differently by environmental policy changes.  To illustrate, consider an 
environmental improvement that leads to an increase in demand for housing in a 
particular neighbourhood.  As demand increases, prices also increase so as to 
clear the property market.  Renters in the neighbourhood would face increases in 
rents, which, in the medium term, may force them out of the area.  In contrast, 
for homeowners in the neighbourhood a price rise represents an additional 
option, not only can homeowners choose to stay in the area and enjoy the 
improvement in environmental quality, they may instead choose to sell their 
housing, thus benefitting from capital gains, and relocate to another 
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neighbourhood.   In some cases, this process may induce the gentrification of a 
neighbourhood in light of a local improvement in quality (Banzhaf and Walsh, 
2004, Sieg et al., 2004).   Clearly, these mechanisms have important implications 
for the distribution of welfare effects across renters and owners.   Moreover, 
changes in prices lead to changes in rental revenues.  In an all-renter model these 
benefits flow directly to absentee landlords.  However, in this paper a more 
realistic design is adopted in which rental revenue is recycled to households.  
Since, empirically, wealthier households are more likely to own a share of the 
stock of rental housing and are also more likely to own their own home, the 
model developed here provides a second channel through which the welfare 
effects of a policy may diverge between owners and renters.  
 
Our discussion thus far has sought to establish the importance of understanding 
the role of tenure choice in order to capture some of the feedback mechanisms 
and model the distribution of welfare effects following a policy change.  
Furthermore, our illustration demonstrates how wealthier households might 
capture the benefits of an environmental improvement even when the policy 
itself is initially spatially targeted towards poorer households.  Conversely, a 
reduction in environmental quality may lead to benefits for poorer households 
through reductions in rental costs that offset the environmental loss whereas 
homeowners face either lower environmental quality or capital losses if they 
wish to relocate to another neighbourhood.   In practice, these capital losses are 
often covered by compensation.  For example, in the UK by Part 1 of the 1973 
Land Compensation Act, which reimburses homeowners for reductions in the 
value of their properties resulting from changes in environmental quality 
resulting from public works. Since compensation is paid to homeowners only, 
there is good reason to believe that current policies work to protect owners but 
not renters from changes in environmental quality.  
 
In this paper I develop an ESM with an endogenous tenure choice, rental revenue 
recycling, a more realistic housing supply function and a compensation 
mechanism.  That model provides a means of examining the magnitude and 
distribution of the welfare changes caused by a policy change.  The model is 
illustrated through a simplified simulation exercise calibrated to reflect the 
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features of a real environmental policy change: the construction of the Polegate 
A27 Bypass, in the county of East Sussex in the UK.  The mechanisms at work 
in the model are complex. To intuitively demonstrate the key features/capacities 
the calibrated model presented in this paper is a highly simplified version of the 
model with just two-neighbourhoods. The simulation exercises reveals 
significant differences between the welfare effects of the construction of the 
Polegate bypass as identified by a static analysis and those identified in the 
general equilibrium analysis. Both the magnitude and distribution of the welfare 
effects are altered once medium to long-term adjustments are accounted for. The 
model suggests that those adjustments tend to channel the benefits of 
environmental improvements to owners and away from renters. Rental revenue 
recycling and compensation for homeowners further exacerbate that process.    
The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings and a 
commentary on the further developments that are needed to enable ESMs to be 
adopted by policymakers as a tool for accurately assessing the magnitude and 
distribution of welfare effects of policies or projects that result in localised 
environmental change.  
 
2.0  Housing Supply and Tenure Choice 
 
Following Binner and Day  (submitted to the Journal of Public Economics), this 
paper uses the theoretical framework of Epple and Platt (1998) as a point of 
departure.  Two major innovations are introduced.  First, a more realistic medium 
to long run housing supply specification is developed.  Second, an explicit tenure 
choice is introduced and households are permitted to alter their tenure status in 
response to changes in conditions.   
 
2.1  Housing Supply 
 
The nature of the housing supply function depends critically on the time horizon 
under consideration.  In the short to medium term housing is likely to be fixed.  
In the medium to long term there is scope for new construction to take place and 
for the existing housing stock to be modified.   
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In ESMs of the property market, the standard assumption is that housing is 
supplied in homogeneous quality/quantity blocks that can be purchased at some 
market price. Within the model households’ decide how many of these blocks 
they wish to purchase. Buying more blocks imitates a household purchasing a 
better quality/larger sized property.  
 
With this building block representation of housing supply responses to changes 
in market conditions are typically handled by allowing for changes in the number 
of blocks available for purchase. For example, a number of authors specify a 
constant elasticity of supply (CES) supply function for housing blocks (Epple, 
Romano and Sieg, 2010, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1998, Hallstrom et al, 2003). 
Of course, such a specification implicitly assumes that the supply of housing in 
any neighbourhood can be expanded without limit, an assumption that is clearly 
unrealistic. Another popular specification, which avoids that critique, is that the 
number of housing blocks is fixed (Bayer et al., 2004, Kerry Smith et al., 2004, 
Ferreyra, 2007, Tra, 2010). Both these specifications, however, make the 
untenable assumption that housing blocks can be costlessly repackaged from one 
particular configuration of properties into another: a neighbourhood of 50 two 
block properties, for example, can be transformed without cost into a 
neighbourhood with 100 one block properties.20  
 
In this paper two housing supply specifications are considered and compared.  
                                                      
 
20 The housing stock is comprised of supply from a number of submarkets including 
new builds and conversions.  In the UK conversions accounted for 5,240 (3.9 per cent) 
of the 134,900 increase in the number of properties in 2011-12 (Housing Statistical 
Release, 2012) Although repackaging, also referred to as conversion, has been discussed 
in a number of papers which point to costs arising from bargaining, regulatory 
requirements and construction costs (Capozza and Helsley, 1989, Pogharian, 1990, 
Rothenberg et al., 1991, Montgomery, 1992, Maddison, 2000), the housing supply 
literature has focused on new construction and, as a result, it is difficult to find any 
empirical work quantifying the extent of these costs.  
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First, the conventional fixed supply of total housing blocks.  Second, a new 
specification that allows flexibility in the supply of housing blocks within a 
neighbourhood but also limits the number of individual properties constructed 
from those blocks that can be accommodated within that neighbourhood .  
 
2.2  Tenure Choice 
 
The vast majority of empirical applications of ESMs treat all households as 
renters (Kuminoff et al., 2010) , the exceptions are Epple and Platt (1998) who 
consider a fixed proportion of the population to be owners with the proportion of 
owners increasing with income and Bayer et al (2005) who treat tenure as a 
characteristic of the housing stock.  In reality, there are a number of tenure types 
from which a household can choose with a key distinction being between 
ownership and renting21.  To integrate an endogenous tenure choice into an 
ESM, households are provided with a choice between renting housing or 
purchasing it.  The appeal of owning as opposed to renting one’s home may 
differ across the population.  In reality the tenure decision is dynamic and 
multifaceted, concerning issues such as borrowing constraints, attitudes to risk, 
wealth, transaction costs, the utility derived from achieving social status through 
ownership, preferences for property maintenance and so on.  In this model I 
condense these dimensions into a single metric, a preference for homeownership, 
which captures the additional utility that households derive from housing units 
when they own them.  This preference parameter is defined such that, for a fixed 
price for housing blocks, some households may prefer renting while others may 
prefer owning.  In addition, purchasing housing requires a household to take out 
a mortgage, leading to the payment of a mortgage interest payment that is not 
incurred by renters. The size of mortgage needed by a household is determined in 
part by the loan-to-value ratio of their mortgage. In the model, loan-to-value 
                                                      
 
21
 Although this point has been raised in a number of theoretical papers (Epple & Platt 
1998, Bayer et al. 2004) it has received little formal attention in the development of 
ESMs. 
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ratios differ across households partly in response to differences in a household’s 
income. 
 
Tenure choice introduces a second discrete component into the residential 
decision: not only do households have to choose between neighbourhoods, but 
they also have to choose whether to rent or purchase their home. As a result, 
richer patterns of substitution are allowed by the model. Since, tenure status has 
important ramifications for how a household is affected by policy changes, how 
it can respond to them and thus how its welfare is affected, the choice of tenure is 
an integral part of a household’s residential choice.  Moreover, by explicitly 
accounting for tenure status it is possible for potential capital gains (and losses) 
to be modelled when owners consider relocating.  As a result, the model provides 
a means of examining the differential impact of policy reform on renters and 
owners. As far as the author is aware, this is the first time that the welfare 
implications of these tenure based property market features have been explored 
in the context of an ESM.  More importantly, in the simulations reported in this 
paper, tenure is shown to have a very significant influence on the welfare effects 
of policy changes. As such, I contend that the distinction in tenure status is of 
crucial import in policy analysis. 
 
3.0  The Model 
 
Consider a closed spatial economy consisting of households, i = 1... I. The model 
is “closed” in as much as households are not allowed to migrate into or out of the 
economy and “spatial” in as much as households make a choice as to the location 
in which they reside within the economy.22 
                                                      
 
22 The closed economy model discussed here makes three assumptions: i) there is no 
immigration in, ii) there is no emigration – though with the Cobb Douglas utility is 
bounded by zero since households can opt not to consume any housing which is 
equivalent to a zero utility outside option and iii) there is no population growth. 
 
In the event of deterioration in quality, the availability of an outside option providing 
some positive level of utility could lead to more pronounced reductions in price to 
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Households differ in their incomes, y, preferences for quantity of housing, , and 
preferences for homeownership, º . The preference for homeownership 
parameter, º, represents the private returns to homeownership anticipated by a 
household. The motivation for including this parameter stems from i) the 
freedom homeowners have to modify their housing to their personal tastes, ii) the 
satisfaction of achieving homeownership status and iii) the financial returns from 
capital gains. These private returns may differ across households for a number of 
reasons: i) households may differ both in their ability to modify housing and in 
the costs that they face to do so and ii) they may differ in the satisfaction that 
they derive from the status of owning their home. The distribution of household 
types across the population is defined by the joint multivariate density 
function,	Y», , º.  
 
The economy is defined by a geographical region which is divided up into a set 
of spatially discrete neighbourhoods,	 = 1, . . . , ¼. Each neighbourhood provides 
a vector of c local public goods23, ½¾ = _m-,/, m-,<, … , m-,^b. The provision of 
                                                                                                                                               
 
maintain demand as households emigrate.  Likewise, quality improvements would draw 
in households from the outside population (though this would be mediated through 
moving and transaction costs) and push up prices, potentially leading to the 
displacement of incumbent residents by incomers.  
 
It would be possible, though not trivial, to extend the model to incorporate these 
additional complexities. The particular difficulties lie in characterising the income and 
preference distribution of the outside population, characterising the outside option and 
how it evolves in response to policy changes and in defining welfare in these settings, 
for example extended in the model to include migration and an “outside” population 
raises questions whether a local authority is interested in welfare increases accruing to 
new residents and those affecting households who leave the area? These questions have 
ethical and political dimensions as well as being methodological. 
 
23
 In this paper local public goods are considered to be exogenously determined, 
however, more generally, local public goods may be comprised of exogenous elements, 
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these public goods is assumed to be homogeneous within a given neighbourhood. 
Households decide in which of the J neighbourhoods they will reside. 
 
3.1  The Demand Side 
 
To reside in neighbourhood j household i must purchase or rent housing in that 
neighbourhood. The decision to rent, F, or own, ¿, housing is referred to as the 
tenure choice. The set of tenure options is	À = 	 _F, ¿b. Accordingly, the model is 
characterised by households’ residential choices, defined by a neighbourhood 
and tenure bundle, _, Ub. The set of residential choices is given by C = J x T. 
 
Households must also choose how much of their income to spend on housing24. 
Following previous treatments (Epple and Romer, 1991, Epple and Platt, 1998, 
Epple et al., 2001, Bayer et al., 2004, Ferreyra, 2007), housing is defined as a 
homogeneous good that can be purchased at a constant per unit price within a 
neighbourhood25. Housing is supplied in neighbourhood  at a per unit property 
price,	S-.  The quantity of housing demanded by household  in neighbourhood  
for tenure type U is denoted, 
 ℎÁ,-, = ℎ-, , ½; », , º (3.1) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 Ã-,~ , such as environmental quality, transport infrastructure or proximity to a central 
business district, and endogenous elements, Ä-,~ , the level of provision of which is 
dependent upon the composition of the set of households that reside within the 
neighbourhood, such that m- = _Ã-,/, … , Ã-,~ , Ä-,~k/, … , Ä-,^b  .  See Nesheim (2002), 
Nechyba (2003b) and Ferreyra (2007).   
24
 In the model, households choose the number of housing units that they wish to 
consume, a decision approximating real life choices over the size and type of house to 
buy or rent. 
25
 In reality housing is not homogeneous, however, as Sieg et al (2002) illustrated, if 
housing enters the utility function through a sub-function that is homogeneous degree 
one, it is possible to construct a ``housing quantity" index tantamount to an empirical 
analogue to the homogeneous housing unit, h.  
 91
Where  is a vector of per unit property prices in each of the neighbourhoods 
and	½ is a vector containing the local public good index for each neighbourhood.  
 
To become a homeowner a household must take out a mortgage 26  and pay 
mortgage interest, ÅÁ , to the lender. Differences in the mortgage rate across 
households can be interpreted as representing the differing abilities of 
households to secure a mortgage and bargain for cheaper interest rates. Mortgage 
interest is paid only on the amount borrowed, which is equal to the product of the 
loan-to-value ratio, ÆÁ , and the value of the housing purchased, S-ℎÁ,-, . 
Differences in the loan-to-value ratio represent differences in the ability of 
households to make a down-payment on housing.   
 
Aggregate demand for housing units conditional on residential choice, _, Ub, is 
calculated by integrating over all households, 
 
Ç-, È = iiiℎ-, . Y», , ºX»XXº (3.2) 
 
3.2  The Supply Side 
 
Housing is produced using land and non-land inputs. The supply of land 
available for supplying housing, É-, may differ between neighbourhoods. As a 
result, the supply of housing may also vary between neighbourhoods. The 
housing supply function for a particular neighbourhood is denoted, 
 Ç-Ê = Y<É- , S- , Ë- , Z- (3.3) 
 É- is the share of total land available in neighbourhood  and S- is the price of 
housing in neighbourhood j. The population size is denoted by Z- .  The largest 
population that can be supported by a neighbourhood is capped by introducing a 
capacity, Ë- . As the population increases towards the capacity the housing 
                                                      
 
26
 For simplicity, the model assumes that all households initially take out a mortgage. 
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supplied at a given price declines as the marginal cost increases.  This 
specification enables density restrictions to be included in the model so as to 
capture constraints on the number of properties that can be built in a 
neighbourhood more realistically. 
 
Traditionally ESMs assume that absentee landlords own the stock of rental 
housing. This approach leaves the model open with some of the costs and/or 
benefits of policy change flowing out of the economy. It is possible to alter the 
model set up to allow rental revenues to be returned to households, as if some of 
those households were themselves landlords. In the model, that process is 
approximated by treating all or some of the stock of rental housing as being 
communally owned and specifying the shares that households have in this stock. 
Households each receive a share, ÌÁ, of the total rental revenues, Í = ∑ S-Ç-,Î¶- , 
in accordance with their shares in the stock. Accounting for such rental revenue 
recycling enables us to consider how changes in rental revenues feed back 
through the economy. 
 
3.3  Government 
 
In this paper the role of government is limited to decision making about the 
location of a bypass that is known to impact environmental quality and the 
administration of compensation27.  The payment of compensation is modelled on 
Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1973, whereby homeowners are 
compensated for reductions in the value of their housing resulting from the 
environmental damage generated by the public works. 
 
3.4  Local Public Goods 
 
                                                      
 
27
 This is not a restriction of ESMs in general.  The models are capable of encompassing 
a variety of behaviour, for example governments may levy income and property taxes, 
fund expenditure on public goods, set production standards or provide subsidies.  
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Households derive utility from the combined provision of the local public goods, 
which is represented by the index of local public goods provision, 
 
m- =	}~m-,~^~./ 	 (3.4) 
 
Where ~  is the weight placed on the kth element in m-28. For simplicity, the 
calibrated simulation exercise developed in the following sections assumes that 
the index combines levels of two exogenous public goods, 
 m- = m-,/ + m-,< (3.5) 
  is the weight that households place on m-,< relative to m-,/. It is assumed that  
is the same for all households and across neighbourhoods, such that households 
agree on the ranking of neighbourhoods in terms of their local public good 
provision.   
 
3.5 Household Optimisation 
 
Households derive utility from their access to local public goods, 	m- ,  their 
consumption of housing, h, and other consumption, . Tenure status affects the 
way in which households enjoy the flow of services provided by housing. All 
else equal, household  derives the same level of utility from owning h units of 
housing as from renting ºℎ units.  For simplicity and clarity, households are 
assumed to have the same preference for local public goods, Ð. Household utility 
is defined by the function, 
 ÑÁ,-, = Ñm-, ℎÁ,-, , U, ; »Á, Ð, Á, ºÁ (3.6) 
 
                                                      
 
28
 As	m- is an index, these weights can be normalised such that	/ = 1. 
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The optimisation problem of household	 can be decomposed into two stages. 
First, households calculate their optimal housing and consumption choices for 
each neighbourhood and tenure bundle. The conditional maximisation problem 
is, 
 max!,Ô|-, Ñm-, ℎÁ,-, , U, ; »Á, Ð, Á, ºÁ A. U.	 
»Á + ÌÁ = S-ℎÁ,-, + Á,																											U = F1+ÅÁÆÁS-ℎÁ,-, + Á, U = ¿ (3.7) 
 
Where S-  is the price of a unit of housing in neighbourhood	.  The owner’s 
budget constraint also includes the term 1 + ÆÁÅÁ indicating that a homeowner 
must pay for each unit of housing and also for mortgage interest.  
 
 
The budget constraints in equation (3.7) assume that households do not initially 
own any housing.  When we consider adjustments to new equilibrium it is 
important to consider the potential for capital gains.  For an existing homeowner 
the model accounts for three ways in which capital gains can accrue, i) when a 
homeowner sells some but not all of their housing units and stays in the same 
neighbourhood and ii) when a homeowner sells their housing in one 
neighbourhood and becomes an owner in a different neighbourhood, and iii) 
when a homeowner sells their housing in one neighbourhood and becomes a 
renter.  The budget constraint for household i can be expressed formulaically as, 
 »Á + ÌÁ + S- 	/JℎÁ,-Õ,Ö2 − ℎÁ,-Õ,Ö/ L = 1 + ÆÁÅÁS-/ℎÁ,-Õ,Ö2 + /, 	AU@»Zm	@A	@Z	T×ZW§»Á + ÌÁ + JS-/ − 1 + ÆÁÅÁS-2LℎÁ,-Õ,Ö2 = 1 + ÆÁÅÁS-/ℎÁ,-Ø,Ö/ + /, ÅTVZm	@A	@Z	T×ZW§»Á + ÌÁ + JS-/ − 1 + ÆÁÅÁS-2LℎÁ,-Õ,Ö2 = S-/ℎÁ,-Ø,Ö/ + /, 																						ÅTVZm	@ZX	ZT×	§WZUZm 
 
Where superscript 0 denotes a baseline variable and 1 denotes a new variable 
choice.  In each equation the third expression on the right hand side denotes the 
capital gains made on units of housing sold the first expression on the left hand 
side represents the new expenditure on housing, including mortgage interest. 
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Maximisation of the direct utility function subject to the constraints yields the 
following conditional indirect utility functions, 
 
¦Á,-, = Ù¦S, m; », Ð, ,													U = F¦S, m; », Ð, , º, U = ¿ (3.9) 
 
Second, households select the neighbourhood and tenure choice that provides the 
greatest level of utility. 
 
3.6  Equilibrium 
 
An equilibrium in this model is defined by a set of neighbourhoods, ¼, a one to 
one correspondence of households to neighbourhoods and an associated set of 
property prices,  = _S/, … , S-b for each neighbourhood, such that, 
 
1. Each household resides in the neighbourhood that maximises its utility 
given the equilibrium vector of prices and endogenous public good 
provision. 
2. All housing markets clear, Ç-, ¶ = Ç-, È 	∀	, U. 
 
The introduction of an endogenous tenure choice and preferences for 
homeownership generalises the pure characteristics ESMs developed by Epple 
and Platt (1998) and does not alter the underlying properties that support the 
existence of equilibria.  Namely, the single crossing, boundary indifference, 
ordered bundles and stratification properties continue to hold29 (Epple and Platt, 
1998, Epple et al., 2010).  
                                                      
 
29  Epple and Romer (1991) demonstrated the existence and properties of a pure 
characteristics equilibrium sorting model.  These properties are: i) stratification - each 
neighbourhood is occupied by households within a certain set of income and 
preferences, ii) boundary indifference - ranking neighbourhoods by price, there exists a 
locus of households defined by their income and preferences who are indifferent 
between any two consecutive neighbourhoods and iii) ordered bundles - the price 
ranking of neighbourhoods is the same as the ranking of neighbourhoods by their public 
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4.0  Response Pathways to Exogenous Policy Change 
 
At this point it is instructive to contemplate the types of responses that can be 
accommodated by the model and the distinction between renters and owners. 
Imagine an environmental improvement that leads to a rise in house prices in a 
neighbourhood. For renters that means higher rents, for owners it means they can 
sell their property at a higher price.  
 
Consider first what those price increases mean for renters. Increases in the cost 
of renting mean that they are no longer able to afford their current housing and 
consumption bundle. A number of options are available. First, the renter could 
remain renting in the same neighbourhood but consume fewer units of housing. 
Alternatively, the rise in rental price may make homeownership relatively cheap 
and thus more desirable in which case the renter may wish to become an owner 
in the same neighbourhood. In addition, the renter may consider relocating to a 
different neighbourhood and may continue to rent or begin owning. 
 
Now consider the consequences of a similar rise in prices on homeowners. The 
rise in prices has rather different implications for this group. Homeowners own 
their properties outright.  As such, homeowners can always afford their current 
housing and consumption bundles, even when property prices rise. In this way, 
homeowners are shielded against price fluctuations. A rise in prices cannot make 
an existing owner worse off, instead it presents an opportunity to sell units of 
housing and use the capital gains to increase consumption or to relocate to a 
neighbourhood that provides more desirable public goods, in which case they 
might continue to own or may become renters. The choices made by each 
household will be determined by its preferences, characteristics and existing 
ownership of housing. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
goods index.  These properties hold under the assumption that indifference curves 
exhibit the single crossing property and utility is monotonically increasing in its 
attributes. 
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In addition to enabling us to distinguish between owners and renters, the ESM 
model developed in this paper also considers the impact of policy change on 
rental revenues that are returned to households.  The total value of rental 
revenues is dependent on the distribution of households resulting from the 
sorting process. Moreover, the rental revenues received by each household may 
alter in response to policy changes as households adjust their tenure choice and 
housing consumption and property prices rise or fall.  Changes in rental revenues 
will have a more significant impact on households with a larger share of the 
rental stock; these are likely to be wealthier households. In turn, changes in rental 
revenues will feedback into the economy as changes in consumption through an 
income effect.  The model easily extends to more general endogenous public 
goods.30 
 
A notable limitation of this model is that is it does not incorporate labour market 
decisions.  There is growing evidence to suggest that transport and infrastructure 
improvements can impact employment decisions, productivity and wages 
(Gibbons et al., 2012, Sanchis-Guarner, 2012).  In future work these additional 
response pathways could be incorporated by moving to a dual market model that 
simultaneously addresses location and labour market decisions (Kuminoff 2009). 
 
5.0 Calibrating the Model 
 
The simulations presented in the following sections draw on work carried out for 
the Department for Transport (DfT), funders of this PhD studentship. The 
objective of that work is to examine the usefulness of ESMs for real world 
project evaluation.  As part of that research a multiple-neighbourhood version of 
                                                      
 
30
 For example, other models have considered the impact of social interaction between 
the occupants of a neighbourhood, such as the influence of peer group effects, on 
education quality and human capital accumulation and the influence of political systems 
of social choice on the level of provision of a local amenities, such as education 
spending per pupil and expenditure on law enforcement.  See Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973).  
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the ESM described above has been developed and calibrated to investigate a real 
DfT project: construction of the A27 Polegate bypass. The results of this analysis 
are presented in Appendix A.  
 
While multiple-neighbourhood models are well-suited to the task of evaluating a 
real world policy they tend to result in very complicated patterns of substitution 
across the numerous neighbourhoods. In order to draw insights as to the 
importance of tenure choice as revealed by the ESM, it is significantly more 
informative to work with a simplified two-neighbourhood version of the model. 
Accordingly, the analyses in this section present results from a stylised two-
neighbourhood simplification of the more general Polegate analysis presented in 
the Appendix.  
 
 
The model is calibrated using census information giving homeownership rates in 
Polegate in 2001, the year before the bypass opened,  and using data the Post 
Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) A27 Polegate Bypass report (2009) which 
details the population shares that were affected by the construction of the bypass. 
Baseline neighbourhood prices for a unit of homogeneous housing were derived 
by taking the neighbourhood specific intercepts from a fixed effects hedonic 
regression. That regression used property price data from 2000 provided by the 
UK Land Registry. That price data was matched, using GIS techniques, to further 
information on property characteristics from OS Mastermap and Edina31. 
 
5.1 The Economy 
 
In the simplified calibration the economy is divided into two regions: one 
comprising the town centre, which has a main road running through it, and the 
second comprising the suburbs.  The town centre is closer to a range of amenities 
(for illustrative purposes these amenities could include parks, shops, a school, a 
medical centre etc.).  However, whilst properties located in the town centre 
                                                      
 
31
 See Kuminoff et al (2010) for a discussion of this methodology. 
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benefit from greater access to these positive local amenities they are also 
exposed to greater road noise as a result of traffic on the busy throughway.  
 
5.2       Households 
 
Household utility is represented by a Cobb Douglas utility function, such that, 
 ÑÁ,-, =	m-ÛºÁ, ℎÜÝ/?Û?ÜÝ (3.10) 
 
Household preferences for public goods,	Ð, and homeownership, ºÁ, are assumed 
to be independent of their income and housing expenditure.  With a Cobb 
Douglas utility function 	  can be interpreted as the share of income that a 
household commits to purchasing housing.   
 
A population of 1600 households were drawn from a joint bivariate distribution, Yln» , , of incomes, y, and expenditure on housing, . The sample size was 
chosen to replicate the actual number of households affected by the bypass, as 
reported in the POPE. The parameters of the joint distribution were estimated 
using data from the Expenditure and Food Survey 2001-2, which provides a 
breakdown of gross weekly income and expenditures on housing including 
mortgage costs, maintenance and depreciation (2001 GB Pounds). A joint 
lognormal bivariate distribution was fitted to the data by maximum likelihood 
estimation. This process reveals a negative correlation between the two variables 
indicating that lower income households spend a larger proportion of their 
income on housing.  The resulting parameter estimates were, 
 &ßàáâ, ßÜ( = 9.83, 0.17 
  
Σàáâ,Ü = 5 2.72 −0.07−0.07 0.03 6 (3.11) 
 
The loan-to-value ratio was calibrated using data from the FSA Mortgage 
Product Sales Data Trends Report (2007). This was used to simulate the correct 
proportion of households with loan-to-value ratios within given intervals (0.00-
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0.67, 0.67-0.83, 0.83-0.99, 0.99-1.00). In the absence of detailed information on 
loan-to-value ratios by income group, loan-to-value ratios (ordered from lowest 
to highest) were assigned to households (ordered from highest income to lowest) 
and a mean zero random component was added. 
 
Preferences for homeownership, º, were drawn from a log normal distribution, 
 lnº~	ßå, :å< &ßå, :å<( = 0.80, 0.03 (3.12) 
 
The mean and variance of the distribution were calibrated using a maximum 
likelihood procedure designed to minimize the difference between observed and 
predicted population shares and homeownership rates in the two neighbourhoods 
at the derived housing prices. 
 
5.3      Local Public Goods 
 
Neighbourhoods are differentiated by their distance to the town centre and road 
noise levels.  The local public goods index is given by, 
 m- = m-,/ + m-,< + æ- (3.13)  
 
Where m-,/ is distance from Polegate town centre (measured as a negative) and m-,< is reduction in noise levels from a maximum of 100 dB.  The proximity to 
Polegate town centre was calculated using ArcGIS.  Noise pollution, is measured 
using the average 18-hour decibel level and is directly affected by the creation of 
the bypass.  The baseline and post-bypass noise levels are calibrated using 
information from the A27 Polegate Environmental Statement.   
 
The parameter,	Ð, relating to preferences for local public goods was set using the 
technique for calibration with non-market goods detailed by Carbone & Smith 
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(2008).32 
  
Using this methodology the parameter can be calibrated using the result, 
 
Ð = SçØm/2 + Sçèm<2» +	SçØm/2 + Sçèm<2 (3.14) 
 
Where SçØ  and Sçè  are implicit prices for distance to Polegate centre and 
reductions in noise pollution respectively, and subscript 0 denotes a baseline 
level of the corresponding variable. Using this approach the weighting parameter 
in the local public goods index, ½¾, can also be calibrated using implicit prices, 
 
 = SçØSçè (3.15) 
 
The implicit prices can be derived from any number of studies of willingness to 
pay for proximity to the town centre and for reductions in road noise. This paper 
uses the estimates of implicit prices for improvements in noise pollution from the 
Day et al (2002) hedonic study of the Birmingham area and the estimate of the 
implicit price for proximity to Polegate centre from a hedonic study 33 .  
Evaluating the implicit prices at the 2000 mean values for air quality and 
                                                      
 
32 The Carbone and Smith (2008) methodology employs implicit prices to calibrate the 
preference for public goods.  The procedure seems a little at odds with the general 
equilibrium nature of the equilibrium sorting model:  The calibration technique itself is 
valid because it assumes that the system is currently in equilibrium and uses implicit 
prices, which are relevant when evaluating a marginal change to infer preference for the 
public good using the current hedonic price function.  However, the approach is 
potentially problematic since the process of household sorting may cause endogeneity, 
which needs to be accounted for when estimating implicit prices to ensure that unbiased 
estimates are obtained.  A preferred method would be to use micro level data to jointly 
estimate the parameters of the model.   
 
33
 In the calibration of this two-neighbourhood model I use data on the sale of properties 
in Polegate in the year 2000 from Zoopla.co.uk. 
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proximity to the central business district provides a calibrated value of 0.11 for α 
and 0.02 for γ.  
 
The model is divided into neighbourhoods with equal shares of the population 
and homeownership rates of eighty per cent (based on census data for 2000).  
The unobserved public good, æ- , was calibrated using a maximum likelihood 
procedure designed to minimize the difference between observed and predicted 
population shares and homeownership rates in the two neighbourhoods for the 
derived per unit housing prices. The resulting indices show that the baseline 
index of public good provision is greater in the suburbs, consistent with the 
higher property price in the suburbs. 
 
5.4      Housing Supply 
 
There are two components to housing supply: baseline housing supply and the 
medium to long term housing supply function.  In the baseline, I assume that the 
economy is in long run equilibrium where the prevailing housing supply reflects 
long run housing supply. In that case, the housing supply is equal to, and can 
therefore be inferred from, the total housing demand in each neighbourhood.   
To evaluate policy changes a housing supply function is specified that defines 
how the supply of housing responds to the market changes precipitated by the 
construction of the bypass. Ideally this housing supply function would come 
from detailed information on the true housing supply functions, but that 
information was not available to us. Accordingly, the housing supply function 
used in the model is developed using plausible assumptions. That supply 
function is linear, assumes a positive elasticity of supply and increasing marginal 
cost associated with the production of additional housing units. In addition, the 
supply function includes an element reflecting the costs of constructing 
additional properties out of housing blocks and a population capacity limiting the 
total number of individual properties that can be supported by a neighbourhood.  
The resulting housing supply function is defined within the limits 0 ≤ ¢¿¢- ≤Ë-¢¿¢-2,  
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ÇÊ&S-( = é @&S- − S-
2( + Ç-2, ¢¿¢- ≤ ¢¿¢-2
@&S- − S-2( + Ç-2 − 7 &¢¿¢- − ¢¿¢-2(¢¿¢-2 , Ë-¢¿¢-2 ≥ ¢¿¢- ≥ ¢¿¢-2 (3.16) 
 
Where ¢¿¢- and ¢¿¢-2 are the new and old population size of neighbourhood , Ç-2 is the housing supply in the baseline, @ and 7 are constants relating to the 
price elasticity of housing supply and the additional cost associated with 
constructing a new plot, and Ë-  is a capacity limit representing the maximum 
percentage increase in population that can be supported in neighbourhood .  In 
this example, Ë is set as a uniform capacity limit that constrains the development 
of new plots to a maximum of fifteen per cent in each neighbourhood34. Whilst I 
do not assume to be capturing all of the facets of housing supply, this extension 
provides an insight into the influence of developments in the property market and 
how these developments propagate and distort outcomes.  
 
5.5      Rental revenue recycling 
 
In the absence of more detailed information, I assume that fifty per cent of rental 
revenues are recycled to households.  The share of rental revenues received by 
households was calibrated using Expenditure and Food Survey data on gross 
weekly household income and income from renting out. The corresponding 
shares are presented in Table 3.1.  Data for 2000 reveals that the share of rental 
revenues being returned to households is increasing in income such that 
wealthier households are more likely to own a share of the stock of rental 
housing. 
 
5.6      Government 
 
                                                      
 
34 The value of fifteen per cent was supported by the UK Housing Review (2009) which 
reports that over the period of 1991-2007 the number of owner-occupied new build 
properties constituted a rise of 15.3 per cent in the housing stock in England. 
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The government provides compensation to households located in a 
neighbourhood where road noise levels increase as a result of the construction of 
the bypass.  Compensation is defined as follows,  
 
TÅSWZA@UTZÁ,-,Ö = ë 0,																																							Å×US ∗ ìm-,< ∗ ℎ,0 < 50Å×US ∗ ìm-,< ∗ ℎ,,¿0 ,						Å×US ∗ ìm-,< ∗ ℎ,0 ≥ 50	 (3.17) 
 
The level of compensation is calculated by defining a marginal willingness to 
pay value, Å×US, (derived from a hedonic regression using baseline property 
prices and environmental quality) that represents the additional premium a 
household pays on every unit of housing for a unit increase in environmental 
quality.  The marginal willingness to pay value is multiplied by the size of the 
change in environmental quality, ìm-,<, to obtain the premium paid for the total 
change and, lastly, multiplied by the quantity of housing units initially owned by 
the household, ℎÁ,-,Ö2 , to calculate the total compensation.  Following the 1973 
Compensation Act the level of compensation is paid when this amounts to at 
least a minimum of £50.  The model accounts for both the direct impact of 
compensation on utility and the interaction between the payment of 
compensation and the behavioural response of households.  
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Income Percentile Share of Rental Revenues 
5th 0 
10th 0 
15th 0.01 
20th 0 
25th 0 
30th 0.01 
35th 0 
40th 0.01 
45th 0 
50th 0.01 
55th 0.04 
60th 0 
65th 0.03 
70th 0.02 
75th 0.04 
80th 0.05 
85th 0.05 
90th 0.25 
95th 0.09 
100th 0.40 
 
Table  3.1: Share of rental revenues by income percentile 
 
The calibrated model is coded in Matlab35  and uses simulation and iterative 
numerical techniques to solve for market clearing prices and endogenous rental 
revenues (Lagarias et al., 1998). 
 
6.0      Exploring the Model  
 
Table 3.2 summarises the two neighbourhoods in the baseline.  Notice that the 
road noise levels are higher in the town centre (59 dB) than in the suburbs (40 
dB).  Properties in the town centre are, on average 400m from the centre of the 
town, whereas properties in the suburbs are an average 1100m from the centre.  
                                                      
 
35
 The Matlab code is available from the authors upon request. 
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These two attributes combine to form an index of public good provision in each 
neighbourhood.   
 Town Centre Suburbs 
Average distance from centre (m) 400 1100 
Road noise level (dB) 59 40 
Public goods index 33.0 33.9 
Population share 0.5 0.5 
Homeownership Rate 0.74 0.82 
 
Table  3.2: Baseline characteristics of the neighbourhoods 
 
The demographics of the two neighbourhoods derived for the calibrated baseline 
are presented in Table 3.3.  A number of patterns of sorting can be seen.  First, 
households with higher incomes tend to locate in the suburbs, driving up the 
price of properties in the neighbourhood with a greater provision of public goods.  
Second, poorer households, who spend a larger proportion of their income on 
housing, are attracted to the town centre by its lower property prices. Lastly, 
households with relatively high preferences for homeownership (theta) become 
owners and others become renters. 
 
 Town Centre Suburbs 
Price (£) 5183 5258 
Population Share 0.50 0.50 
Homeownership Rate 0.74 0.82 
 Population Characteristics 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income (£) 35,964 53,992 104,075 90,492 
Mean  0.399 0.36 0.1 0.11 
Mean í 1.00 1.13 0.99 1.12 
Mean housing 2.72 3.97 2.07 2.14 
Median housing 0.83 1.29 0.41 0.35 
Population 205 597 144 654 
 
Table  3.3: Calibrated baseline neighbourhood composition 
 107
6.1      Examining Local Environmental Change  
 
In that initial equilibrium, the economy experiences a change in conditions as a 
result of the construction of a bypass. The immediate impact of the bypass is to 
change the exposure to traffic noise of properties in the two neighbourhoods. 
Drawing on data from the real world experience in Polegate, road noise levels in 
the town centre fall by 2 dB to 57 dB as traffic flows are reduced.  In the suburbs 
road noise rises by 1 dB to 41 dB due to noise from the bypass.  
 
The conventional approach to assessing the welfare impact of constructing the 
bypass is to look at the direct impact on the households.  In this case, the direct 
impact for households in the town centre is an improvement that equates to a 
0.65 per cent rise in utility for all households36.  For households in the suburbs 
the rise in road noise translates to a 0.33 per cent decrease in utility.  Using the 
formula for calculating static or partial equilibrium (PE) willingness to pay, 
 À¢¡· = »0 + Ì0 − WS00 , ½¾® , »0 + Ì0, +0 (3.18) 
 
Which by substitution becomes, 
  
À¢¡· = îïï
ð1 − ñ½¾½¾® ò
Ð1−Ð
óôô
õ »0 + Ì0 
(3.19) 
 
Table 3.4 summarises the willingness to pay values for renters and owners in 
each of the two neighbourhoods and the sum of these values, which corresponds 
to the residents’ total willingness to pay for bypass project. Results from the 
partial equilibrium calculation are presented in the top six rows. The partial 
analysis suggests that overall the bypass provides a welfare gain for residents 
with willingness to pay summing to £12,268. Notice that the partial equilibrium 
                                                      
 
36
 As a result of the Cobb Douglas utility function the percentage change in utility is 
equal across households, however this translates to different values of willingness to 
pay.  
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analysis suggests that utility gains flow predominantly to poorer households in 
the town centre. 
  
Let us now compare this to the findings from the general equilibrium (GE) 
analysis of the same project. Results from that analysis are presented in the 
bottom half of Table 3.4.  In the GE model willingness to pay is calculated as37, 
 À¢ö· = »0 + Ì0 − WS11 , ½¾®® , »0 + Ì1 + TÅSWZA@UTZ, +0 (3.20) 
 
Notice that in the GE calculation it is not only the environmental quality that 
changes.  Households respond to the construction of the bypass by relocating and 
adjusting their consumption and tenure choice, this in turn has knock on effects 
on house prices and rental revenues. 
 
Of course, this relies upon the assumption of free mobility and there are a 
number of additional frictions that we might also want to consider in 
applications: two important considerations are transaction and moving costs.  
These costs violate the assumption of free mobility and alter the nature of the 
choice set faced by households.  In this chapter we abstract from these 
complexities however they have been addressed in the wider literature on 
equilibrium sorting models.  For example Bayer, Keohane and Timmins (2009) 
show that moving costs related to a household’s home town can have a large 
impact on estimates of willingness to pay, Bayer et al (2011) explore the 
psychological costs using information on the timing of moves and Ferreira 
(2010) examines the impact of transaction costs arising through the property tax 
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 Again, by substitution, this becomes, 
À¢ö· =
îï
ïïï
ð
1 −
÷
øùñ½¾½¾® ò
ÐñS11S00 ò
 º0º1úû
ü
11−Ð
	
óô
ôôô
õ
&»0 + Ì0(+ Ì1 − Ì0 
(3.1)
Where ºý = Ùº, Uý = ¿1, Uý = F	 
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regulations in California.  Kuminoff (2009) explores the impact of moving costs 
on the substitution options available to households and demonstrates how failing 
to account for moving costs can introduce bias into estimates of willingness to 
pay since it alters the way in which revealed preferences are interpreted.  
Transaction and moving costs will also affect our prediction of the new 
equilibrium following a policy change as alter the incentives faced by households 
and serve to reduce the benefits from re-optimisation.   
 
In the context of our model I anticipate that transaction and moving costs would 
lead the ESM to predict lower levels of relocation, in a way bringing the partial 
equilibrium and general equilibrium predictions closer together by preventing the 
relocation of households.  However, prices would also have to adjust in response 
to moving costs.  The overall impact would depend on the distribution of costs.  
For example, consider an increase in quality in a neighbourhood.  In the absence 
of moving costs we would expect an increase in demand for housing in this 
neighbourhood from households with a relatively high preference for public 
goods, which would cause prices to rise.    In the presence of moving costs the 
outcome would be different.  If moving costs are very high no relocation takes 
place, if they are uniform but low then some but not all of the anticipated 
relocation will take place.  In addition, transaction and moving costs could 
influence the distribution of welfare gains and losses if some households are 
more mobile than others, for example renters may have lower moving costs than 
owners, since they do not have to pay realtor’s fees or sales taxes when they 
move, providing them with a greater ability to re-optimise.  If moving costs are 
heterogeneous households with lower moving costs will be more likely to 
relocate.   
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 Town Centre Suburbs 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
 Partial Equilibrium 
Mean WTP PE  260.60 391.23 -385.49 -335.19 
Standard Deviation 702.25   686.99   954.79  985.77 
Total WTP PE  12,268 
Average WTP PE 7.67 ∆ Rental revenues 0 ∆ Mortgage payments 0 
 General Equilibrium 
Mean WTP GE  71.76 444.10 300.15 -57.61 
Standard Deviation 166.52   991.00   735.89   565.19 
Total WTP GE  285,380 
Average WTP GE 178.36 ∆ Rental revenues 0 ∆ Mortgage  480 
Net Benefits 285,860 
 
Table  3.4: Willingness to pay for the bypass (£)  
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 Town Centre Suburbs 
Price (£) 5305 5153 
Population Share 0.65 0.35 
Homeownership Rate 0.85 0.64 
 Population Characteristics 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income (£) 99,840 82,856 35,313 50,639 
Mean  0.11 0.25 0.39 0.17 
Mean í 0.99 1.12 1.00 1.13 
Mean housing 2.02 2.98 2.71 3.14 
Median housing 0.44 0.90 0.82 0.47 
 Population Movements 
From Town Renters 9 0 196 0 
From Town Owners 0 567 0 30 
From Suburb Renters 144 0 0 0 
From Suburb Owners 0 313 8 333 
Population 153 880 204 363 
 
Table  3.5: Neighbourhood composition after the bypass 
 
To understand more clearly how the difference in the GE WTP results arise, 
consider Table 3.5 which describes the ESM’s prediction of the new equilibrium 
which arises in the community after the impacts of the new bypass have worked 
their way through the economy. The first three rows of the table display the new 
prices, population shares and homeownership rates for the two neighbourhoods, 
the next five rows presents the new population characteristics and the last five 
rows detail the population movements and new population totals.  
 
After the construction of the bypass, the town centre supports a greater provision 
of public goods, this attracts wealthier households.  Indeed, as can be seen from 
the population movement figures, the renters and almost half of the owners from 
the suburbs migrate to the town centre causing the population share to rise to 65 
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per cent.  The shift in demand causes prices to rise in the town centre and fall in 
the suburbs.  As a result, some lower income households relocate from the town 
centre to the suburbs as property prices in the town rise.  Consequently, the 
average income of households in the town centre rises, both amongst renters and 
owners, while the average income of households in the suburbs declines.  This 
process has been described as “environmental gentrification” by Sieg et al (2004) 
and has been demonstrated in previous applications of ESMs to the study of 
improvements in air quality in the LA basin (Sieg et al 2004), Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) emissions (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2004) and the provision of open 
space (Walsh, 2003).   
 
Rising property prices in the town centre lead to quite different welfare effects 
being experienced by renters and owners originally resident in that 
neighbourhood.  While both initially enjoy the benefits of reduced road noise, 
those gains are offset for renters by higher rental prices.  Indeed, the price 
differential between the town centre and the suburbs is such that the town centre 
renters all choose to forgo the improved environmental quality and move to the 
suburbs.  Examining Table 3.4, the ESM analysis shows that the welfare gains 
for town centre renters are substantially lower than those suggested by the partial 
analysis, which ignores the price changes.  Renters face higher rental costs that 
offset the environmental gains from lower road noise.  As can be seen by 
comparing the partial and general equilibrium results in Table 3.4, this causes the 
GE WTP values for renters initially located in the town centre to be lower than 
their PE equivalents.  For owners, on the other hand, price rises present an 
opportunity to sell up and realise the benefits of capital gains on housing.  
Accordingly, in the GE analysis, the welfare gains for town centre owners are 
substantially higher than those suggested by the PE analysis.  The combination of 
these effects leads to a striking difference between the total willingness to pay 
values calculated in the PE analysis and the GE analysis, with the latter being an 
order of magnitude greater than the former. 
 
For households in the suburbs, the decrease in utility predicted in the PE analysis 
is dissipated through a number of mechanisms.  First, the ability to relocate 
allows some households to migrate to the town centre and benefit from a greater 
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provision of public goods. Second, some owners benefit from lower property 
prices that allow them to expand their housing consumption.   Overall, the price 
effect transforms the welfare impact for renters in the suburbs by more than 
compensating them for the increase in road noise levels.  For owners in the 
suburbs, the welfare loss can only be partially offset so that, on average, the GE 
analysis concludes that these households experience a welfare loss but smaller 
than the one predicted by the partial analysis.   
  
 
 
 
Figure  3.1: The convex hull of willingness to pay values for households 
grouped by initial residential choice.  (Endogenous tenure choice ESM) 
 
Figure 3.1 plots the distribution of GE willingness to pay values by household 
income.  The figure groups together households by their initial residential 
choices and plots the convex hull of their willingness to pay values.  Since the 
environmental change experienced in each neighbourhood is different, the 
separation between households in the suburbs and town is anticipated in the PE 
analysis.  However, Figure 3.1 also clearly captures the striking distinction 
between the willingness to pay of renters and owners, even within a 
neighbourhood.  In particular, at a given income, a renter in the town will benefit 
less than an equivalent owner, whereas in the suburbs a renter is likely to benefit 
equally or greater than an equivalent owner in the suburbs. 
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This simplified ESM demonstrates clearly how the welfare conclusions drawn by 
a partial equilibrium approach contrast to a general equilibrium approach and the 
mechanisms through which the two differ.  It is clear that the distribution of 
gains and losses is altered once households are permitted to adjust their 
behaviour in response to the exogenous policy change.  In particular, a large 
degree of environmental gentrification is observed resulting in the environmental 
improvements being enjoyed by wealthier households who displace poorer 
households who are originally resident in the town.  Furthermore, it is clear that 
medium to long term adjustments lead to striking divisions between the welfare 
effects experienced by renters and owners that are being overlooked in the partial 
analysis.  As a result, the PE analysis provides a misleading picture of welfare 
changes. 
 
7.0      Model Extensions 
 
 
In reality of course there are more complexities that need to be included in the 
analysis.  Let us introduce, in turn, three extensions to the model: rental revenue 
recycling, housing supply constraints and compensation.   
 
7.1      Rental Revenues 
 
 
In the model considered above rental revenues flow out of the economy to 
absentee landlords.  In the real world, households may also own rental housing 
stock.  In this case, changes in rental revenues also have consequences for 
household welfare.  As described in Section 5.5, the ESM can be extended to 
allow households in the economy to also be landlords such that some or 
potentially all of the revenues from rental payments are recycled within the 
community. 
 
Table 3.5 presents information on the population characteristics for the two 
neighbourhoods in the calibrated baseline when fifty per cent38  of the rental 
                                                      
 
38
 At present there is little information on the proportion of rental revenues that are 
recycled rather than flowing to government and private organisations.  I adopt the 
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revenues are returned to households.  In the baseline total rental revenues amount 
to £4,552,600.  As is clear from a comparison of Tables 3.3 and 3.6, the 
recycling of these revenues has no impact on the sorting of households between 
the two neighbourhoods, which is expected since it does not alter the relative 
desirability of the two areas 39 .  Instead, since the amount of money being 
returned to any individual household is relatively small the response occurs 
through increases in housing units and other consumption. 
 
 Town Centre Suburbs 
Price (£) 5183 5258 
Population Share 0.50 0.50 
Homeownership Rate 0.74 0.82 
 Population Characteristics 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income (£) 35,964 53,992 104,075 90,492 
Mean  0.40 0.36 0.10 0.11 
Mean í 1.00 1.13 0.99 1.12 
Mean housing 2.79 4.07 2.10 2.17 
Median housing 0.83 1.31 0.41 0.36 
Population 205 597 144 654 
 
Table  3.6: Calibrated baseline with rental revenue recycling 
 
Now let us consider the impact of the construction of the bypass when rental 
revenues are recycled.  The new prices and population characteristics are 
presented in Table 3.6.  The key mechanisms are the same as those discussed 
above however, the rise in revenues (from £4,552,600 to £4,578,300) leads to an 
                                                                                                                                               
 
assumption of fifty per cent as a largely uninformed estimate.  The successful 
integration of general equilibrium sorting models would benefit from more informed 
estimates of the actual share of revenues being recycled. 
39
 If the model included minimum housing sizes or other discrete constraints this would 
likely alter the results such that the distribution of households became sensitive to the 
recycling of rental revenues. 
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increase in demand for housing units and other consumption.  To clear the 
market, house prices in both neighbourhoods rise and end up higher than in the 
analysis when rental revenues are not recycled (Table 3.4).  
 
The corresponding PE and GE welfare impacts are detailed in Table 3.7.  Notice 
that the increase in rental revenues provides additional utility gains for 
households initially located in the town centre and renters in the suburbs, and 
partly offsets the losses experienced by owners in the suburbs.  As a result, the 
GE total willingness to pay value rises to £304,160.  The distribution of welfare 
gains and losses between neighbourhoods remains largely the same although the 
rental revenue mechanism provides additional gains to those at the higher end of 
the income distribution.  Notice by comparing Tables 3.3 and 3.7 that accounting 
for rental revenue recycling leads to an increase in the standard deviation of the 
willingness to pay values within each group. 
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 Town Centre Suburbs 
Price (£) 5307 5155 
Population Share 0.65 0.35 
Homeownership Rate 0.85 0.64 
 Population Characteristics 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income (£) 99,840 83,057 35,313 50,061 
Mean  0.11 0.25 0.39 0.17 
Mean í 0.99 1.12 1.00 1.13 
Mean housing 2.05 3.06 2.77 3.18 
Median housing 0.44 0.91 0.82 0.47 
 Population Movements 
From Town Renters 9 0 196 0 
From Town Owners 0 568 0 29 
From Suburb Renters 144 0 0 0 
From Suburb Owners 0 313 8 333 
Population 153 881 204 362 
 
Table  3.7: Neighbourhood composition after the bypass with revenue 
recycling   
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 Town Centre Suburbs 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
 Partial Equilibrium 
Mean WTP PE  266.57 400.92 -391.72 -341.35 
Standard Deviation 714.38   702.85   963.51   993.06 
Total WTP PE  14,349 
Average WTP PE  8.97 ∆ Rental revenues 0 ∆ Mortgage payments 0 
 General Equilibrium 
Mean WTP GE  74.53 462.42 311.97 -49.10 
Standard Deviation 171.80     1,022.60    750.10 569.50 
Total WTP GE  304,160 
Average WTP GE ( 190.10 ∆ Rental revenues 300 ∆ Mortgage payments 500 
Net Benefits 304,960 
 
 
Table  3.8: Willingness to pay with rental revenue recycling (£) 
 
 
7.2      Housing supply constraints 
 
 
The ESMs discussed so far have adopted the conventional approach to housing 
supply, which is to assume that the number of housing blocks is fixed at the 
baseline level.  In the results that follow the linear housing supply function with 
capacity limits described in Section 5.4 is adopted to reflect more realistically the 
medium term adjustments that might occur in housing supply.   
 
Since the housing supply function has no impact on the calibration the baseline 
for this model is as before (Table 3.6).  The prices and population characteristics 
in the new equilibrium following the introduction of the bypass are presented in 
the first eight rows of Table 3.9.   
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The last five rows of Table 3.8 summarise the population movements that took 
place between the baseline and the new equilibrium.  The capacity constraint, 
which in this case limits the population share to 0.58 in the town, is binding and 
inflates prices in the town centre as wealthier households relocate from the 
suburbs to the town centre.  As capacity is reached in the town the rising price 
leads to the displacement of households with relatively high  values from the 
town to the suburbs: this can be observed through comparing the average 	 
values in each neighbourhood in Table 3.9 to those in Table 3.7.  As can be seen 
in the population movements section of Table 3.9, a greater number of 
households are displaced in this model than when capacity limits are not 
accounted for.  Consequently, there is an increase in demand for housing units in 
the suburbs, which pushes up property prices in the neighbourhood despite the 
small fall in public good provision. 
 
These price effects have important and substantial implications for welfare 
changes, as summarised in Table 3.10.  Price rises in both neighbourhoods lead 
to welfare losses for renters initially located in both neighbourhoods.  In contrast, 
the price rises confer gains to owners in the town centre and provide a source of 
compensation for owners in the suburbs.  Consequently, the distribution of 
welfare gains and losses is transformed once the housing supply adjustments are 
incorporated.  Total willingness to pay falls to £159,210.  Moreover, the 
distribution of gains and losses shifts with large losses accruing to lower income 
renters and large gains to wealthy owners.  Figure 3.4 plots the distribution of 
willingness to pay and household income for each of the initial residential choice 
groups.  Comparing Figure 3.2 to Figure 3.1, it is apparent that the introduction 
of a medium to long term housing supply specification leads to further 
adjustments in the property market which redistribute the benefits of 
environmental changes towards homeowners and away from renters. Moreover, 
the capacity constraint acts to constrain the increase in the number of households 
residing in the centre to 120 households in comparison to 232 households in the 
absence of the capacity constraint.  As can be seen in Figure 3.2, these 
adjustments actually lead to losses for the majority of renters from both the 
suburbs and the town, despite the direct improvement in environmental quality. 
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 Town Centre Suburbs 
Price (£) 5514 5314 
Population Share 0.58 0.42 
Homeownership Rate 0.86 0.67 
 Population Characteristics 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income (£) 111,352 69,927 37,350 78,579 
Mean  0.09 0.25 0.37 0.18 
Mean í 0.99 1.12 1.00 1.12 
Mean housing 1.98 2.14 2.68 4.60 
Median housing 0.38 0.73 0.83 0.64 
 Population Movements 
From Town Renters 0 0 205 0 
From Town Owners 0 521 0 76 
From Suburb Renters 126 0 18 0 
From Suburb Owners 0 275 0 379 
Population 126 796 223 455 
 
Table  3.9: Neighbourhood composition after the bypass with revenue 
recycling and linear housing supply   
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 Town Centre Suburbs 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
 Partial Equilibrium 
Mean WTP PE  266.57 400.92 -391.72 -341.35 
Standard Deviation 714.38   702.85   963.51   993.06 
Total WTP PE  14,349 
Average WTP PE  8.97 ∆ Rental revenues 0 ∆ Mortgage payments 0 
 General Equilibrium 
Mean WTP GE  -374.53 557.42 -117.18 -122.20 
Standard Deviation 883.20     1,359.30     623.80     850.20 
Total WTP GE  159,210 
Average WTP GE  99.51 ∆ Rental revenues 0 ∆ Mortgage payments 500 
Net Benefits 159,710 
 
Table  3.10: Willingness to pay with rental revenue recycling and linear 
housing (£)  
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Figure  3.2: The convex hull of willingness to pay values for households 
grouped by initial residential choice.                                                     
(Endogenous tenure choice ESM: Housing Supply) 
 
Comparing these results to the partial equilibrium approach it becomes clear that 
the partial analysis does not adequately capture the importance of initial tenure 
status and provides an incomplete picture of the welfare implications of a policy 
change. 
 
 
7.3      Compensation 
 
The final extension considered is that of compensating homeowners for loss of 
value in their properties.  For this purpose we incorporate a compensation 
mechanism into the ESM, which is modelled on Part 1 of the 1973 
Compensation Act.   
 
As previously, the relevant baseline is given in Table 3.5.  Table 3.10 presents 
the neighbourhood prices and population characteristics following the 
construction of the bypass.  The largest compensation payment is £29,101. The 
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receipt of compensation has little impact on the behaviour of households: as with 
the receipt of rental revenues, households receiving compensation use it to 
increase their housing and other consumption.  This leads to a small increase in 
the average number of housing units consumed by owners initially located in the 
suburbs. 
 
 Town Centre Suburbs 
Price (£) 5514 5315 
Population Share 0.58 0.42 
Homeownership Rate 0.86 0.67 
 Population Characteristics 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income (£) 111,352 69,927 37,350 78,579 
Mean  0.09 0.25 0.37 0.18 
Mean í 0.99 1.12 1.00 1.12 
Mean housing 1.98 2.14 2.68 4.61 
Median housing 0.38 0.73 0.83 0.64 
 Population Movements 
From Town Renters 0 0 205 0 
From Town Owners 0 521 0 76 
From Suburb Renters 126 0 18 0 
From Suburb Owners 0 275 0 379 
Population 126 796 223 455 
 
Table  3.11:  Neighbourhood composition after the bypass with revenue 
recycling, linear housing supply and compensation   
 124
 Town Centre Suburbs 
 Renters Owners Renters Owners 
 Partial Equilibrium 
Mean WTP PE  266.57 400.92 -391.72 -341.35 
Standard Deviation 714.38   702.85   963.51   993.06 
Total WTP PE  14,349 
Average WTP PE  8.97 ∆ Rental revenues 0 ∆ Mortgage payments 0 
 General Equilibrium 
Mean WTP GE  -365.80 571.59 -99.38 221.21 
Standard Deviation 864.50         1,380.00 613.30     758.70 
Total WTP GE  396,610 
Average WTP GE  247.88 ∆ Rental revenues 0 ∆ Mortgage payments 570 
Compensation 221,770 
Net Benefits 175,410 
 
Table  3.12: Willingness to pay with rental revenue recycling, linear housing 
and compensation (£) 
 
The influence of compensation is most clearly visible in Table 3.12 and Figure 
3.3, which summarise the GE willingness to pay values.  Driven by the increased 
revenues entering the system from government compensation payments, total GE 
willingness to pay rises to £396,610.  Comparing with Table 3.10, the results 
illustrate that, on average, the payment more than compensates owners initially 
located in the suburbs.  Notice that compensation is paid only to owners initially 
located in a neighbourhood that experiences environmental depreciation. 
Accordingly, renters initially located in both the town and the suburbs continue 
to experience a reduction in utility.  Comparing Figure 3.3 to Figure 3.2, the 
payment of compensation clearly alters the distribution of gains and losses, 
broadening the division between renters and owners.  In both neighbourhoods, 
the corresponding GE willingness to pay values are negative for the majority of 
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renters, almost uniformly for renters initially in the town centre, and are almost 
entirely positive for owners.  
 
 
Figure  3.3: The convex hull of willingness to pay values for households 
grouped by initial residential choice.                                                  
(Endogenous tenure choice ESM: Compensation)  
 
 
8.0     Discussion  
 
A key objective of the work presented above has been to explore the magnitude 
and distribution of welfare changes precipitated by policies that result in 
localised environmental change.  In terms of magnitude, the results demonstrate 
a large difference between the welfare changes predicted by a partial equilibrium 
analysis in comparison to a general equilibrium one.  For this particular policy 
simulation the general equilibrium total willingness to pay value is an order of 
magnitude greater than the in the partial analysis suggesting that adjustments in 
the property market serve to amplify the direct benefits of the policy.    
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To examine the distributional impact of a policy it is useful to develop ways to 
characterise the distribution of welfare and welfare changes.  One approach is to 
take inspiration from the Lorenz curve (which presents a graphical representation 
of the Gini-coefficient) and consider the cumulative share of total utility that is 
enjoyed by a particular share of the total population.  Plotting these two measures 
against each other results in a utility equivalent to the Lorenz curve where the 
45-degree line represents the situation where all households in the economy 
enjoy an equal level of utility.  Figure 6 plots this utility-based Lorenz curve for 
the calibrated baseline with rental revenue recycling.  The deviation of the curve 
from the 45-degree line represents inequality in the distribution of utility across 
households.  More specifically, the line lies below the 45-degree line, which 
reflects the fact that poorer households receive a less than equal share of utility.   
The gradient of the Lorenz curve does not reach tangency with the 45-degree line 
until the horizontal axis reaches roughly eighty per cent of the population.  This 
indicates that the top twenty per cent of the population receive a greater than 
even share of utility. 
 
 
Figure  3.4: The Utility based Lorenz Curve plotting the cumulative share of 
total utility (in the baseline with rental revenue recycling) against the 
cumulative share of the total population ranked by lowest to highest income. 
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Whilst the distribution of welfare described in Figure 3.3 is driven primarily by 
the assumed distribution of income in the population, our central interest is to 
understand how policies that affect local environmental quality change this 
distribution.  To provide a perspective on the distributional impact it is more 
useful to consider changes in the cumulative share of total utility that occur as a 
result of the policy change.  
 
Figure 3.4 plots the corresponding changes in the cumulative share predicted by 
the PE and GE analyses against log income.  The figure is not intuitive at first 
glance, the figure in panel 7a plots the PE and GE curves together.  Notice that 
the PE analysis suggests that the policy has large distributional impacts of a 
sizeable magnitude, whereas the GE analysis suggests that the impacts are much 
smaller (the plot of these changes is barely distinguishable from the horizontal 
axis).  At log income values where the curves are positive the cumulative share 
of total utility held by households whose logged incomes are less than or equal to 
this amount is higher than in the baseline, meaning that households at the lower 
end of the income distribution have increased their share of utility.  When the 
curve is negative this implies the opposite: that the share of utility has fallen.  At 
any given log-income value, a positive gradient indicates that the share of utility 
held by that household has increased whereas a negative gradient indicates that 
their share has fallen. 
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Figure 3.5a 
 
Figure 3.5b 
Figure  3.5: The distribution of changes in the cumulative share of total 
utility by income in the Partial and General Equilibrium analyses.  The 
bottom panel displays the general equilibrium plot at a finer scale 
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Turning attention to the PE (dashed) curve in Figure 3.5, the curve is positive 
and increasing (or at least predominantly increasing) up to around 600,000.  This 
indicates that the PE analysis suggests the policy change is progressive and, 
through targeting environmental improvements at low-income households, alters 
the distribution of utility making it more equitable.  In contrast, panel 7b shows a 
rescaled version of the GE curve.  After re-scaling a clear distributional impact is 
evident and it is remarkably different to the one that is predicted by the PE 
analysis.  The GE analysis suggests that once adjustments in location, property 
prices, rental revenues and compensation have been accounted for the direct 
environmental benefits are channelled away from poorer households.  In fact, 
households at the lower end of the income distribution are left with a smaller 
share of the total utility.   The benefits of the policy therefore are channelled to 
households with logged incomes between 100,000 and 1,250,000 who now 
receive a greater share of total utility.   Overall then the GE analysis suggests that 
despite seemingly progressive targeting of the bypass, the overall welfare 
impacts are moderately regressive.  
 
9.0      Concluding Remarks and Future Directions 
 
 
In this paper I have sought to explore the magnitude and distribution of the 
welfare effects resulting from policies with localised environmental impacts 
through the development and calibration of an ESM with endogenous tenure 
choice. The mechanisms and feedbacks at work in this model have been 
illustrated through the presentation of a stylised two-neighbourhood policy 
analysis.  The results from this example also enable us to draw some more 
general conclusions regarding the magnitude and distribution of welfare changes.  
In particular, the results clearly demonstrate that once relocation, capital gains, 
rental revenues, housing supply and compensation are taken into account the GE 
welfare changes predicted by the ESM deviate substantially both in magnitude 
and distribution from those anticipated using a conventional PE approach.   
 
The modelling exercise highlights two key conclusions that may be drawn about 
welfare changes.  First, considering the magnitude of the welfare impact, the GE 
analysis produces a substantially larger - by one order of magnitude - total 
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willingness to pay value than the PE analysis, indicating that the general 
equilibrium adjustments that occur in response to the policy change, propagate 
and add to the initial environmental change and, ultimately, convey larger overall 
welfare gains to households.  Second, with regards to the distribution of these 
welfare changes, the PE analysis suggests that targeting environmental policies 
directly towards poorer households could increase their welfare and act as a tool 
for redistribution.  The GE analysis contradicts this assertion and suggests that 
the property market acts to channel these targeted benefits away from renters 
towards owners and away from lower income households towards wealthier 
ones.  As a consequence of this mechanism, environmental policy is at best a 
convoluted tool for redistribution and at worst entirely misguided.  Indeed, in the 
example presented here the overall amount of redistribution is small and, despite 
the policy being targeted, the redistribution that does take place is regressive in 
nature.   
 
The GE analysis also has implications for the effectiveness and equity 
implications of initiatives like the 1973 Land Compensation Act.  The motivation 
behind the payment of compensation is to reimburse households who are 
subjected to welfare losses as a result of the policy.  Our results show that the 
payment of compensation to homeowners (and not renters) serves to broaden the 
inequality between the welfare effects experienced by homeowners and those 
experienced by renters.  Moreover, the magnitude of compensation far exceeds 
the amount required to make these homeowners as well off as they were before 
the policy change.  By neglecting to account for the medium term adjustments 
that take place, the compensation mechanism thus becomes a tool for 
redistributing welfare to homeowners.  
 
In conclusion, policies that affect local environmental quality have complex 
distributional impacts.  Although relatively young in terms of their theoretical 
development and range of applications, ESMs provide a framework which can 
provide insights into both the magnitude and distribution of the welfare effects 
that result from a policy change. The analysis presented in this paper has focused 
upon introducing an endogenous tenure choice in the ESM framework.  
However, there are a several other theoretical and empirical considerations that 
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present continuing challenges.  First, there are a number of additional 
complexities that have not been addressed in this paper, such as the role of 
moving costs (Kuminoff 2009), duality between residential and labour market 
decisions and a more complete development of housing supply with a buy-to-let 
property market.  A comprehensive analysis would need to bring these 
complexities together into a single model.  Second, from an empirical 
perspective, further work on estimating or calibrating the baseline model is 
needed.  To achieve this, improvements are needed in terms of the availability of 
information relating to mortgage payments, ownership of the stock of rental 
housing and the nature of medium to long term housing supply.  This is an active 
and rewarding area of research with many on-going developments and avenues 
for future work, which will have profound impacts on the way in which welfare 
analysis is conducted. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
“The benefits of homeownership for families, communities and the nation are 
profound.” - Elizabeth Dole 
 
The promotion of homeownership has been a widespread and long-term focus of 
public policy (Andrews and Sánchez, 2011). Support for such policies derives both 
from political ideology and from a belief that homeownership delivers positive 
spillovers. Homeowners, it is argued, have greater incentives to invest in the physical 
and social capital of their communities, thus providing private and public benefits. 
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that lends credence to this view. 
Homeownership is strongly correlated with property condition and maintenance 
(Galster, 1983), neighborhood stability (Rohe, 1996, Dietz and Haurin, 2003), child 
attainment (Green and White, 1997, Haurin et al., 2002, Bramley and Karley, 2007), 
citizenship (DiPasquale and Kahn, 1999) and lower crime rates (Glaeser and 
Sacerdote, 1996, Sacerdote, 1996, Sampson and Raudenbush, 1997)40. 
 
A wide variety of policy measures have been implemented to promote 
homeownership. Attempts have been made to encourage the supply of mortgage 
lending: for example, in the U.S. through the establishment of Government Sponsored 
Entities providing liquidity and security for mortgage lenders. Policies have also been 
implemented to encourage particular groups into homeownership: for example, in the 
U.K. through the Right to Buy scheme for social housing tenants.  Homeownership 
has also been promoted through the tax system e.g. through exemptions from capital 
gains tax on property sales and mortgage interest deduction (MID). MID, the focus of 
this paper, allows taxpayers to subtract interest paid on a residential mortgage from 
their taxable income. 
 
MID is present in the tax laws of many countries including the U.S., Belgium, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden and was previously offered in the U.K. and 
                                                      
 
40
 Of course, correlation is not causality. Doubts remain as to whether there is a direct causal 
link between homeownership and the observed positive spillovers or whether households 
who choose to own their homes are also more inclined to pro-social behavior. 
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Canada. It was introduced in the U.S. in 1913 when the homeownership rate was 45.9 
percent. Under MID and numerous other initiatives, homeownership rose after the 
Second World War reaching a peak of 69 percent in 2004 41 . Currently, MID 
constitutes the second largest US tax expenditure42 with the cost estimated to be some 
$104.5 billion dollars in foregone tax revenue in 2011 (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2011). 
 
In the context of a large US fiscal deficit, MID has come under increased scrutiny. It 
has been argued that rather than encouraging homeownership the tax subsidy is simply 
capitalized into property values making properties no more and potentially less 
affordable than without the policy (Shapiro and Glaeser, 2003, Hilber and Turner, 
2010). Furthermore, critics contend that MID most greatly benefits high-income 
taxpayers who would likely be homeowners irrespective of the tax incentives (Shapiro 
and Glaeser, 2003). Certainly higher income households are more likely to own their 
homes, hold larger mortgages and itemize mortgage interest payments on their tax 
returns (Poterba and Sinai, 2008). Of course, courtesy of their higher incomes, they 
also itemize at a higher rate (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). As a result, in 2004 the 
government paid an average $5,459 in MIDs to households earning over $250,000 
compared to $91 for households earning below $40,000 (Poterba and Sinai, 2008). 
 
In the face of strong opposition, particularly on the part of financial services interests 
and housing lobbyists, repeated efforts to reform MID in the U.S. have borne little 
fruit (Ventry Jr, 2010)43. Over the last three budget cycles the U.S. administration 
proposed reforms to MID, but on each occasion those initiatives have failed to pass 
into law. The key element of those proposals was to limit MID for households paying 
the top marginal rates of income tax. Other proposals for reform include: replacing 
MID with a system of tax credits (Follain et al., 1993, Dreier, 1997, Green and 
                                                      
 
41
 Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
42
 The largest being the exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance and 
medical care. 
43
 In March 2011 Moe Veissi, the president elect of the NRA, launched a call for action to 
Preserve, Protect and Defend the Mortgage Interest Deduction. 
http://www.realtor.org/government affairs/mortgage interest deduction. 
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Vandell, 1999), scrapping MID in order to fund cuts in federal income taxes (Stansel, 
2011) and replacing MID with a fiscal incentive open only to first time buyers (Gale 
and Gruber, 2007). 
 
The debate is fuelled by a lack of clarity with regards to how such reforms will play 
out. Clearly, eliminating the MID will increase the cost of borrowing for the purposes 
of buying property and, ceteris paribus, cause demand for owned properties to fall. 
This reasoning underpins the National Association of Realtors claim that “eliminating 
the MID will lower the homeownership rate in the U.S”44. Of course, it is recognized 
that the impact of eliminating the MID also depends on supply conditions in the 
property market. The extent to which falling demand translates into reductions in 
homeownership as opposed to falling prices depends on the price elasticity of housing 
supply. Bourassa and Yin (2008) estimate that for some groups the negative effect of 
losing MID may be more than outweighed by the positive effect of falling property 
prices. Indeed, homeownership amongst such groups could actually rise as a result of 
eliminating the MID. 
 
What is less widely recognized is that changing market conditions in the property 
market will have ramifications in the closely associated rental market. Falling demand 
for homeownership can translate into rising demand for rental housing, increasing 
rental prices. More complex still is the interplay between homeownership and the 
desirability of residential locations. When homeownership contributes to the provision 
of various local public goods, reductions in homeownership in a neighborhood may 
reduce their desirability as a residential location. Since residential location choice is 
endogenous to the problem, eliminating MID might not only provoke the movement 
of individuals between ownership and rental but also the migration of households 
between neighborhoods. 
 
While numerous attempts have been made to identify the impacts of eliminating the 
MID (Bourassa and Yin, 2008, Hilber and Turner, 2010, Toder, 2010) those studies 
                                                      
 
44
 Statement by NAR Chief Economist Lawrence Yun at the “Rethinking the Mortgage 
Interest Deduction” forum, Tax Policy Center, Washington, July 29, 2011. 
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have been based on a partial characterization of the problem.  This paper develops a 
model that more completely describes the complex adjustments in spatially defined 
and interrelated property and rental markets and uses that model to explore some of 
the possible ramifications of MID reform. 
 
The model developed in this paper is an equilibrium sorting model (ESM) (Kuminoff 
et al., 2010). ESMs provide a framework within which it is possible to examine how 
households choose their residential location from a set of discrete neighborhoods. As 
reviewed in Section 2, ESMs have been developed to examine a number of economic 
issues relating to choice of residential location. As far as I am aware, however, this 
model is the first to simultaneously model purchase and rental markets while 
endogenising tenure choice. In Section 3 the innovations of the model, particularly the 
specification of a neighborhood level of public good provision whose value depends 
in part on endogenous levels of homeownership and the development of an adjustment 
process to policy reform that accommodates capital gains, are outlined in detail. 
 
To elucidate the pathways of adjustment that MID reform may initiate in property 
markets, Section 4 presents a simple two-jurisdiction calibration of the model based 
on 2000 census data for Boston, Massachusetts.45 The calibrated model is used to 
                                                      
 
45
 In this chapter I have simplified the problem down to a model with two jurisdictions.  This 
simplification serves to provide a clear illustration of the adjustment mechanisms in the 
model.  However, in applications the choice of the number of jurisdictions is important as it 
defines the choice set faced by households.  The appropriate number of neighbourhoods is 
defined by the nature of the problem being studied.  In particular, each jurisdictions should 
provide a homogeneous level of public good provision; as a result jurisdictions are likely to 
be defined by geographical features such as valleys – which may influence the exposure of 
an area to pollutants, local authority boundaries – such as school authority boundaries – and 
the spatial extent of spatial interactions such as peer effects.  There is no theoretical limit to 
the number of feasible jurisdictions, although in practice this is limited by the computing 
power available to the analyst and the resolution of the available data. 
 
If the jurisdictions are incorrectly defined this is likely to cause bias in the willingness to pay 
values derived from the model Kuminoff (2009).  This can arise through two channels: first 
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simulate four different MID reform proposals: capping MID at a rate of 28%, 
replacing MID with refundable tax credits, scrapping MID and reducing income taxes 
and replacing MID with a lump sum payment to new owners. The simulations allow 
us to examine several important questions with regards to MID reform. In particular, 
to explore how reforms may impact purchase and rental prices, levels of 
homeownership, the distribution of welfare across income groups and the mixing of 
income groups within and across jurisdictions. 
 
This analysis suggests that, contrary to existing claims, with the right policy design it 
may be possible to reform MID whilst maintaining the prevailing rates of 
homeownership, increasing public goods provision and contributing to a reduction in 
the federal deficit. 
 
2.0 Equilibrium Sorting Models 
  
In essence, equilibrium sorting models (ESMs) provide a stylized representation of the 
interactions of households, landlords and government within a property market. 
Originally developed to explain observed patterns of socio-economic stratification and 
segmentation in urban areas (Tiebout, 1956, Oates, 1969, Schelling, 1969, Ellickson, 
1971, Epple, 1991), ESMs provide a formal account of the process whereby 
heterogeneous households sort themselves across the set of neighborhoods within a 
property market.  
 
Neighborhoods, it is assumed, differ in quality according to the level of public goods 
each provides. Those public goods may reflect purely physical attributes of a location 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
if the parameters of the utility function are estimated from the model the definition of the 
jurisdictions will affect the assumed value of the public goods indices and influence the 
implied stratification of households.  Second, incorrectly specifying the jurisdictions will 
affect the predictions that are made about how households respond to policy change.  I 
envisage this having a greater impact in the exploration of targeted policy changes where 
omitting a jurisdiction removes a substitution option that is or would be available to 
households.  It would be interesting to see future work exploring the sensitivity of WTP 
estimates to the definition of the choice set.  
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(for example, a neighborhood’s proximity to commercial centers) or the levels of 
provision of local amenities (for example, the quality of local schools). An important 
distinguishing feature of ESMs is in allowing local amenity provision to be shaped by 
endogenous peer effects: that is to say, by the characteristics of the set of households 
that choose to locate in a neighborhood.  Epple and Platt (1998), for example, present 
a model in which local taxes and lump sum payments are determined by the voting 
preferences of the residents in a neighborhood. Similarly, Ferreyra (2007) and 
Nesheim (2002), present models in which school quality is related to measures of the 
average income of households in a locality.    
 
In an ESM, the mapping of households to quality-differentiated neighborhoods is 
mediated through property prices. Indeed, a solution to an ESM is taken to be a set of 
property prices that support a Nash equilibrium allocation of households to 
neighborhoods such that the supply and demand for properties are equated in all 
neighborhoods. While some simple ESMs have closed form solutions (Epple and 
Romer, 1991, Epple and Platt, 1998) equilibria for more complex models, perhaps 
including endogenous neighborhood quality, are usually calculated using techniques 
of numerical simulation (Bayer et al., 2004, Ferreyra, 2007).  
 
Over the last decade ESMs have increased in popularity and complexity. Recent 
modeling extensions allow for moving costs (Bayer et al., 2009, Kuminoff, 2009, 
Ferreira, 2010), overlapping generations46  (Epple et al., 2010, Bayer et al., 2011, 
                                                      
 
46
 Like many of the models in the literature, the ESMs developed in this chapter adopts a 
static framework, in reality households are more like forward looking agents who make 
location decisions in a dynamic setting. This issue is starting to receive attention in the 
literature, see Kuminoff et al. for a discussion of these developments.  For example Epple et 
al. (2012) develop an over-lapping generations ESM in which household preferences are age 
dependent.  In this two-period model there are young and old household types (with young 
households becoming old in the second period).   Epple, Romano and Sieg show that 
introducing moving costs in their model leads to lower levels of segregation by income and 
age as households are forced to trade-off utility in the two periods.  Similarly, Bayer et al 
(2011) develop a model with dynamic timing and location decisions using an infinite 
horizon life cycle approach in which household preferences change over the life cycle and 
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Epple et al., 2012) and simultaneous decisions in a parallel labor market (Kuminoff, 
2007, Kuminoff et al., 2010). In addition, the ESM framework has been used to 
explore empirical data on the distribution of households and property prices in order to 
derive estimates of the value air pollution (Smith et al., 2004), school quality 
(Fernandez and Rogerson, 1998, Bayer et al., 2004) and the provision of open space 
(Walsh, 2007).  ESMs have also been used to explore policy issues such as school 
vouchers (Ferreyra, 2007), open space conservation (Walsh, 2007, Klaiber and 
Phaneuf, 2010) and hazardous waste site clean ups (Klaiber and Smith, 2009).  A 
comprehensive review can be found in Kuminoff et al. (2010). 
 
One area that has received relatively little attention in the ESM literature is that of 
tenure. Indeed, the vast majority of ESM applications make the assumption that 
households rent their properties from absentee landlords. In those applications where 
tenure status has been considered it has been treated as a fixed household 
characteristic rather than a choice variable (Epple and Platt, 1998, Bayer et al., 2004). 
In reality, of course, households choose from a number of tenure options, with the key 
distinction being between ownership and renting. For a number of issues, such as the 
reform of MID policy, the choice of tenure is the central consideration of the policy 
debate.  
 
Accordingly, one of the key contributions of this paper is to describe an ESM in which 
tenure choice is endogenised; in the model household choices to rent or purchase a 
property are a function of market conditions. Moreover, to capture the purported 
positive spillovers of homeownership, levels of homeownership in a neighborhood 
contribute positively to its residential desirability; in this model, rates of 
homeownership contribute to the provision of an endogenous local public good. 
Allowing for homeownership in an ESM has other ramifications, particularly with 
regards to simulating the outcomes of policy reform. When those policy reforms result 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
households anticipate changes in amenity values and prices.  In the future, I can envisage the 
endogenous tenure ESM progressing into an overlapping generations framework as it 
provides a suitable means for exploring the issues of borrowing constraints, capital gains, 
inheritance and moving costs.  
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in price changes in the property market, homeowners and renters are impacted 
differently. In particular, homeowners will be faced by capital gains or losses that are 
not experienced by renters. The modeling framework in the next section outlines a 
method for incorporating that distinction.  
 
3.0 The Model 
3.1 The Economy 
 
Consider a closed spatial economy consisting of a continuum of households. The 
model is closed insomuch as households may not migrate in or out of the economy. 
Households differ in their incomes, y, their preferences for housing,  , and 
preferences for homeownership, º . Preferences for homeownership represent the 
private returns to homeownership that are not realized when renting. Such private 
returns are motivated by numerous considerations including i) freedom to modify 
housing, ii) satisfaction from homeownership status and iii) financial returns from 
capital gains. The distribution of household types in the population is defined by the 
joint multivariate density function Y», , º. 
 
The economy is divided into a set of spatially discrete neighborhoods, 	 = 	1, . . . , ¼	.In 
this model, each neighborhood is assumed to have its own local government. 
Henceforth, I describe these areas as jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction is characterized 
by a vector of local public goods, m- 	= 	 _Ã-,/	. . . , Ã-,	, Ä-,/, . . . , Ä-,b, comprised of H	 = 	1, … , Ñ exogenous elements, Ã-, , and V	 = 	1, … , ¦  endogenous elements, Ä-, , 
the level of provision of which is dependent upon the composition of the set of 
households that reside within the jurisdiction. The provision of public goods is 
assumed to be homogeneous within a jurisdiction.  
 
3.2 The Demand Side 
 
To reside in jurisdiction j a household must buy housing within it. The decision to 
rent, F, or own, ¿, housing is referred to as tenure choice. I describe the set of tenure 
options as À	 = 	 _F, ¿b . Accordingly, our model is characterized by households 
choosing to participate in one of a number of property markets each defined by a 
 141 
jurisdiction and tenure bundle, _, Ub. The set of markets is given by 	 = 	¼		À. 
 
Households also choose a quantity of housing, a decision approximating real life 
choices over the size and quality of home to buy or rent.47  Housing is defined as a 
homogeneous good that can be purchased at a constant unit price, S- , within a 
jurisdiction48 (Epple & Romer 1991, Epple & Sieg 1998, Epple & Platt 1998, Ferreyra 
2007).  Housing can also be rented from absentee landlords at the rental price, §-. 
 
The quantity of housing demanded by a household in market , U is denoted ℎ-, =	ℎ&S- , §- , m-; 	», , º(.		 To become a homeowner a household must take out a 
mortgage49 and pay mortgage interest, Å, to the lender.  Mortgage interest is paid only 
on the amount borrowed, given by the product of the loan-to-value ratio, ÆÁ, and the 
value of the housing purchased, S-ℎ-, . Differences in ÆÁ represent the varying abilities 
of households to make a down payment.  Property taxes  are paid on both rented 
and purchased housing.   
 
Homeowners are permitted to itemize mortgage interest costs and property taxes, that 
is, to deduct these costs from their taxable income. Since the marginal rate of income 
tax increases with income, the implicit subsidy of itemization also increases with 
household income.  However, not all households choose to itemize.  I use the variable UWÅ to denote whether a household itemizes.  Empirically itemization rates are higher 
amongst high-income households.  To account for this the model includes the 
probability that a household itemizes, which is expressed as a function of household 
income 
                                                      
 
47
 This simplification is made at the cost of assuming, somewhat unrealistically, that housing 
is continuously divisible and can be reconfigured without cost. 
48
 In reality housing is not homogeneous, however, as Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf & Walsh (2002) 
illustrated, if housing enters the utility function through a sub-function that is homogeneous 
degree one, it is possible to construct a “housing quantity” index tantamount to an empirical 
analogue to the homogeneous housing unit, h. 
49
 For simplicity, the model assumes that all households must take out a mortgage. 
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 ¢§T7UWÅ = 1 = » (4.1)  
 
Where ( ) denotes a cumulative distribution function and, 
 
UWÅ =	 	1					Y	@	ℎTHAWℎT
X	UWÅÃWA0					TUℎW§×AW																										  
 
Accordingly, the implicit subsidy a household receives by itemizing mortgage interest 
payments and property tax payments on their tax return, =Ë&S, ℎ, , U, »( , is 
endogenous to the household’s decision and depends upon the purchase price of 
property, S, the quantity of housing demanded, ℎ, the property tax rate,  , tenure 
choice, t, and household income, » (which also determines the loan-to-value ratio and 
the probability that the household itemizes). 
 
Aggregate demand for housing in market , U	is calculated by integrating across 
households, 
 
 
Ç-, È 	= iiiℎ-, . Y», , ºX»XXº (4.2)  
 
3.3 The Supply Side 
 
Housing supply is determined by purchase and rental property prices.  Housing supply 
may differ between jurisdictions such that the housing supply function for a particular 
market , U is denoted, 
 Ç-, ¶ = Ç¶S-, §- 
 
(4.3)  
 
Note that purchase prices may affect the supply of housing in the rental market and 
vice versa. 
 
3.4 Government 
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Government operates at two levels, federal and local, serving the dual roles of 
redistributing income and providing local public goods. The federal government raises 
revenue through income taxes, charged at a series of marginal rates, , which are an 
increasing function of taxable income.  The tax paid by a household is U@â 	=	U@â» − =Ë,  .The total federal tax revenue is, 
 
Àâ = iiiU@â. Y», , ºX» XXº (4.4)  
 
Federal tax revenues are used to finance the provision of public goods.  The revenue 
foregone to mortgage interest deductions is equal to the sum of the MID payments 
across all households. 
 
À=Ë	 = iii=Ë. Y», , ºX»XXº (4.5)  
 
It is assumed that the federal expenditure on local public goods provision is organized 
so as to allocate an equal amount of revenue per household, 
 -µ = D-Àâ − À=Ë (4.6)  
 
Where D- is the share of the population locating in neighborhood . 
 
Local governments raise revenue through proportional property taxes, ,50 which are 
levied on the value of property. As such, the total property tax revenue of jurisdiction  is, 
 À,- = S-Ç-,ÖÈ +Ç-,ÎÈ  (4.7)  
 
Local tax revenues are increasing in property prices and aggregate housing demand. 
Local tax revenues are used to finance local expenditure on public goods, 
                                                      
 
50
 Our model considers exogenous tax rates but easily extends to endogenous rates i.e. 
through a majority vote (Epple & Romer 1991, Epple & Platt 1998). 
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 -¸ = À,- (4.8)  
 
Total expenditure on local public good provision, therefore, is equal to the sum of 
federal and local expenditure, 
 - = -µ + -¸  (4.9)  
 
3.5 Local Public Goods 
 
Households derive utility from the combined provision of local public goods, 
represented by the index, 
 m- = ­~./ 	~Ã-,~ + ­~.k/k 	~Ä-,~ (4.10) 
 
Where ~ is the weight placed on the kth element in m.  For simplicity I consider the 
case where m- consists of only one exogenous, z, and one endogenous public good, q; 
 m- = Ã- + Ä- (4.11) 
 
Where  is the weight that households place on Ä relative to Ã and is uniform across 
households and jurisdictions. Our specification implies, therefore, that households 
agree on the ranking of jurisdictions in terms of their provision of local public goods. 
 
Endogenous public good provision within a jurisdiction is an increasing function of 
three inputs: government expenditure, - , homeownership rate, ]-  and other 
characteristics of the community of households in that jurisdiction, -, such that, 
 
 
 Ä- = Ä- , ]- , - 
 XÄ-X- ≥ 0, XÄ-X]- ≥ 0	@ZX XÄ-X- ≥ 0 
 
(4.12) 
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Our specification makes two important assertions i) that homeownership provides 
positive spillovers and ii) that the proportion of homeowners in a community rather 
than the absolute number is important in delivering those external benefits. Those 
assertions are consistent with the majority of the literature on the social benefits of 
homeownership (Dietz and Haurin, 2003), which suggests that homeownership can 
have a positive impact upon crime rates, voting participation, property maintenance, 
neighbourhood stability, membership of community groups and the educational 
attainment of school children.  The presence of -  in the public good production 
function defines a peer effect whereby community characteristics, perhaps median 
household income, affect the provision of public goods. Such peer effects have 
considerable empirical support (Nechyba, 2003a) and have been incorporated in a 
number of existing ESM specifications (Nesheim, 2002, Ferreyra, 2007). 
 
3.6 The Household Optimization Problem 
 
Households derive utility from local public goods, m, consumption of housing, ℎ, and 
other consumption,  .  Preferences for local public goods are determined by the 
parameter Ð that is assumed to be constant across households while preferences for 
housing are determined by the parameter,  , which is allowed to vary across 
households.  
 
The model also allows for the fact that households can derive more utility from 
housing when they own their home than when they rent it (or vice versa). Each 
household is characterized by a value for the parameter º, which scales the utility 
derived from housing for homeownership. Values of º greater (less) than one imply 
that a household gains more (less) utility from owning housing than from renting. 
 
Household utility is defined by the function, 
 
 ÑÁ,-, = Ñ&ℎ, U, ; »Á , Ð, Á, ºÁ , m-( (4.13) 
 
The household optimization problem can be decomposed into two stages. First, a 
household calculates its optimal housing and consumption choices for each market. 
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The conditional maximization problem is, 
 max!,Ô|-, ÑÁ&ℎ, U, ; »Á, Ð, Á, ºÁ , m-( 
s.t. 
» = Ù U@â + §-ℎ- + S-ℎ- +  																				U = FU@â + 1 +  +ÅÆS-ℎ-																								 U = ¿. (4.14)
 
Which yields the following conditional indirect utility functions, 
 
¦Á,-, =  ¦§-, m-; »Á, Ð, Á 				U = F¦S-, m-; »Á , Ð, Á, ºÁ U = ¿. (4.15)
 
Subsequently, households select the jurisdiction and tenure combination that provides 
them the greatest level of utility. 
 
3.7 Equilibrium 
 
An equilibrium of the model is defined by a set of jurisdictions,  , a one to one 
correspondence of households to jurisdictions and an associated set of rental and 
purchase prices for each jurisdiction, S	 = 	 _S/, . . . , S-, §/, . . . , §-b, such that, 
1. Each household resides in the jurisdiction that maximizes its utility given the 
equilibrium vector of prices and endogenous public good provision. 
2. All housing markets clear, Ç-, È =	Ç-, ¶ , ∀	, U.   
3. All local government budgets balance, - 	= 	À,-, ∀	. 
 
3.8 Simulating Responses to Exogenous Policy Change  
 
In reality policy changes occur in a world in which households already rent or own 
existing properties. That reality influences the outcome of a policy change in at least 
two ways. First, changes take place in the context of an existing housing stock whose 
quantity and location has been determined by households’ initial choices. Second, a 
household’s current tenure status determines whether their choices following the 
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policy change are influenced by capital gains. 51  To see that more clearly, it is 
instructive to briefly contemplate how market changes impact differently on renters 
and owners.  
 
Consider a change that leads to increased rental prices. When rental prices go up 
existing renters are unable to afford their current consumption bundle. Households can 
respond in a number of different ways.  They can alter their tenure choice, for 
example, moving from owning to renting.  They can also move to another location 
where property prices are lower and they can reduce their demand for housing and 
consumption.  Moreover, they can do a combination of these. In contrast, consider a 
change that precipitates increased purchase prices. Owning a property outright 
prevents changes in prices from making the current consumption bundle unaffordable: 
homeowners are shielded against price fluctuations. Instead, a rise in prices presents 
homeowners with the opportunity to sell-up and use the capital gains to increase 
consumption or relocate to a jurisdiction that provides more desirable public goods.  
 
To simulate the process of adjustment in the property market within the context of 
what is essentially a static model requires some careful consideration. I first assume 
that the market is in a state of long-term equilibrium, an equilibrium achieved under 
the baseline policy. Households have optimally chosen where to live, whether to rent 
or own and how much housing to consume. To reflect that state of the world, I 
imagine a property market in which all the housing units demanded under that 
baseline policy have been constructed and that these existing housing units cannot be 
demolished in the face of a policy change (though they can be repackaged and new 
units may be constructed).  
 
The policy change is introduced into this world at a point after homeowners have paid 
for their current properties at the pre-change prices but before rent has changed hands, 
                                                      
 
51
 Other authors have examined the importance of moving costs in equilibrium sorting 
models (Bayer et al. 2009, Kuminoff, 2009). Like capital gains, moving costs can vary 
depending on the household’s initial position and have the potential to alter the shape of the 
equilibrium that results from a policy change. 
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consumption goods have been bought and taxes and mortgage interest have been paid. 
As a result of the policy change, households reconsider their choices of housing units, 
location and tenure status and the model is solved for the set of property prices that 
bring the market back to equilibrium under the changed conditions. Households then 
buy properties or pay rent and make the tax and mortgage payments due according to 
their new housing decisions under these new prices.  
 
For renters, the features of their choice problem following the policy change are little 
different from those characterizing their choice in the original long-term equilibrium. 
In contrast, the choices of homeowners under the new conditions will be influenced by 
the fact that any increase (decrease) in the price of their currently owned property will 
present them with capital gains (losses).  
 
4.0 Simulating MID Reforms  
 
The model developed above provides a rich environment in which to explore the 
general equilibrium consequences of reforming MID policy.  Within that environment 
the impact on government expenditure, on patterns of community composition, on 
homeownership rates and on the levels and distribution of household welfare can be 
considered simultaneously. To undertake this exercise it is preferable to examine a 
model that replicates the real world. Such a model required reasonable but tractable 
functional forms that can be calibrated to produce a model that resembles a real world 
property market.  Following the convention of Epple and Platt (1991) I specifically 
model Boston in 2000.  To provide a clear and accessible illustration of the pathways 
of change that operate in light of a policy reform it is prudent to consider a simple 
two-jurisdiction version of the model.  This simplification enables us to trace out 
clearly the chain of reactions that occur through these pathways.  The model is coded 
in Matlab52 and uses simulation and iterative numerical techniques to solve for market 
                                                      
 
52
 The Matlab code is available from the author upon request.  I would like to thank Kerry 
Smith, Dennis Epple and Maria Ferreyra for providing data and copies of their code for 
solving other ESMs). 
 149 
clearing prices and provision of endogenous public goods (Lagarias et al., 1998)53. 
 
4.1 The Proposed Policy Reforms  
 
The current debate regarding reform of MID policy is motivated in part by the large 
U.S. deficit. Indeed, as part of plans to reduce that deficit, President Obama submitted 
federal budget proposals in 2011 and 2012 that advised capping itemized deductions, 
including MID, at 28 percent. Both times Congress has rejected the recommended tax 
reforms.54 All the same, I take the proposal of capping MID at 28 percent as our first 
potential policy reform. In practice, this policy amounts to limiting the implicit tax 
subsidy to homeowners paying a marginal rate of income tax above 28 percent.  
 
I also consider three alternative MID-reform policies: a refundable flat-rate tax credit, 
an income tax reduction and a new owner scheme.  So as to compare the various 
proposed policies, I make the assumption that the central motivation for reform to the 
MID is reduction of the budget deficit.  Accordingly, I calculate the reduction in 
deficit brought about by our baseline reform of a 28 percent cap on MID.  I then tailor 
the three alternative MID-reform policies to ensure that they facilitate the exact same 
reduction in the budget deficit as the cap.55 
 
Let us briefly review the alternative MID-reform policies. First, replacing MID with a 
refundable56 flat-rate tax credit has been advocated by both the Center for American 
Progress, who propose a 15 percent refundable tax credit, and the National 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility (2010), who propose a 12 percent non-
refundable mortgage interest tax credit. For the purposes of our simulations, I model 
                                                      
 
53
 Due to endogeneity, the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not guaranteed. One way to 
explore this is to alter the initial values used in the code. In the simulations discussed below, 
this procedure had no influence on the outcomes, suggesting uniqueness of each equilibrium. 
54
 The same proposal has been included in the 2013 budget proposals. 
55
 Revenue equivalent policies were found using a search process. 
56
 Here the term ‘refundable’ indicates that households whose income tax liability is lower 
than the value of the credit actually receive a payment from the Treasury covering that 
difference. 
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this reform as being a policy change in which MID is abandoned and, instead, all 
households who are owners can claim back a flat-rate percentage of their mortgage 
interest and property tax costs. As explained previously, that flat rate is chosen such 
that cost savings achieved by this policy are identical to capping MID at 28 percent. 
 
Our second alternative MID-reform policy follows the proposal made by the Reason 
Foundation (Stansel, 2011) to scrap MID and instead introduce a revenue neutral 
reduction in federal income tax for all households. Here, I consider a policy in which 
MID is abandoned and a portion of the savings in government expenditure are used to 
fund an equal percentage reduction in income tax for all households. Again, the level 
of income tax reduction is chosen such that the policy achieves the same reduction in 
the federal government budget deficit as the other proposed reforms. 
 
Our final alternative MID-reform policy takes motivation from the First Time Buyers 
scheme proposal made by Gale & Gruber (2007), which suggests scrapping MID and 
introducing a refundable payment to first-time buyers in the first year after a property 
is purchased. In the model this is achieved through a New Owner Scheme, which 
makes an equal lump sum payment to new homeowners. Again the level of payments 
to these first time buyers is chosen so as to ensure comparability in the reduction of 
the federal budget deficit across reforms. 
 
4.2 Calibration  
 
To carry out our simulations, specific functional forms have to be selected for the 
various structural equations of the model and parameter values for those functions 
must be determined. Following the example of Epple and Platt (1998), parameter 
values were chosen such that the model approximates the reality of the Boston 
Metropolitan (PSMA) area, though in our application I take data for Boston from 2000 
and not 1980.  Table 4.1 presents a summary of important statistics for Boston in 2000 
and Table 4.2 summarizes the parameters obtained by calibrating the model to that 
reality. The assumptions and methods used in deriving those parameters are explained 
in the following. 
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 »w Mean Income (2000 USD) 74,119 
 »Áq Median Income (2000 USD) 55,183 
   ] Homeownership Rate 0.72 
   Ã Mean Air Quality (¿) 3 
   Ä Mean School Quality 420 
 
  
 
Table  4.1: Empirical Statistics for Boston in 2000 
 
  
4.2.1 Jurisdictions  
 
To allow the pathways of response to MID reform to be studied with reasonable 
clarity, I explore a simple two-jurisdiction version of model. Extensions to multiple-
jurisdiction models are relatively easy to implement, but greatly complicate 
interpretation. Again following Epple and Platt (1998), I achieve that by simply 
imagining that the Boston Metropolitan area is divided into two jurisdictions that I 
label A and B.   
 
4.2.2 Households  
 
Households in the model are characterized by three parameters: income, y, preferences 
for housing, , and preferences for homeownership, º. The first step in calibrating the 
model, therefore, is to establish the joint distribution of those parameters amongst the 
residents of Boston in 2000. 
 
As made explicit shortly, a Cobb-Douglas utility function is assumed such that a 
household’s preferences for housing, Á, equate to the proportion of their income that 
they spend on housing. That data along with information on household income, »Á, is 
available from the census.  To establish the joint distribution of y and   I fit a 
bivariate-normal distribution Y
Z»,  	∼ 	ß , ­ to 2000 census data for Boston.  
Parameter values from that estimation are recorded in the first row of Table 4.2.  
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Notice that  is negatively correlated with », indicating that high-income households 
spend a smaller proportion of their incomes on housing than low-income households. 
 
Parameters Description Calibrated Value 
   
ln» , ~[,[ Income and Preferences for housing 
[ = [10.604, 0.149] 
[ = Q 1.045 −0.0503−0.0503 0.007 R 
 Ð Preference for Local Public Goods 0.35 
   ln[º− 1]~ßå, :å< Preference for Homeownership &ßå, :å<( = −2.0, 9.0 
   Å Mortgage Interest Rate 0.1339 
   
Æ2, Æ/ Parameters of the Loan to Value Ratio Function −0.3, 6 × 10? 
   
» Probability of Itemising 
< » < ¢§T7UWÅ = 1 
38,000 0.234 
72000 0.661 
120,000 0.855 
240,000 0.981 
240,000+ 0.999 
 
 
  » Income Tax Bracket (lower limits) [0, 7350, 21925, 52975, 80725, 144,175] 
   
â Marginal Income Tax Rate [0, 0.15, 0.28, 0.31, 0.36, 0.396] 
   
 Property Tax Rate 0.5 
   
 Weight on School Quality in Public Goods Index 0.03 
   g Elasticity of Housing Supply 3 
   
 
Table  4.2: Calibrated Parameter Values   
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For simplicity, and due to a lack of existing empirical evidence, it is assumed that 
household preferences for homeownership, º , are independent of income and 
preferences for housing. Accordingly, values were drawn from a log-normal 
distribution 
Z	º − 1 ∼ &ßå, :å<( with mean and variance chosen so as the baseline 
model predicted homeownership rates comparable to those observed in Boston in 
200057.  The parameters selected through that procedure are also recorded in Table 
4.2. 
 
For the purposes of simulating the model, I create a simulated sample of 2,000 
households, which I denote by  = 1,… 2,000 , with income, »Á , and preference 
parameters Á and ºÁ drawn from those estimated distributions.58 
 
4.2.3 Taxes  
 
In 2000, Federal income taxes were structured into six marginal tax brackets. Those 
tax brackets are defined by lower bound incomes,  , at which the corresponding 
marginal tax rates, , become payable. The first bracket ranging from income of $0 
to $7,350 has a marginal tax rate of zero. Accordingly, $7,350 is often referred to as 
the standard deduction. The tax brackets and associated marginal tax rates are 
recorded in Table 4.2.  Table 4.3 illustrates how the income tax payable is calculated 
for households in each of the tax brackets. 
 
The property tax rate, , was set at the average level for Boston in 2000 using data 
supplied by the Massachusetts State Government. 
 
To capture the correlation between income and itemization rates, the probability of a 
                                                      
 
57
 Equilibria were also characterized for a range of alternative to explore the sensitivity of 
the results to the parameterization and to allow consideration of the range of permissible 
outcomes. The results remain qualitatively unchanged and are not reported here, however a 
full set of results is available from the author upon request. 
58
 The baseline model was also run for population sizes of 500 and 10,000. This did not alter 
the results and conclusions that could be drawn. 
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household itemizing was calibrated using data on itemization rates by income in 
Poterba & Sinai (2008), which is reproduced within Table 4.2. 
 
Bracket 
Income is greater 
than… 
but less than 
… Tax Payable 
1st  0 7350 0 
2nd 7350 21925 0 +15% x amount over 7,350 
3rd 21925 52975 2,186.25 
+28% x amount over 
21,925 
4th  52975 80725 
10,880.2
5 
+31% x amount over 
52,975 
5th  80725 144175 
19,482.7
5 
+36% x amount over 
80,725 
6th 144175 - 
42,324.7
5 
+39.6% x amount over 
144,175 
 
Table  4.3: Income Tax Brackets 2000 
 
 
4.2.4 Mortgages  
 
In our model, the size of mortgage needed by a homeowner is determined by their 
loan-to-value ratio parameter, ÆÁ. For the purposes of the simulation, the relationship 
between loan-to-value ratio and household income was estimated empirically using 
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances reproduced in Poterba & Sinai (2008). 
Using that estimated relationship the parameter ÆÁ was calculated as, 
 

Z	ÆÁ =	Æ2 − Æâ»Á  
 
Where Æ2 and Æâ are the estimated regression coefficients, 
 

Z	ÆÁ =	−0.3 − 0.00006»Á 												0.058		0.000009 (4.16) 
 
Since Æâ  is positive, wealthier households face lower loan-to-value ratios and, as a 
consequence, lower marginal costs of purchasing housing. 
 
The mortgage interest rate, m, was set to the average level for Boston in 2000 using 
data supplied by the Federal Housing Finance Association. 
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4.2.5 Housing Supply  
 
Housing supply is specified using a Cobb-Douglas function following Epple and 
Romer (1991)  and Epple and Platt (1998), 
 Ç-, ¶ = E-, S-,   
 
(4.17) 
Where E-,  is a constant reflecting property market factors such as local zoning 
restrictions, p is the price of a homogeneous unit of housing and η is the price 
elasticity of housing supply. 
 
Following Epple and Platt (1998) η is set to three in all markets for the baseline 
simulation59. 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, it has been noted that the degree to which 
reforming mortgage interest deduction will lead to falling homeownership rates or 
falling property prices depends on the price elasticity of housing supply.  The housing 
supply elasticity adopted here was 3 which implies quite elastic housing supply.  More 
recent work by Siaz (2010) suggests a price elasticity that is closer to 1 might be more 
suitable for the Boston metropolitan area in 2000.  Whilst the pathways of adjustment 
would remain the same, as the elasticity of housing supply contracts I would anticipate 
that the results of the model simulations will also change:  A tighter elasticity will 
work to offset the gains in utility derived from reductions in rental prices since the 
influx of previous owners into renting will cause greater pressure on prices the lower 
the elasticity of housing supply.  I would expect this to also lead to fewer households 
moving out of owning, thus causing property prices to fall by a smaller amount than in 
the case with more elastic housing supply.  As a result, it is likely that the less elastic 
housing supply is, the smaller the potential for gains in homeownership from 
reforming MID.60   
                                                      
 
59
 Alternatively, η could be set to 0 to produce a completely inelastic housing supply. 
60
 Replicating the simulations with a price elasticity of housing supply equal to 1 confirms this 
intuition.  The patterns of sorting observed in the baseline remain the same, although 
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4.2.6 Local Public Goods  
 
For the purposes of simplification, the calibrated model considers only one 
exogenously determined local public good and one endogenously determined local 
public good. The extension to multiple local public goods is facile, but adds 
complexity to the interpretation of the simulation results.  
 
I take air quality to act as a representative exogenous local public good. In our 
simulation, air quality is defined in units of nitrogen oxides concentration (measured 
in pphm) below the highest level observed in Boston in the Massachusetts Air Quality 
Report. Using that measure, the mean level for air quality in Boston in 2000 was 3. 
Accordingly I set air quality in jurisdiction B to that level but assume that jurisdiction 
A offers a slightly higher level of provision, 4.  
 
Likewise, I take school quality to act as a representative endogenous local public. 
School quality is a natural choice in this regard since empirically it is correlated with 
many other measures of local public good provision (Black, 1999, Bayer et al., 2004, 
Bramley and Karley, 2007).  Also there is an increasing body of evidence to suggest 
that school quality is determined, in part, by levels of local homeownership (Dietz, 
2002, Dietz and Haurin, 2003).  
 
Following Nechyba (2003a), Nechyba & Strauss (1994), Ferreyra (2007) and 
Fernandez & Rogerson (1998) school quality is determined by a production function. 
The functional form adopted in those papers is extended here to include a term 
relating to homeownership,  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
equilibrium property prices and rents are higher, reflecting the less elastic supply.  Evaluating 
the 28% cap, the same patterns of adjustment are observed: The average owned property size 
falls as demand contracts; purchase prices fall; some lower income renters are encouraged into 
homeownership; some previous owners become renters.  However, in this case the inflow of 
demand into the rental sectors causes overall increases in rental prices which remove some of 
the gains to renters.   
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Ä- = E-OØ»Áq-Oè]-/?OØ?Oè 
 
(4.18) 
 
Where  is expenditure per pupil, »Áq is median household income and ] is the 
homeownership rate. 
 
To calibrate the production function (19), I regress a state level measure of school 
quality (combined fourth grade mathematics and reading attainment score) against 
state level measures of median household income, homeownership rates (both taken 
from 2000 census data) and data from the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP) on expenditure per pupil. The resulting regression equation was,61 
 
lnÄ = 2.17 					+0.14ln	 							+0.26ln	»Áq +0.6ln	]0.428 0.044 0.061 																					0.075  (4.19)  
 
 
4.2.7 Household Preferences  
 
The household utility function is specified as a Cobb-Douglas according to, 
 
 
Ñ-, =  m-ℎÜ/?Û?Ü 	U = Fm-ºℎÜ/?Û?Ü U = ¿. (4.20) 
 
Carbone and Smith (2008) show that when household preferences are assumed to be 
Cobb-Douglas, preference parameters for non-market goods can be simply retrieved 
using estimates of the implicit prices of those non-market goods taken from non-
                                                      
 
61
 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. In the computed equilibria, income and 
expenditure are deflated to match the school production function, which was estimated in 
2002 dollars.   
This relationship suffers from potential endogeneity problems since median income, 
homeownership rates and expenditures are determined by the sorting of households.  In 
future work I would collect data to facilitate a two stage least squares estimation or calibrate 
the school production function using values in the literature.  
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market valuation exercises.  Here I take the implicit price of air quality, pz, from the 
hedonic study by Harrison & Rubinfeld (1978)62  and the implicit price of school 
quality, pq, from the hedonic study by Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan (2007). Following 
Carbone and Smith, preferences for public goods, Ð, and the weighting parameter, , 
can then be calculated according to, 
 
Ð = SÃ2 + SÄ2» + SÃ2 + SÄ2 (4.21) 
 
 		 = SS (4.22) 
 
Where S and S are implicit prices for air quality and school quality respectively, and 
subscript 0 denotes a baseline value.  The calibrated values from this procedure are 
0.35 for α and 0.03 for γ. 
 
4.3 Results  
 
The long-run equilibrium under current policy conditions was calculated for a 
simulated sample of 2,000 households. 63  The impact of MID-reform was then 
investigated by finding the new equilibrium characterizing the property market when 
each of the four proposed policy reforms was instituted from that baseline. 
 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 describe important features of the equilibrium in the baseline and 
for each policy-reform scenario. Table 4.4 presents a characterization of those 
equilibria in terms of the composition and characteristics of the communities in each 
jurisdiction. Table 4.5 characterizes the equilibria from the perspective of households 
in each of the six tax brackets.  Throughout our discussion of the results I will use the 
                                                      
 
62 The Harrison and Rubinfield (1978) study was chosen on account of the location of the 
study, this being the Boston SMSA.   
63
 In choosing a simulated sample size one faces a trade-off between small sample bias and 
computational efficiency. For the baseline scenario I experimented with larger population 
sizes up to 10,000, but found no significant changes in the characteristics of the equilibrium. 
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term “price” to refer to the price inclusive of property tax since this is the effective 
price faced by households. 
 
4.3.1 Baseline with MID  
 
Consider how the equilibrium evolves under the current system of MID. In the 
baseline A and B differ initially only in their exogenous provision of public goods. 
The better air quality in jurisdiction A shapes the resulting equilibrium. Households 
prefer a greater provision of public goods which increases demand for housing in A 
relative to B. Consequently, as shown in Table 4.4a, the population of A is higher than 
the population of B, with 82.3 percent of all households residing there. As the supply 
of housing in A is not infinitely elastic, relatively stronger demand in A drives the 
prices of housing in A above the prices in B. The purchase price of housing (including 
property tax) per unit of homogeneous housing is $116.66 in A compared to $75.09 in 
B.  Likewise, the rental price of housing is $108.25 in A and $72.47 in B. The wedge 
between purchase and rental prices implies that on average preferences for 
homeownership more than offset mortgage costs.  
 
Price differences between jurisdictions and tenure options precipitate the stratification 
of households. Column 4 of Table 4.4 confirms that households with relatively strong 
preferences for homeownership, θ, choose to purchase housing whilst those with 
relatively weak preferences for homeownership rent housing. Similarly, as can be seen 
from column 5 of Table 4.4a, households with who spend a relatively large proportion 
of their income on housing, high β, prefer lower housing prices and choose to reside in 
jurisdiction B. Since   is negatively correlated with income, this also introduces 
segregation by income.  As shown in Table 4.5a, only 40 percent of households in the 
lowest income tax bracket (1st) choose to live in A compared to 100 percent in the 
highest tax bracket (6th). Consequently, the median income of households in A is 
almost 3 times that of B.  
 
Within each jurisdiction some households rent whilst others own. Recall from the 
calibration that households with higher incomes face relatively lower loan-to-value 
ratios and, under the existing MID policy, can itemize their mortgage interest and 
property tax costs at a relatively higher marginal rate. Accordingly, the marginal cost 
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of purchasing housing is lower for higher-income households and, ceteris paribus, 
households with high incomes are more likely to become homeowners. As shown in 
Table 4.5a, only 50 percent of households with incomes below the standard deduction 
choose to own compared to 72 percent of households in the highest income tax 
bracket. This result is consistent with observed homeownership rates in Boston in 
2000. Returning to Table 4.4a, the concentration of higher income households in A 
leads the homeownership rate to be slightly higher than in B. 
 
Recall from equation (4.5) that local property tax revenues depend on both purchase 
prices and the total quantity of housing demanded in a jurisdiction. In the baseline 
equilibrium, higher property prices in A more than offset larger property sizes in B 
such that tax revenues per household in A exceed those in B: $22,097 and $21,490 
respectively. Larger local tax revenues translate directly into higher levels of local 
government expenditure on the endogenous public good. In addition, since median 
income is higher in A than B (column 7, Table 4.4a), jurisdiction A also benefits from 
relatively larger provision of the public good through a stronger peer effect. Overall, 
provision of the endogenous public good is higher in A, with a school quality score of 
450 than it is in B, at 323.  That difference in provision of the endogenous public good 
acts to exaggerate further the patterns of sorting sparked by the initial difference in 
public goods provision.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  Baseline 
a 
A Purchase 4 0.51 166.66 1.1 0.2 86020 49223 0.62 114 22097 440 
Rental 
 
0.31 108.25 1 0.2 67820 135 
B Purchase 3 0.1 75.09 1.1 0.4 25230 16546 0.57 153 21490 323 
Rental 
 
0.08 72.47 1 0.4 22630 175 
 28% Cap 
b 
A Purchase 4 0.53 113.25 1.1 0.2 83550 48988 0.64 111 22621 457 
Rental 
 
0.3 107.39 1 0.2 71000 141 
B Purchase 3 0.1 73.49 1.1 0.4 24530 16613 0.58 154 22092 326 
Rental 
 
0.07 71.72 1 0.4 24000 184 
19% Flat Rate Tax Credit 
c 
A Purchase 4 0.5 107.31 1.1 0.2 86980 48800 0.6 117 22461 442 
Rental 
 
0.33 106.22 1 0.2 65540 138 
B Purchase 3 0.1 68.85 1.1 0.4 28180 16911 0.58 152 21786 326 
Rental 
 
0.07 72.71 1 0.4 23670 179 
 2.89% Income Tax Reduction 
d 
A Purchase 4 0.52 113.25 1.1 0.2 86000 47755 0.63 111 22683 457 
Rental 
 
0.31 104.71 1 0.2 65540 138 
B Purchase 3 0.1 77.76 1.1 0.4 27040 16911 0.6 170 22592 334 
Rental 
 
0.07 72.03 1 0.4 22660 179 
 New Owner Scheme 
e 
A Purchase 4 0.6 117.2 1.1 0.2 79266 48837 0.73 100 21535 490 
Rental 
 
0.23 98.17 1 0.2 78770 186 
B Purchase 3 0.14 81.45 1.1 0.4 22855 16033 0.76 147 21183 379 
Rental 
 
0.03 70.36 1 0.4 29963 240 
* Where S> = &1 + (S for the purchase market and S> = § + S for the rental 
market.  All prices are in 2000 USD. 
 
Table  4.4: Characterising Equilibrium by Jurisdiction 
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F ℎ ] Ä  ↑ Ñ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Baseline 
a 
1st Lowest 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 28.85 0.05 370 0 
2nd 0.37 0.28 0.2 0.15 67.65 0.57 399 26 
3rd 0.49 0.35 0.1 0.06 118.03 0.59 423 199 
4th 0.62 0.34 0.03 0.02 174 0.64 436 868 
5th  0.64 0.32 0.03 0.01 225.2 0.67 437 1484 
6th 0.72 0.28 0 0 313.5 0.72 441 4477 
28% Cap 
b 
1st Lowest 0.25 0.18 0.29 0.29 28.88 0.54 393 0 1.00 
2nd 0.39 0.26 0.21 0.15 67.59 0.60 420 124 1.00 
3rd 0.51 0.33 0.10 0.06 118.32 0.61 444 847 1.00 
4th 0.63 0.33 0.03 0.02 174.39 0.65 457 2284 1.00 
5th  0.64 0.32 0.03 0.01 227.01 0.67 458 3388 0.84 
6th 0.69 0.30 0.00 0.01 319.55 0.69 462 4978 0.83 
19% Flat Rate Tax Credit 
c 
1st Lowest 0.16 0.23 0.31 0.3 28.49 0.47 371 71 0.56 
2nd 0.34 0.31 0.19 0.15 66.88 0.53 402 204 0.38 
3rd 0.47 0.37 0.1 0.06 117.7 0.57 424 382 0 
4th 0.63 0.32 0.04 0.01 170.48 0.67 436 757 0 
5th  0.64 0.32 0.03 0.01 224.52 0.67 437 893 0 
6th 0.69 0.29 0 0.01 315.44 0.7 440 1093 0 
2.89% Income Tax Reduction 
d 
1st Lowest 0.27 0.2 0.26 0.27 29.82 0.53 390 0 0.97 
2nd 0.38 0.28 0.19 0.14 69.11 0.58 413 28.83 0.98 
3rd 0.5 0.34 0.1 0.05 120.65 0.6 434 155.48 0.97 
4th 0.63 0.31 0.04 0.02 176.3 0.69 446 386.1 0.85 
5th  0.63 0.33 0.03 0.01 234.44 0.64 448 768.52 0.87 
6th 0.73 0.26 0.01 0 320.93 0.74 451 2384.49 0.93 
New Owner Scheme 
e 
1st Lowest 0.37 0.06 0.5 0.06 30.12 0.87 427 1417 1 
2nd 0.52 0.11 0.29 0.08 66.4 0.81 449 1154 0.99 
3rd 0.6 0.25 0.1 0.05 122.96 0.7 474 674 0.97 
4th 0.64 0.3 0.04 0.02 183.48 0.69 484 495 0.86 
5th  0.66 0.3 0.03 0.01 240.92 0.68 485 384 0.88 
6th 0.72 0.27 0.01 0 336.08 0.72 488 180 0.93 
 
Table  4.5: Characterising Equilibrium by Income Tax Bracket 
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4.3.2 28% Cap  
 
Now consider how things change when MID is capped at a rate of 28 percent. Under 
the new policy those households in the top three tax brackets who had previously been 
able to itemize their expenditures on mortgage interest and property tax at 31, 36 and 
39.6 percent respectively, would now be limited to itemizing at 28 percent. In the 
absence of other adjustments, the cap raises the per-unit cost of housing for the 85 
percent of households in the top three income tax brackets that itemize mortgage on 
their tax returns in the baseline. Characteristics of the new equilibrium are presented 
in Tables 4.3b and 4.4b. 
 
The immediate impact of the reform is a reduction in demand for housing amongst 
existing owners in the top three tax brackets. As shown in column 3 of Table 4.4b, 
contracting demand is accentuated by the assumption that housing units cannot be 
destroyed leading to downward inelasticity in the housing supply function. 
Accordingly purchase prices shrink by around 2.3 percent in both jurisdictions. 
Interestingly, this fall in purchase prices stimulates entry into homeownership by 
previous renters. Ultimately, the reform transforms the purchase market in A from a 
small number of large properties to a larger number of smaller properties. In contrast, 
average property sizes in B edge up as a result of an influx of high-income 
homeowners, forced out of A by the increased costs of a mortgage, who opt to buy 
large properties in jurisdiction B’s relatively cheaper property market. 
 
These adjustments spill over into the rental market. The movement of a number of 
renters into the purchase market contracts demand for rental housing. To meet the 
rental supply constraint, rental prices fall (by 0.8 percent in A to $107.39 and by 1.1 
percent in B to $71.72) inducing existing renters to expand their housing demand. 
Consequently, adjustments in the rental market are the mirror image of those in the 
purchase market; a smaller number of households now rent somewhat larger 
properties. Comparing column 9 of Table 4.4a and 4.4b confirms that the mean owned 
property size falls by 1.4 percent whilst the mean rental property size increases by 4.1 
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percent64. Despite some migration from B to A, the median incomes of both are 
almost entirely unchanged (column 7, Table 4.4b). 
 
Further effects are triggered through the impact of those adjustments on the levels of 
provision of the endogenous public good:  First, through changes in homeownership 
and, second, through changes in local property tax revenues. While homeownership 
rates fall amongst those in the very top tax brackets, this direct impact is more than 
offset by increased homeownership in the lower tax brackets occasioned by falling 
purchase prices. Overall, homeownership increases by 1.3 percent in A and 0.8 
percent in B. Property tax revenues rise in both jurisdictions despite the fall in 
purchase prices because of a rise in the total quantity of housing demanded. The 
property tax revenues per household go up by 2.4 percent in A and 2.8 percent in B. 
The combined effect is a rise in the provision of public goods in both jurisdictions, 
with school quality rising by 1.6 percent to a score of 456 in A and by 0.9 percent to a 
score of 326 in B. 
 
Perhaps unexpectedly, despite policy reform constituting a significant (23.2 percent) 
reduction in federal government spending, within the simulation the knock-on effects 
of a policy capping MID at 28% actually precipitates general welfare increases for 
households in our simulated population. The key driver of that finding is that a policy 
that increases mortgage costs for high-income households has the effect of reducing 
their demand for housing without causing those households to switch out of owning. 
Falling demand for housing reduces property prices, having positive impacts for low-
income households and encouraging more of them into homeownership. Consider the 
                                                      
 
64
 This is partly due to the assumption that the housing stock is divisible and can be easily re-
packaged, in reality this is like dividing a house into several flats etc.  As discussed in 
chapter 3, although repackaging, also referred to as conversion, has been discussed in 
a number of papers (Capozza and Helsley, 1989, Pogharian, 1990, Rothenberg et al., 
1991, Montgomery, 1992, Maddison, 2000) that discuss costs arising from 
bargaining, regulatory requirements and construction, the housing supply literature 
has focused on new construction and, as a result, it is difficult to find any empirical 
work quantifying the extent of these costs. 
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final column of Table 4.5b, the rise in public good provision and fall in rental and 
purchase prices leads to utility gains for all households in the lowest four income 
brackets. Moreover, despite being most directly and adversely affected by the cap, 84 
and 83 percent of households in the 5th and 6th income tax brackets experience gains in 
utility, primarily through the increased levels of provision of local public goods. 
 
 
4.3.3 Refundable Flat-Rate Tax Credit  
 
A seemingly more progressive reform of MID would be to replace the current system 
with a refundable flat-rate tax credit. Under this policy, rather than being able to claim 
MID against income tax, the federal government reimburses all homeowners a certain 
percentage of their mortgage interest payments. To maintain comparability with the 
MID cap reform, I consider a refundable tax credit of 19 percent which leads to the 
same overall deficit reduction.  
 
In contrast to capping MID, the introduction of a tax credit has immediate 
implications for all households. In the absence of any other adjustments, the marginal 
cost of purchasing housing reduces for households in the lowest two tax brackets and 
all non-itemizers. For itemizers in the top four tax brackets the marginal cost rises. For 
the top tax brackets, the MID cut is more severe than under the cap (down to 19% 
compared to 28%).  Accordingly, as in the case of the cap, the reduction in MID leads 
to a contraction in housing demand amongst previous owners in the top tax brackets. 
Since those households are nearly exclusively located in A that demand contraction 
reveals itself as a fall in purchase prices in that jurisdiction to $107.31 (column 2, 
Table 4.4c). 
 
The pressures pushing down demand for property purchases in A are partially offset 
by further adjustments in the property market. First, a number of households who were 
renting in A choose to switch to owning in that jurisdiction as the price of purchasing 
falls. Second, low-income homeowners in B, who were not previously itemizing, are 
benefited by the tax credit and the reduction in property prices. Some of those 
households now choose to purchase property in A. This in-migration of relatively low-
income households serves to reduce median income in jurisdiction A (column 7, Table 
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4.4c). 
 
As previous owners become renters, the rental community in A grows putting upward 
pressure on rental prices. Those increases are more than offset, however, by falls in 
local government property taxes. Recall property taxes are based on the purchase price 
of housing and since purchase prices are falling in A, so are property tax bills. Overall, 
the rental price in A (inclusive of property tax) falls to $106.22. The mean property 
size in the rental market in A falls slightly as downsizing by existing renters 
outweighs the larger housing demand of previous owners switching to renting.  
Ultimately, falling homeownership and falling median household income in A are 
responsible for a reduction in public good provision in that jurisdiction (column 11, 
Table 4.4c). 
 
Complex patterns of change are also observable in jurisdiction B. First, in the face of 
higher costs some high-income itemizing owners in B reduce their property sizes 
while others become renters.  As a result, purchase prices in B fall to $68.85. Second, 
non-itemizing owners use the tax credit to purchase larger properties. Third, a number 
of renters now stand to benefit from the tax credit by becoming owners. In doing so, 
they opt for smaller properties. As is shown in columns 8 and 9 of Table 4.4c, in 
contrast to jurisdiction A, the homeownership rate in B rises slightly by 0.4 percent 
and the mean size of owned properties increases.  Demand for rental housing increases 
as households switch from owning to renting.  The upward pressure this exerts on 
rental prices is not completely offset by reductions in property tax (via lower purchase 
prices) and the rental price (including taxes) rises to $72.71. Changes in rental price 
and housing demand increase tax revenues, which coupled with higher median income 
(due to inward migration of higher-income households from A) and homeownership 
causes the endogenous provision of local public goods in B to increase by 0.9 percent 
to 326. 
 
The flat-rate tax credit causes substantial changes across the economy, stimulating 
changes in the tenure and location choice of over 12 percent of the population. The 
progressive nature of the policy makes it unsurprising that the majority of the benefits 
are focused upon the lowest two tax brackets. What is surprising, however, is that a 
smaller proportion of households in the bottom two income tax brackets benefit from 
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the tax credit in comparison to the cap, primarily as a result of the negative impact on 
public goods provision in A. In addition, more substantial increases in the costs of a 
mortgage and a reduction in public goods provision results in losses for all households 
in the top four income tax brackets. 
 
4.3.4 Income Tax Reduction  
 
Consider next a policy that removes MID and uses the resultant tax revenues to reduce 
federal expenditure (by 23.2 percent to maintain comparability with the cap policy) 
and reduce income taxes by cutting all positive marginal tax rates by 2.89 percent.65  
 
For non-itemizers and renters, this reform is generally positive. Their lower income 
tax liability opens up the possibility of consuming larger properties or relocating to A 
to enjoy relatively higher levels of public good provision. For homeowners, the 
immediate impact of the reform depends on income. Households in the lowest tax 
bracket do not pay income tax and, as such, are not immediately affected by the policy 
reform. For homeowners in the 2nd tax bracket, housing expenditure represents a 
significant proportion of their income. The scrapping of MID is a significant loss and, 
for those with incomes below $50,000, more than offsets their reduced income tax 
liability. Accordingly, the dominant patterns of change are for households in this 
group to switch to renting or to relocate as owners to B.  In contrast, homeowners with 
income above $50,000 tend to be advantaged by the policy reform. Accordingly, 
despite facing higher marginal costs of purchasing, many households in this group 
remain owners though some choose to switch out of owning and use their increased 
income to rent larger properties.   
                                                      
 
65
 In this discussion I abstract from changes in labour supply that may occur as a result of 
the reduction in income tax.  Households receiving a lump sum payment, proportional to 
their income tax burden may increase or decrease their labour supply in response, which 
would have a further effect on the income and consumption choices made by these 
households.  In future work it would be useful to incorporate the labour market to allow 
these interactions to be modelled.  In the absence of a labour market model I am implicitly 
assuming that household labour supply decisions are not altered by a reduction in their 
income tax burden.   
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The characteristics of the new equilibrium are presented in Tables 4.4d and 4.5d. 
Overall, in A the population increases, mean property size falls as new owners 
purchase smaller properties than existing owners and the purchase price falls by 0.6 
percent to $115.95 as low income owners exit the market. Rental prices also fall, by 
3.3 percent, to $104.71 as demand declines (column 3, Table 4.4d).   Higher 
homeownership and tax revenues serve to increase the provision of endogenous public 
goods, providing indirect benefits to some households at the bottom of the income 
distribution not benefitting directly from the tax reduction.  In jurisdiction B, higher 
housing demand increases homeownership by 2.2 percent and raises purchase prices 
by 3.5 percent (column 8, Table 4.4d).  Higher median income and tax revenues also 
contribute to a greater provision of endogenous public good. 
 
Despite its seemingly regressive design, this policy increases utility for the majority of 
households. For higher income households, the utility benefits of the income tax cut 
tend to outweigh the loss in MID. Indeed, the proportion of households in the top two 
income tax brackets who gain from this policy reform is larger than under the 28 
percent cap.66  Even amongst households in the lowest tax bracket where the policy 
has no immediate impact, 97 percent experience gains in utility (column 9, Table 
4.5d). Those gains are largely achieved through other market adjustments that increase 
public good provision.    
 
 
4.3.5 New Owner Scheme 
 
This final policy reform replaces MID with a New Owner Scheme that pays a lump 
sum of $2,250 to new homeowners. Again, this is revenue equivalent to the MID cap 
policy. The characteristics of the equilibrium under this policy appear in Tables 4.4e 
and 4.5e. 
                                                      
 
66
 Although administrative costs are not explicitly included in this model, future work may 
wish to consider the additional advantage of the tax reduction’s lower administrative 
demands. 
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As with the other reforms, the removal of MID has the immediate effect of contracting 
housing demand amongst existing homeowners and encouraging substitution towards 
renting. Those responses put downward pressure on purchase prices and upward 
pressure on rental prices. The introduction of a new owner payment, however, 
stimulates entry into homeownership amongst previous renters. As households exit the 
rental market, pressure on rental prices is alleviated and the final result is that those 
prices fall significantly, by 9.1 percent in A and 2.9 percent in B, to meet the housing 
stock constraint. In contrast, the demand pressure created by these new homeowners 
results in increased purchase prices, rising by 0.4 percent in A and by 8.4 percent in B 
(column 3, Table 4.4e). While the group of new owners is large, each household 
demands a relatively small property. Mean owned property sizes fall and 
homeownership rises significantly, reaching 73 percent in A and 76 percent in B. 
 
Despite higher purchase prices, tax revenues in both jurisdictions fall as a result of the 
lower total housing demand.  While, migration between A and B reduces median 
incomes in both jurisdictions, the enhanced peer effect from increased homeownership 
causes the provision of endogenous public goods to rises by 8.8 percent in A and 17.3 
percent in B (column 11, Table 4.4e).  Accordingly, previous homeowners who lose 
the MID and gain no advantage from the new policy, are compensated in two ways. 
First, since property prices rise, they benefit from capital gains. Second, they benefit 
from increased levels of public good provision.  
 
While focusing on new owners, this policy reform results in widespread welfare gains 
across the spectrum of households. In fact, these welfare gains Pareto-dominate those 
generated by the Income Tax Reduction67.  The key pathway through which those 
gains are delivered is by encouraging a substantial movement of households into 
homeownership, a movement which increases the value of the properties of 
homeowners, reduces prices for those remaining in the rental sector and contributes to 
                                                      
 
67
 Again, it is worth remembering however that this model does not account for labour 
market decisions and could be improved by extending the analysis to a dual market model 
(Kuminoff, 2007). 
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a general increase in public good provision.  
 
5.0 Discussion  
 
This paper contributes methodologically to the existing literature by developing an 
ESM that incorporates an explicit endogenous tenure decision as well as endogenous 
local public goods that depend partly on homeownership. These innovations extend 
the range of policy problems to which ESMs can be applied to include those where 
tenure choice and the impact of policy reform on rates of homeownership are central.  
Moreover these innovations allow us to account for the influence of capital gains and 
housing stock constraints on the distribution of benefits. 
 
A simplified model is calibrated to real world data and used to examine the possible 
consequences of reforms to the policy of MID in the U.S. This exploration begins to 
shed some light on the complex patterns of change that such reforms may precipitate 
in the property market and provides insights that help to inform some of the more 
acrimonious disputes surrounding the debate over MID reform.  With regard to that 
debate, our calibrated simulations show that the impact of removing MID depends 
crucially on the nature of the policy that takes its place. 
 
First, consider the argument that MID inflates property prices making homeownership 
less affordable (Glaeser & Shapiro 2002). Our results suggest that capping MID would 
indeed lead to a general fall in the purchase price of properties. This is also the case 
when I consider the introduction of a revenue equivalent flat-rate tax credit and a tax 
rebate. In contrast, the targeted New Owner Scheme increases purchase prices as 
demand for homeownership booms.  
 
Second, supporters of MID argue that removing it would damage homeownership 
rates. Our simulations suggest that the impact of reform on homeownership may be 
positive or negative. For the Cap, Income Tax Reduction and New Owner Schemes I 
predict increased homeownership as purchase prices fall and new incentives for 
homeownership are introduced.  
 
Third, critics of MID argue that it subsidizes excessive housing consumption amongst 
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wealthy households, suggesting that the removal of MID would lead to a contraction 
in the average property size of owners in the top tax brackets. As with the 
homeownership rate, our simulations suggest that the nature of the policy reform has a 
strong influence on the mean property sizes demanded by households in each income 
tax bracket. Contrary to previous predictions, however, under each reform the mean 
property size demanded by households in the top income tax bracket increases as a 
result of lower purchase prices and, in the cases of the tax rebate and new owner 
payment, increases in disposable income. 
 
Examining a range of alternative policy reforms also demonstrates the importance of 
policy design and the role of path dependency in shaping the outcome of those 
reforms. With the regard to the latter, there are three key mechanisms at work.  First, 
owning a property shields high-income households from changes in property prices 
and subsequently enables them to channel benefits through capital gains.  Second, 
housing stock constraints act to suppress prices and stabilize homeownership in the 
face of contracting demand.  Third, endogenous public goods can act as a mechanism 
for compensating households.  As a result, the complex patterns of change precipitated 
by policy reforms in the property market can have quite unanticipated results. Policies 
designed to be progressive, such as the tax credit reform, may do less to benefit poorer 
households than those that appear to be regressive, such as the income tax reduction 
reform. Likewise, policies that economists would normally assume to have excellent 
efficiency improving qualities, such as the income tax reduction reform, may be 
Pareto-dominated by others that bear none of those hallmarks, such as the new owner 
payment reform. Taken as a whole, our investigation suggests that several reforms to 
MID could maintain the prevailing levels of homeownership whilst delivering more 
public goods and contributing to a reduction in the federal deficit. 
 
Of course, these results relate to the calibration of a simplified two-community 
problem. Given the results, it would be interesting to see future work directed towards 
the estimation of a large-scale model with more formally quantified social returns to 
homeownership. With these extensions it would be possible to simulate economy wide 
responses to the proposed reforms. Nonetheless, the results demonstrate the usefulness 
of the modeling framework and provide important insights into the broader 
implications of reforming MID. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
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1.0 Concluding Remarks  
 
The research undertaken in this thesis has been motivated by the challenges to 
economic analysis raised by the increasing importance of space.  In particular, the 
thesis is divided into two parts that draw together four chapters, examining issues in 
estimation and prediction in the context of environmental economics.  
 
Chapter 1 began by identifying a broad class of spatial issues that arise in the 
analysis of data that is spatially organised.  I show that these spatial issues can be 
thought of as spatial data generating processes (DGPs) in the context of estimation.  
Furthermore, I demonstrate that this broad range of spatial-DGPs is encompassed in 
a general framework.  Having formalised the spatial data issues chapter 1 considers 
the conventional spatial parametric estimation solution and contrasts this to a semi-
parametric spatial smoothing approach.  I derive a set of three identification 
conditions pertaining to a general spatial smoothing estimator and translate these into 
two sufficient identification conditions for the use of a local polynomial regression 
based spatial smoothing estimator.  These conditions provide intuitive and concise 
guidance for applied analysts that can be referred to when considering the use of 
spatial smoothing in the analysis of spatial data.  Finally, a series of Monte Carlo 
simulations are presented to illustrate the performance of the spatial smoothing 
estimator and contrast it to OLS and SEMs.  Moreover, I demonstrate how the 
spatial smoothing estimator can be used in combination with a spatial econometric 
model to allow analysts to test for specific interaction effects. 
 
 
Chapter 2 extended this work to develop a local adaptive spatial smoothing estimator 
(LASSE).  I derive a comparable set of identification conditions for a LASSE and 
demonstrate the conditions under which the LASSE provides efficiency gains over a 
Fixed SSE alternative, which employs the same smoothing parameters at every 
location.  The identification conditions reveal that the LASSE provides greater 
opportunities for identification and are always as efficient, if not more efficient, than 
an alternative Fixed SSE making the LASSE the preferable method of estimation.  
Chapter 2 also presents a series of Monte Carlo simulations that illustrate the 
performance of LASSE and contrast it to a Fixed SSE.  
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In Part II I progress to consider a number of issues associated with economic policy 
evaluation in spatial models.  Chapter 3 sets out to contrast a conventional partial 
equilibrium approach to welfare analysis with a general equilibrium approach 
provided by the framework of equilibrium sorting models (ESMs) for evaluating 
policies that impact local environmental quality and give rise to adjustments in 
household location choices. The central contribution of Part II of the thesis is the 
development of an ESM with an endogenous tenure choice and refined middle to 
long term housing supply function.  This model is capable of accounting explicitly 
for the myriad of complex responses and feedbacks that occur in response to a policy 
change, and therefore provides a pivotal tool for conducting medium to long term 
welfare analyses of policies with spatial impacts.  Moreover, the model is able to 
differentiate between households in terms of their characteristics (income, tenure 
status and preferences) and, as a result, permits a detailed analysis of both the 
magnitude and distribution of welfare changes.  
 
Chapter 3 develops the ESM with endogenous tenure choice and examines the 
intuition of the ESM model through a stylized two-neighbourhood model in which 
the key mechanisms of the model can be explored. The chapter then uses the model 
to explore how project evaluation using a conventional static analysis compares to an 
ESM based analysis that allows for property market adjustments using the Polegate 
bypass case study to calibrate the model and illustrate how the model might be used 
to provide input in a real policy context. Through allowing for rental and purchase 
markets the ESM model with endogenous tenure choice provides a far richer 
characterisation of the differences between the two approaches.  Within the ESM 
framework I was easily able to adapt the model to explore how the magnitude and 
distribution of welfare are impacted when I allow for the possibility that households 
in the neighbourhood are also landlords and hence receive income from rental 
payments made by other households.   The analysis highlights the complexity of the 
adjustments that follow a policy change and the distortionary impact that they can 
have on the distribution of welfare changes.  Importantly, the model demonstrates 
the limitations of ex ante policy targeting and, furthermore, suggests that 
environmental policies are likely a poor tool for achieving redistribution as the 
property market channels gains from renters towards owners through increases in 
rental and property prices. 
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Chapter 4 adapted the ESM with endogenous tenure choice to examine a current 
policy question under debate in the US: Whether Mortgage Interest Deduction 
(MID) should be reformed.  Chapter 4 contributes to the MID debate by exploring a 
number of potential revenue equivalent policy reforms using an ESM with 
simultaneous rental and purchase markets and an endogenous tenure choice.  The 
model is extended by additionally endogenising local quality, such that the quality of 
each local jurisdiction is determined partly by its levels of homeownership and partly 
by local tax revenues collected from property taxes.  The public policy relevance of 
the model is demonstrated through a calibration exercise for Boston, Massachusetts, 
which explores the impacts of various reforms of MID.  The simulations confirm 
some of the arguments made about reforming MID but also demonstrate how the 
complex patterns of behavioural change induced by these reforms can lead to 
unanticipated effects.  For example, the simulations suggest that it may be possible 
to reform MID whilst maintaining the prevailing rates of homeownership and 
reducing the federal budget deficit.  The results also reiterate the conclusions of 
Chapter 3, namely that it is important to consider the interaction of policy design and 
the adjustment mechanisms at work in the property market, as these can alter the 
outcomes of policies that are designed to target specific groups. 
 
2.0 Future Directions 
 
This thesis presents a significant contribution to understanding and overcoming the 
challenges raised by spatial processes in the estimation of economic models and the 
evaluation of economic policy.  The research presented within the thesis contributes 
to the frontiers of the topic and in doing so both highlights the need and paves the 
way for many new avenues of research. 
 
In the context of estimation the thesis has made significant advances in developing a 
unified framework for conceptualising spatial data problems.  The derivation of 
concise identification conditions and subsequent illustration of these through the use 
of Monte Carlo simulations provides an accessible introduction to the use of semi-
parametric smoothing estimators for applied analysts.  In the future it would be 
interesting to complement this research with a more formal examination of the 
asymptotic properties of the LASSE.  It would also be of great benefit to see the 
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work extended to deal with discrete data so that spatial smoothing techniques could 
be integrated into Logit and Probit models for analysing discrete choices.  This 
would provide an opportunity to confront spatial data problems across a wider range 
of economic analyses, for example in the analysis of stated preferences through 
contingent valuation and choice experiments.  This would be particularly useful in 
the analysis of recreational demand models where there is an obvious and 
overwhelming potential for omitted spatial covariates. 
 
Similarly, the thesis presents the first applications of an ESM with an endogenous 
tenure choice.  This methodological development broadens the range of policies that 
ESMs can be implemented to analyse.  Through examining tenure choice and 
refining the housing supply function the model provides a useful tool for undertaking 
a general equilibrium analysis of policy change.  The simulations presented in this 
thesis are based on calibrated models, it is essential for future research to develop an 
estimation procedure that can be adopted for policy analysis and through doing so 
identify the necessary data requirements for undertaking general equilibrium welfare 
analysis within this framework.  In addition, I have focused on developing an 
endogenous tenure choice within the framework of the pure characteristics ESM 
developed by Epple and Platt (1998).  In the future I would be interested in 
examining the extension of this to the random utility based ESM developed by Bayer 
et al (2004).  This would also facilitate a transition from the homogeneous housing 
unit approach to a discrete treatment of housing.  Housing supply itself presents a 
fruitful and challenging avenue for future research.  In particular, the medium to long 
term housing supply function needs to be explored and the buy-to-let market could 
be integrated into the model to reflect housing supply decisions and the redistributive 
role of property ownership more accurately.  More broadly, this research is part of a 
wider body of work at the forefront of the equilibrium sorting literature.  As such, 
there are many developments taking place within this area, for example recent work 
has sought to explore moving costs (Bayer et al., 2009, Kuminoff, 2009), dynamics 
(Bayer et al., 2011), overlapping generations (Epple et al., 2010) and dual market 
models (Kuminoff, 2007, Kuminoff, 2009) which combine residential and labour 
decision making.  Bringing together the innovations developed in this thesis with 
those evolving in the wider literature would provide a way to examine a broader 
range of the complexities and realisms of the economic problem.    
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APPENDIX A 
5  
The Polegate Bypass: Comparing Partial and General Equilibrium 
Welfare Measures 
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In this Appendix, I present the results of a more sophisticated ESM analysis 
designed to replicate the Polegate bypass case study more closely. The model 
specification is developed so as to imitate the situation in Polegate prior to the 
construction of the bypass. The introduction of the bypass is then simulated using 
information from the Post Opening Project Evaluation A27 Polegate Bypass report 
(POPE).  As previously, results from both a partial equilibrium (PE) and general 
equilibrium (GE) ESM-based analysis are explored and contrasted.   
 
A1 The A27 Polegate Bypass 
 
Polegate is a small town in the East Sussex with 8,000 residents.  Prior to the bypass 
Polegate had in the region of 18,000 vehicles per day passing through on the B2247 
(Eastbourne News (19/06/2002)).  
 
Figure A1: Road Map of Polegate (source Map data @ Google 2012) 
 
Figure A1 provides a road map of Polegate.  In 2002 the A27 Polegate Bypass was 
opened providing an alternative route to the original A27 (now the B2247) through 
Polegate between the A22 Cophall Roundabout and Golden Jubilee Way.   A 
complete discussion of the objectives of the bypass and the project impacts is 
available in the POPE.  This analysis focuses on the impact that the introduction of 
the bypass had on road noise levels across neighbourhoods.  Under Part 1 of the 
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Land Compensation Act 1973, homeowners who were adversely affected by the 
change were able to claim compensation up to the value of the impact of the change 
on value of their properties.  This compensation is included in the model. 
 
A2 Calibrating the Model 
A2.1 The Economy 
 
Let us begin to develop a model of the Polegate area by dividing the area into 
neighbourhoods. Neighbourhoods are defined as areas within which the provision of 
local public goods is uniform.  There are a number of features that could be used to 
define neighbourhoods.  In this example I consider the age of the buildings in the 
area, the distance from Polegate town centre and the pre and post-bypass road noise 
exposure levels (provided in the Environmental Assessment Report).  Information on 
the location of properties from OS Mastermap and the age of properties provided 
through the LandMap service was combined with information on the spatial 
distribution of changes in noise levels from the A27 Polegate Environmental 
Statement and assigned to a map of individual properties using ArcGIS.  Property 
types were grouped into four categories.  The intersection of these property types 
with changes in road noise level leads to the identification of 7 distinct 
neighbourhoods.  The 7 neighbourhoods are displayed in the map in Figure A2.   
ArcGIS was then used to compute the average distance of properties within each 
neighbourhood to the centre of Polegate. 
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Figure A2: The 7 neighbourhoods identified by intersecting 
property type and road noise exposure before and after the 
bypass. 
 
Data on property prices and characteristics, supplied by the Land Registry and Edina, 
along with census information on homeownership rates were added to the GIS layer.  
These were used to compute neighbourhood statistics on population shares and 
homeownership rates, which formed the basis of the calibration procedure for the 
parameters of the distribution of preferences for homeownership,	ßå, :å<, and the 
unobserved neighbourhood specific local public goods,  . The data on property 
prices and characteristics were used to undertake a fixed effects hedonic regression 
to determine neighbourhood specific prices for a unit of homogeneous housing, . 
 
The remainder of the model is calibrated in an identical manner to the two-
neighbourhood models with rental revenue recycling that were discussed in the main 
body of this section.  For compactness the details are not repeated here, however, the 
calibrated parameter values are detailed in Table A1 below.  
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Variables Parameters Values 
Income and preference for 
housing 
&ßàáâ, ßÜ( Σàáâ,Ü 
9.83, 0.17 
5 2.72 −0.07−0.07 0.03 6 
Housing supply @- 
 7 
10S-2Ç-¶	2  
0.1 
Capacity  - 1.15 
Preference for local public 
goods 
Ð 0.11 
Local public goods index 
weights 
 0.02 
Preferences for 
homeownership 
ßå, :å< 	0.84, 0.02	  
 
Table A1: Parameters used in the calibration 
 
A3 Welfare Effects of the Bypass 
 
Taking the changes in noise levels predicted in the A27 Polegate Environmental 
Statement it was possible to replicate the environmental impact of the bypass.  Table 
A3 characterises the seven neighbourhoods after the introduction of the bypass, 
taking into account household relocation, rental revenue recycling, housing supply 
constraints and compensation received under the Part I of the Land Compensation 
Act 1973.   
 
For tractability it is prudent to separate our discussion of the results into three parts 
characterised by the direct environmental impact of the bypass.  To simplify the 
discussion let us divide the neighbourhoods into three groups: ‘town centre’, 
‘suburban’ and ‘bypass’.  First, in the town centre neighbourhoods (1, 2 and 3) road 
noise falls by 4 dB as traffic is diverted away from the B2247.  In these areas the 
environmental improvement leads to price increases as households with a relatively 
high preferences for environmental quality move there. Homeowners in these 
neighbourhoods enjoy capital gains while, in contrast, renters find these 
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neighbourhoods less affordable.  In fact, renters from town centre neighbourhoods 1 
and 3 migrate to neighbourhood 6 near the bypass.  The population movements are 
detailed in Table A4. 
 
Second, suburban neighbourhoods (4 and 5) are south of the B2247 and experience 
no change in environmental quality.  However, in the general equilibrium analysis 
they do experience changes in composition and price due to adjustments in the other 
neighbourhoods.  As a result of the quality increases in the town centre 
neighbourhoods, and lower prices in the bypass neighbourhoods (6 and 7, to be 
discussed subsequently), prices in the suburban neighbourhoods fall as households 
migrate to neighbourhoods 1 in the town centre, and 6 and 7 near the bypass.   
 
Third, bypass neighbourhoods (6 and 7) are located close to the new bypass and both 
experience an increase in road noise of 7dBs.  This reduction in environmental 
quality prompts a series of relocation choices with some households seeking out 
higher environmental quality in the town centre (neighbourhood 3) and others being 
drawn to lower prices in the suburban area (neighbourhood 4).  As housing demand 
contracts, prices in the bypass neighbourhoods fall.  This attracts new demand from 
households who spend a relatively large share of their income on housing and 
provides benefits, in the form of lower rental costs, to renters.   In addition, the 
payment of compensation provides large gains for owners. 
 
Tables A5a and A5b summarises the welfare changes that are anticipated by both the 
partial and general equilibrium analyses respectively.  The welfare changes include 
values for willingness to pay separated for renters and owners in each of the seven 
neighbourhoods.  First, let us consider the partial equilibrium values.  These are 
positive for renters and owners in the town centre neighbourhoods (1, 2 and 3), 
reflecting the environmental improvement, zero for households in the suburban 
neighbourhoods (4 and 5) since there is no change in the provision of local public 
goods here, and negative for households in the bypass neighbourhoods (6 and 7) who 
experience environmental degradation.  In contrast, the general equilibrium values 
show that overall, the average willingness to pay value is positive in every 
neighbourhood.  Moreover, for households initially located in the town centre 
neighbourhoods (1, 2 and 3) owners have higher average willingness to pay values 
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than renters.  In the suburban neighbourhoods (4 and 5) renters have higher average 
willingness to pay values than owners as a result of the benefits conveyed through 
falling rental prices.  In the bypass neighbourhoods (6 and 7), homeowners have very 
high willingness to pay values as a result of the benefits provided by compensation.  
Renters have moderately high values, again attributable to the substantial fall in 
rental prices. 
 
A4 Discussion 
 
The application of our ESM to the Polegate bypass demonstrates the flexibility of the 
framework and its suitability for analysing these sorts of policy questions.  The 
mechanics of the model have been discussed in detail in the main body of the 
section, here I focus upon the welfare changes induced by the A27 Polegate bypass 
and compare the key findings with those of the two-neighbourhood simulations.   
 
Let us begin with the magnitude of welfare changes.  As in the previous simulations, 
there is a large difference between the total willingness to pay values calculated 
using partial and general equilibrium analyses.  In fact, for the Polegate bypass the 
difference is even greater, a result driven by the fact that the magnitude of the 
environmental changes in this analysis is greater than those examined in the two-
neighbourhood simulations.  In the partial analysis the total willingness to pay is 
negative as a result of the large losses in environmental quality that fall directly upon 
households initially located near the bypass route.  The general equilibrium analysis 
sees these losses being avoided by households through relocation.  As in the two-
neighbourhood simulations environmental gentrification occurs with wealthier 
households from the suburbs relocating to the town centre and displacing poorer 
households, who in turn move to suburban or bypass neighbourhoods so as to benefit 
from lower property prices.   
 
Turning now to the distribution of welfare changes, Figure A3 plots the changes in 
cumulative shares of utility for the current analysis.  The pattern is, for the most part, 
equivalent to that presented in Figure 3.7 for the two-neighbourhood simulation.  
The partial analysis predicts a progressive re-distributional impact of the bypass with 
an increased share of total utility being provided to households with logged incomes 
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less than 400,000.  In contrast, under the general equilibrium analysis the policy has 
a small overall impact in terms of redistribution.  In addition, the pattern of 
redistribution is almost the mirror image to that predicted by the partial analysis with 
the cumulative share of total utility falling amongst lower income households.  
Interestingly, in this policy analysis the greatest gains in the share of utility accrue to 
medium-to-high income households.   
 
The results presented in this appendix demonstrate the application of the ESM with 
endogenous tenure choice to a policy analysis with several neighbourhoods.  While 
the adjustments that take place are more complex to follow when the number of 
neighbourhoods increases, the results reiterate and reinforce those of the two-
neighbourhood simulations.  Comparing the PE and GE analyses reveals important 
differences in both the magnitude and the distribution of welfare changes.  
Furthermore, accounting for tenure choice and medium term property market 
adjustments reveals substantial differences in the welfare effects experienced by 
renters and owners, as well as across socio-economic groups.  In conclusion, the 
partial equilibrium analysis provides misleading policy guidance.  Moreover, the 
opportunities for harnessing environmental policies as a tool for redistribution is 
complicated by the complex adjustments that take place in the property market and 
interact with the policy.  
 185
 
 Town Centre Suburban Bypass 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Price 4449 5976 4576 4581 4176 4584 4331 
Population Share 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.45 0.05 0.16 0.10 
Homeownership 
Rate 
0.83 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.77 0.91 0.79 
  
Renters Renters Renters Renters Renters Renters Renters Renters Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income 24,053 45,832 36,238 75,674 29,067 49,817 28,459 82,596 7,980 44,537 41,517 111,460 22,074 47,163 
Mean  0.39 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.35 0.35 0.22 0.21 0.63 0.61 0.08 0.08 0.47 0.46 
Mean í 1.01 1.12 1.00 1.11 1.00 1.12 1.00 1.11 1.02 1.13 1.00 1.11 1.02 1.13 
Mean housing 2.35 4.47 0.16 0.33 2.45 4.19 1.48 4.01 1.30 7.02 0.87 2.14 2.78 5.64 
Population 20 97 12 158 11 92 82 642 17 57 23 234 33 122 
 
Table A2: Calibrated 7 neighbourhood baseline with rental revenue recycling 
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 Town Centre Suburban Bypass 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Price 4509 6516 5081 4537 4047 4283 4032 
Population 
Share 
0.08 0.11 0.07 0.51 0.05 0.08 0.10 
Homeownership 
Rate 
0.73 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.77 0.66 0.79 
  
Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean Income 25,277 66,684 36,238 75,914 25,717 113,392 41,927 81,992 20,854 44,537 21,759 68,644 15,237 47,163 
Mean  0.25 0.39 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.45 0.61 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.46 
Mean í 1.01 1.12 1.00 1.11 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.11 1.02 1.13 1.01 1.12 1.02 1.13 
Mean housing 1.68 5.30 0.15 0.32 0.35 1.61 1.44 3.54 2.65 7.10 2.08 6.46 2.30 8.91 
Population 36 97 12 160 9 109 48 771 17 57 44 86 32 122 
 
Table A3:  Neighbourhood characteristics after the bypass with revenue recycling, linear housing supply and compensation  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners 
From 1 
Renters 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 
From 1 
Owners 
0 0 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
From 2 
Renters 
0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
From 2 
Owners 
0 0 0 0 158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
From 3 
Renters 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 
From 3 
Owners 
0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 83 0 0 
From 4 
Renters 
0 36 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 12 0 0 0 
From 4 
Owners 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 639 0 0 1 0 0 
From 5 
Renters 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 
From 5 
Owners 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
From 6 
Renters 
0 0 0 0 0 9 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
From 6 
Owners 
0 0 0 0 2 0 100 0 132 0 0 0 0 0 
From 7 
Renters 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 1 0 15 0 
From 7 
Owners 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 122 
 
Table A4: Population Movements 
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Town Centre Suburban Bypass 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean WTP PE (£) 255 489 314 657 283 485 0 0 0 0 -803 -2,147 -531 -1,135 
Total WTP PE (£) -469,200 
Average WTP PE (£) -293.25 
Total Compensation 861,250 
Change in rental 
revenues  
0 
Change in mortgage 
payments 
0 
 
Table A5: Partial equilibrium willingness to pay with rental revenue recycling, linear housing and compensation 
  
 189
 
 
 
 
Town Centre Suburban Bypass 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners Renters Owners 
Mean WTP GE (£) 238 619 246 770 260 2,195 113 98 175 41 128 5607 314 657 
Total WTP GE (£) 4,593,600 
Average WTP GE (£) 2,871 
Change in rental 
revenues 
860 
Change in mortgage 
Payments 
38,580 
Total Compensation 861,250 
Net Benefits 3,771,790 
 
Table A5b: General equilibrium willingness to pay with rental revenue recycling, linear housing and compensation 
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Figure A3a 
 
Figure A3b 
Figure A3: The distribution of changes in the cumulative share of total utility 
by income in the partial and general equilibrium analyses.  The bottom panel 
displays the general equilibrium plot at a finer scale. 
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